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ABSTRACT

Taryn M Sweeney

AESTHESIS UNIVERSALIS: RECONCILING AESTHETIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE
CARTESIAN PARDIGM

The Cartesian paradigm, in its modern existence, can be understood as comprised of four
pillars—the founding principle of cogito ergo sum, dualism, a mechanistic worldview, and
mathesis universalis. Each of these four pillars contributes to aesthetic philosophy in
foundational ways that are largely unacknowledged. This error is owed to literal readings of
Descartes’ works that neglect the operational intentions of his paradigm. When one approaches
the Cartesian paradigm operationally, it is revealed that aesthetic philosophy owes a tremendous
debt to Descartes’ works. Moreover, modern philosophers have dedicated substantial efforts to
connecting subjective concepts such as mood and sensation to Descartes’ paradigm. These
connections, which all rely on literal readings of the paradigm, are often tenuous and depend
heavily on large extrapolation from small notations. However a broader reading of Descartes’
model of the soul reveals a unique niche for subjective expression which provides a distinct role
for aesthetic considerations in his epistemology. Revelatory knowledge—knowledge of a
nonscientific nature that reveals things as they are—need not be marginalized from mathesis
universalis. What is more, it is revealed that aesthetic philosophy is one of the largest
contributors to the overall project of mathesis universalis in modernity. This contribution is
based on the act of poiesis—a form of knowledge-making that is grossly overlooked as an
epistemological process. A series of paintings by Joseph Wright of Derby provide a case study
of how revelatory knowledge can be integrated with, and inform, the Cartesian paradigm.
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Concepts of modernity by Hans Blumenberg illuminate the need for understanding revelatory
knowledge as integral to mathesis universalis by imaging the pillar as an evolving mechanism of
human construction. In conclusion, a discussion of the parallels between aesthetics and other
marginalized epistemic sources (women, artists, and fiction) reveal consonant efforts to reshape
mathesis universalis as more inclusive of revelatory knowledge.
Keywords: Descartes, Epistemology, Joseph Wright of Derby, Cartesian paradigm, Sources of
Knowledge
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INTRODUCTION

Modernity is a game played upon the gridded chessboard of the Cartesian paradigm. This
paradigm is four-pillared, consisting of a mechanistic world-view, mind/body dualism, the
guiding principle of the Cogito, and (the most fascinating of all) the concept of mathesis
universalis. While Descartes himself may have laid out more pillars than these, these four have
survived the scrutiny and criticisms of the philosophers who have followed.
I present these four pillars as immoveable forces in Western philosophy, and as such a
significant area of inquiry for any practicing philosophy scholar. What I will maintain throughout
is that the exclusion of aesthetics from the paradigm is not fundamental to the operations of the
four pillars. None of them necessarily requires an exclusion of concepts germane to aesthetics to
continue their project of universal epistemology. What is more, I will argue that aesthetics, as a
branch of formal philosophy, is based upon these four pillars.
In Chapter 1, I will present these pillars and discuss how they are integral to the
development of contemporary aesthetics, despite their perceived opposition to qualitative
concepts. This chapter explains these four pillars in the context not just of the Cartesian
paradigm, but also in the context of their relation to aesthetic discourse. I begin in this way not
only as a means reviewing primary Cartesian texts, but also to underscore how much these four
pillars are still relevant today. It is true that each pillar has received renovations over time, some
prompted by post-modern sensibilities regarding mind-body dualism. Other changes are spurred
by expanding notions of what universal epistemology must entail –gender and cultural diversity,
for example.
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In Chapter 2, I will present several different approaches to reconcile aesthetics to
Descartes, which I see as having various degrees of success and completeness.
In Chapter 3, I will thoroughly investigate Descartes’ model of the soul. I will
demonstrate his synthesis of Platonic and Aristotelian ideas, as well as discussing the
incompleteness of the Cartesian model of the soul in terms of its lack of attention to personal
expression.
It is my intention with these first three chapters to present the Cartesian paradigm in a
new light. Rather than approaching it as Descartes would have seen it on his own terms, I present
it as the underlying platform of subsequent Western philosophy. Whereas Alfred North
Whitehead remarked that all philosophy is a footnote to Plato, I think it more accurate to say that
all modern Western philosophy is an addendum to Descartes. Though many philosophers have
moved to reject Descartes, one cannot fully excise the Cartesian paradigm from the Western
consciousness. Its four pillars (the four aspects that integrally form those aspects of the paradigm
that persist in our contemporary time) are still operationally identical to how Descartes had
intended them despite numerous renovations.
In Chapter 4, I will present the work of Martin Heidegger, the greatest opponent to
Descartes, in order to demonstrate that the most researched of critiques of the Cartesian
paradigm cannot escape his influence. I will then sketch a history of universalized systems of
knowledge beginning with Descartes, moving through Gottfried Leibnitz, on to Gottlob Frege,
and concluding with Ludwig Wittgenstein. This history will serve as evidence of the evolution
of mathesis universalis since Descartes’ original conception of the pillar.
Of the four pillars, this dissertation focuses most upon that of mathesis universalis: the
fully encompassing schema of knowledge that Descartes postulates. Our understanding of
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mathesis universalis, indeed of all universalized-epistemic paradigms, is enriched when we
properly understand the continual marginalization of aesthetics as un-necessary. Though
Descartes’ exclusion of aesthetics from the realm of true knowledge has been influential in
formal philosophy, there are works of art that integrate aesthetic modes of perceiving into those
modes of knowledge indebted to Descartes. An examination of an artist (Joseph Wright of
Derby) whose work pursues such an integrated project, as we shall explore in Chapter 5, shows
that aesthetic/artistic dialogue with the concept of mathesis universalis is possible, though
examples of it have rarely been recognized. Wright’s paintings, as seen in the fourth chapter, will
demonstrate how aesthetic practices may enrich articulation of the four pillars of the Cartesian
paradigm.
In Chapter 6, I will briefly sketch the work of Hans Blumenberg, showing how his ideas
about modernity shed light on how the pillar of mathesis universalis might be modified to
include ideas of human evolution—ideas that profoundly impact mathesis universalis. I will next
examine paintings by Baroque painter Diego Velasquez in terms of their epistemic connotations,
revealing possible visual dialogue with the Cartesian paradigm. Concluding with an avenue for
further research, I will discuss two contemporary authors, Urusla K Le Guin and Neil Gaimon,
and how their respective works bring to light extra-Cartesian aspects of mathesis universalis.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction
In this chapter, I will describe the four pillars of the Cartesian paradigm as integral to one
another, and as foundational to modern Western discourse. What is revealed by this analysis is
the enormity of the debt aesthetics (as a branch of formal philosophy) owes to the four pillars of
the Cartesian paradigm. This demonstration should dispel any doubts as to the “compatibility” of
aesthetics and the Cartesian paradigm. I will next show how in the articulation of each of these
four pillars there are implicit references to aesthetic ideas, though Descartes’ program itself
unnecessarily marginalizes aesthetic concepts. In doing so it betrays its own aesthetic
underpinnings. I will then describe the constitution of an aesthetic program as we, since the
eighteenth century, have come to understand the term. In this description I will reveal how later
articulations of aesthetics implicitly build upon Descartes’ pillars. This description will reveal a
relationship between the Cartesian paradigm and aesthetics that Descartes did not anticipate. I
will then briefly discuss the two primary texts by Descartes that were aimed at fully
encompassing epistemology and the methodology for inquiry. Through this we may see
Descartes’ initial vision was to provide a program for objective inquiry. His methodology was
soon adapted to explore the subjective experience in taking in external knowledge. Finally, I will
conclude with an anticipation of the deeper conversation in Chapter 4 wherein I argue that works
of art interested in aesthetics and in the Cartesian paradigm may provide us insight into implicit
undeveloped connections between Descartes’ model of knowledge and aesthetic modes of
knowledge.
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The Question of Need
I will argue that Descartes errs in omitting the arts and aesthetics from his paradigm. This
omission has been taken as fundamental to his methodology, and upheld by those who have
followed in his tradition, as no one has yet to suggest that an implied aesthetic program could be
drawn from the Cartesian paradigm. This dissertation will endeavor to do so and thus open
possible doorways for the establishment of an implied Cartesian aesthetic program.
Many Western philosophers treat art as something special making it an “other” to various
fields of study. It is worth examining why that separation is so prevalent. While some might
argue that this tendency stems from Plato, the true source of art’s peculiar status over the past
four hundred years may be found in the tenets of the Cartesian paradigm. However, I find the
basis of this exclusion to be widely misunderstood and the power of the arguments leading to it
to be erroneous.
This chapter introduces the Cartesian paradigm and then establishes what exactly
constitutes an aesthetic program. Primary evidence from Descartes’ own writings establish
opportunities for an implied Cartesian program of aesthetics. Secondary literature on Descartes
also suggest opportunities for developing aesthetic notions relevant to Descartes’ thought. To be
clear, Descartes himself provided few specific remarks concerning aesthetic concepts and did not
foresee that his epistemological paradigm could include subjective and aesthetic knowledge. I
am making the case that the establishment of an implied Cartesian aesthetic program is a
legitimate pursuit as it enriches our understanding of the reaches of both aesthetics and of the
Cartesian paradigm.
The next sections inquire into the wider context of the individual pillars and how they
have been discussed by subsequent literature. I will show that the broader conversation of the
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Cartesian tradition brings to the fore aesthetic concepts such as beauty, mimesis, and quality.
While that does not in itself answer the question “Is there a need to establish a place for
aesthetics in the Cartesian paradigm?” it does at least open up the possibility for a sound implied
Cartesian aesthetic program.
Throughout this dissertation I will use the term operational in contrast to the term literal.
Rather than interpreting Descartes’ paradigm solely through his own explicit writing (the literal
approach), I intend to evaluate his paradigm by the broader operations of the four pillars as they
exist today (the operational approach). This is not to say we should dismiss, or even circumvent,
his original words. On the contrary, the next chapter is dedicated to an in-depth examination of
his works that are germane to the topics at hand. However, to conduct philosophical discourse
that relies solely or heavily on the mere words of a master perpetuates an academic kind of
fundamentalism that yields little progress and prevents one from applying important ideas from
one era to the next. We must give more weight to the practices and schemas developed from a
philosopher’s work if we are to truly enrich our contemporary philosophic endeavors. In Chapter
2, I will more fully flesh out the importance of an operational approach.

The Cartesian Paradigm: The Four Pillars
As the phrase “Cartesian paradigm” could conceivably refer to many aspects of his
original philosophy, it behooves me to explain what I refer to specifically. There are four pillars
of the Cartesian paradigm: the mechanistic worldview, the cogito, mind-body dualism, and
mathesis universalis. Without each of these pillars, the entire paradigm collapses. Descartes
intended his paradigm to be a means of situating the subjective, thinking self in an objective
world and therefore it encompasses both objective and subjective frames. It begins with the

7
subjective assertion that one exists, and next moves to determining the boundaries of the self in
an objective world. The thinking being is then compelled to make order of the world it inhabits.
Taken in this way the integral nature of the paradigm becomes evident. In order for the rational,
thinking being to accept that she is not being deceived by the representations of objects presented
to her, she must accept the foundational propositions that she exists and that the world has a
somewhat fixed order. She must be able to engage in a cognitive process that fully divides what
is of herself from those representations in her mind that are not of herself. She must understand
that in separating herself from the world she is taking on a cognitive heuristic endeavor and not
physically separating herself from nature. And she must understand knowledge to be
discoverable, but not as created by humans. In these next sections I will approach each of these
pillars in depth and demonstrate how in each one there is an implicit doorway to aesthetic
discourse that has yet to be fully developed.

The Cogito as Performance and Peacemaker
The proposition “cogito ergo sum” (often abbreviated as the cogito) is perhaps the most
influential statement in the history of Western thought. I will argue against reading the cogito
simply as a proposition. The term cogito as I will use it in this dissertation can be understood as
the result of a performative meditation that has three related modalities:
1.) The proposition itself
2.) The meditation that allowed Descartes to logically arrive at his views of the
conscious-self
3.) A ritual of decorum that is offered to fellow scientists/philosophers as a two-part tool
of peacemaking within the then-chaotic field of natural philosophy
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As stated above, when approaching philosophic discourse operationally it is essential that the
practices and schemas that develop from a particular stance are kept in focus. This requires an
understanding of ideas beyond their literal expression. In the passages that follow I will show
how this expanded definition of the cogito operationally establishes a foundational link between
aesthetics and the Cartesian paradigm.
Explicitly written in Discourse on Method (1637) and then referred to in Descartes’ other
philosophical texts, the statement of the cogito is typically paired with musings on the discomfort
one would feel knowing that a thinking thing does not exist while it thinks.
While we thus reject all of which we can entertain the smallest doubt, and even
imagine that it is false, we easily indeed suppose that there is neither God, nor
sky, nor bodies, and that we ourselves even have neither hands nor feet, nor,
finally, a body; but we cannot in the same way suppose that we are not while we
doubt of the truth of these things; for there is a repugnance in conceiving that
what thinks does not exist at the very time when it thinks. Accordingly, the
knowledge, I think, therefore I am, is the first and most certain that occurs to one
who philosophizes orderly. (Principles 10)
This passage is significant as it stresses a qualitative need for calm. It sets the need for the mind
to purge itself of toxic effects in order to purse objective inquiry. If the mind is discomfited, it
cannot proceed clearly and rationally. What Descartes leaves unsaid is that a qualitatively
defined calm constitutes the prerequisite upon which scientific inquiry may proceed. Descartes
acknowledges that the mind must be calm to perceive what is clear and distinct. What he fails to
emphasize is the process by which this calm is achieved and how this calmness must be
understood by both reason and the senses for thought to continue. It is precisely this linking of
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reason and the senses that provides the strongest evidence for an aesthetic precondition to the
Cartesian paradigm. All three aspects of the cogito (the statement, the meditation, and the ritual)
are governed by the intention of calming the mind in a manner that is aesthetically pleasing.
Reason may then proceed unfettered by the angst created by certain traditional metaphysical
inquiries.1
If we understand the cogito in these three related modalities, then we understand the
therapeutic affective consequences of this statement for the individual. To see the cogito as the
conclusion of an introspective meditation is an easy first step. Descartes’ process of hyperbolic
doubt leads him to the cogito as a foundational epistemological kernel that all other knowledge
may proceed from. But intrinsic in the writing of the mediation, there is also the expectation that
the reader as a fellow philosopher will proceed through the same process on her own. When the
reader arrives at this conclusion, she will enjoy a stable affectual state, Descartes believes. Being
in this affectual state her reason may proceed unfettered by the types of metaphysical doubt that
Descartes finds improper, outmoded, and purposeless for scientific inquiry. As others in the
philosophic/scientific community read and reenact this performance, they enter a social contract
of sorts that is bound by the foundational tenet of the cogito and affectual conditioning that it
provides. Descartes is, simply put, providing a schema that operates on principles of decorum for
fellow members of the philosophic/scientific community. They will be able to pursue reason
from an affectual baseline of comfort. He has provided a model of appropriateness, or decorum,
for one’s further participation as a peer in the community of philosophers, having set the
aesthetic precedent for the staging of clear and distinct communication.
The metaphysical security that arriving at the statement of “cogito ergo sum” permits
serves a second purpose beyond initial calm that is more relevant to Descartes’ time. It is also
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relevant in addressing the anxieties and uncertainty aroused by religious dispute in Descartes’
time. Coming to see for oneself and to feel for oneself that cogito ergo sum is true, provides
existential calm without any necessary reference to a specific version of god. This would be
important for Descartes as different ideas of god were extremely divisive, to the point of creating
decades-long civil wars. Entire books have been devoted to explicating Descartes’ ontological
argument2 and exploring its significance to the sciences and subsequent Western philosophy.
There is no need to rehearse that here. It is sufficient to note that Descartes’ argument (found in
the third and fifth Meditations, as well as in Principles) boils down to the claim that certainty of
existence springs from a clear and distinct idea of a non-deceiving God. Having shown the
thinking being how to “solve” the issue of the existence of God, Descartes believes that his
readers would then be free to study objects of the natural world. This is the second type of calm
delivered by the cogito—a reprieve from the onus of pinpointing the metaphysical source and
direction of our existence. This has the overall effect of allowing peers of the scientific world
divided by religious difference to embrace a shared perspective on metaphysics or the procedures
necessary for inquiry. For Descartes, it is simply enough to state that God does exist and that he
does not deceive us. This second form of calm is more historical in nature and has less
connection to the aesthetic conversation at hand, but it is relevant to remark that Descartes’ aim
with the cogito was no mere performance of introspection, and that his hopes of creating
common, calm grounds for his peers can be easily grasped.3 Having established two of
Descartes’ aims for Meditations, we now turn to an evaluation of the cogito as a decorous
performance.
The idea of the cogito as performance originated with Finnish philosopher Jaakko
Hintikka in his 1962 article Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance? In the discussion
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below I expand Hintikka’s argument to develop a broader grasp of the operational effects of the
cogito. I will argue that Descartes’ intentions are to establish criteria of decorum (properness) as
essential for rational thinking. Hintikka’s own work ends at the idea of the cogito as a
performance, but he fails to address the intention and repercussions of the performance. I will
extend Hintikka’s argument by examining the intended audience for the cogito and what the
implications are for that audience. Rules and Meditations both contain an implicit appeal to
others in his profession to reproduce his meditation for themselves in order to achieve a proper
initial state for reason to work from. If we combine this appeal with Hintikka’s suggested reading
of the cogito as performance, the cogito now becomes a ritual of decorum.
Hintikka opens his essay with an examination of the label of “dictum” that has
traditionally been assigned to the Cogito. Dictums are generally statements pronounced by some
authoritative figure declaring a directive or governing law. Hintikka’s aim is to look beyond the
cogito as a pronouncement made for the benefit of oneself or one’s cognitive process. He views
it as a statement given to a broader audience of inquirers. While reading the cogito as a dictum
does not preclude Descartes’ fellow natural philosophers from our understanding of the
statement, it supports the idea that Descartes might have stated the cogito as an authoritative end
to the question of one’s own existence—a commanding voice speaking to lesser thinkers. Yet if a
dictum is what Descartes intended, Hintikka asks, then why lead the reader through the
meditation that arrives at the cogito at all? His answer is because the writing clarifies Descartes’
own thoughts for himself:
In a special case a self-defeating attempt of this kind can be made without saying
or writing anything or doing anything comparable. In trying to make others
believe something I must normally do something which can be heard or seen or
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felt. But in trying to make myself believe something there is no need to say
anything aloud or to write anything on paper. The performance through which
existential inconsistency arises can in this case be merely an attempt to thinkmore accurately, an attempt to make oneself believe-that one does not exist.
(Hintikka 12)
Hintikka writes his observations of the cogito as if to declare solipsistic intentions on
behalf of Descartes. However, if one understands the cogito as delivering a therapeutic calm to
the thinking being, as well as having the intention of improving future performances of rational
meditation, then any accusations of solipsism can be rendered moot as both of those intentions
require participation from others. The cogito is directed not solely towards Descartes, but to all
those participating as peers in the scientific community. Meditations and Discourse on Method
constitute scripts from which those community members are invited to re-enact those same
cognitive processes. Hintikka’s evaluation of the cogito-as-performance does not go beyond the
terms of an introspective act that clarifies one’s own conclusions. I expand this evaluation so that
we may consider the intended audience of the cogito. It must be recalled that the broader aim of
Descartes’ philosophical texts was to draw order to a chaotic community. This is evidenced in
the introductions to both Rules for the Direction of the Mind4 and Discourse on Method.5
Descartes calls upon a community to compose their inquiries and their communications in such a
way that offers the most clarity and distinction. In short these texts—works that Descartes
explicitly intended for setting criteria for scientific inquiry—also direct one on how to properly
(or decorously) set the stage for reason and logical communication between thinkers.
The idea of decorum needs clarification for a proper understanding of my expansion
of Hintikka’s ideas. Decorum is a concept of appropriateness whose importance for aesthetics is
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underscored in Aristotle’s Poetics and Horace’s Ars Poetica. The idea of decorum presupposes a
common sense of good taste among members of society. Judgements that some things are
appropriate and that others are not in given situations are also encompassed by decorum.
Theatrical decorum is of particular interest to our discussion as it relates to the idea of properly
“setting the stage.” The classic examples of theatrical decorum typically reference consistency
with what one would find natural and agreeable.6 Horace, for example, warns against the
assigning of the part of an old man to a young boy.7 He urges poets to keep their audience in
mind at all times, and advises them to “invent consistently.” Connecting Descartes to theatrical
concepts is not difficult as his own writings often reference the theater of the mind and state that
the performance of reason occurs within the theater of the mind. At the very beginning of his
philosophy Descartes is relying on a notion that is deeply embedded in a concept relevant to
classical theater that was experiencing a revival during his lifetime. A resurgence of interest in
classical ideas of decorum marked much of the literature and theater during the mid-seventeenth
century. A particular emphasis of the concept’s theatrical tradition is placed on what actions are
suitable for center stage. That is to say, that there is not a restriction on what action and
movements can occur. It is that there should be a mindfulness about what actions are shown and
communicated centrally to the audience.
Aesthetically speaking, decorum is rooted in the same idea of repugnance that Descartes
mentions in Meditations. One finds displeasure when something is out of the bounds of
appropriateness. For example, it is a breach of theatrical decorum if a stately character speaks or
behaves as a lowly character would. One would be off-put, or repelled by the impropriety. This
parallels the repugnance of a breach of clarity or distinction for one’s reason. By using the word
repugnance, Descartes implies that if we see someone thinking “I am thinking,” but does not
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follow it with “I am,” the same sense of repugnance is produced. Descartes’ own intentions with
the cogito echo that of theatrical decorum. It should be understood that this sense of decorum
was not to hinder or even direct the free play of cognition as a free and willful agent. Rather it
places emphasis on directing one’s inquiries towards what can be clearly and distinctly
communicated to fellow natural philosophers so that this sense of displeasure can be avoided.
The emphasis is on the clarity and distinction (both qualitative concepts) of that which is
performed on the properly set stage of discourse.
Descartes introduces a social concern for the individual thinker. In order to properly
situate a performance, one must avoid that which could potentially produce repugnance. The
individual thinker must be able to clearly follow her own processes when arriving at conclusions
and propositions. This is not only to avoid this repugnance for herself, but to avoid producing it
for others. In essence, one knows a proposition or conclusion makes sense for you when you can
imagine it will make sense for others. Descartes’ notion of the subjective is more social than it is
given credit for. Descartes is usually associated with subjective individualism, but in this reading
of the cogito it is clear that while the individual may be isolated in the theater of the mind, the
performances of reason must be set forth in such a way that may be reproduced decorously for
the reason of others.
The social aspects of the cogito as an aesthetically grounded performance that is intended
to unite a community of peers are visually imagined by Joseph Wright of Derby’s 8Science
Paintings. Works of art that are interested in Cartesian discourse, such as Wright’s, manage to
connect Descartes’ mode of epistemology with other, more directly aesthetic modes of
knowledge. As we shall discuss in depth in Chapter 4, Wright’s paintings placed scientists in a
community of peers and non-peers (those who are more spectator or witness to scientific
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practice). Wright adds to the political discourse of science by including the presence of those
whom, during his time, would not readily have been understood as “contributors” to the
scientific discussion. In each of the six Science paintings Wright includes those who are
observing the work at hand, and yet not immediately participating. In doing so Wright is drawing
attention to the fact that the scientific community is itself a specialized part of a larger, stratified,
society. Simply put, he visually notes that there are those who are clearly included in the
conversation, as well as those who merely observe the conversation.
Descartes presents the cogito as the result of performative meditation given to a
community of rational minds that must communicate with each other within the bounds of this
foundational tenet—a tenet normalized by the ritualized meditation upon the implication of
hyperbolic doubt that others in the community are invited to perform for themselves. There is an
implicit reference to aesthetics underlying the project of establishing the proper foundations for
scientific discourse. This foundation of the cogito serves to secure the limits of inquiry and
conversation, and thus preliminarily to establish the appropriate “taste” of discourse. Descartes
has established a rule that it is distasteful (recall his own use of the world repugnant from above)
to think that a subject could think without also recognizing that it existed. To do so is not
impossible, but is outside the bounds of good form.
However with this exercise of working through that which is doubtful, Descartes
implicitly marginalizes aesthetics in a manner that belies its important role in his own processes.
Ironically, most of the later articulations of aesthetics implicitly build upon Descartes’ pillars,
revealing a relationship between Cartesianism and aesthetics that he did not anticipate. From the
unified starting point of the cogito, Descartes asks the next question: Now that you know that
you exist, what is of you and what is not of you? The imperative to distinguish what is of oneself
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(including biases, affects, prescribed and ascribed conditions, etc.) allows one to determine the
borders between oneself and the natural world, and more importantly, how one’s own cognition
can influence our understanding of the natural world.

Dualism as a Practical Concept
Dualism is the most contentious of the four pillars and has received the most renovations
since Descartes’ time. In this respect, the advantages of an operational approach to the Cartesian
paradigm are the most evident. I make the argument that mind body dualism is operationally
about determining what is of oneself and what is not of oneself. Dualism, as it exists today, is a
cognitive practice predicated on the principle established in the first pillar, that of the cogito.
Paired together, dualism and the cogito encompass the subjective aspects of the Cartesian
paradigm. With the cogito, the thinker has been placed within the theater of the mind and
existence (metaphysical and physical) has been confirmed. Dualism then allows the thinker to
establish the boundaries between herself and the world around her. What is more is that dualism
allows the thinker to identify the various lenses (biases) that color her perspectives on truth. The
identification, study, and expression of those lenses have led to an entirely new approach to the
search for truth—subjective philosophy. Subjective philosophy is most often portrayed as
oppositional to Cartesian philosophy. Fleshing out dualism, and Descartes’ intentions for
dualism, helps to clarify why the influence of this pillar is particularly deep and (perhaps
surprisingly) continues today.
Dualism is first described in the Sixth Meditation, and sketched out further in Passions of
the Soul (1649) and in the lesser-known anatomical sketch, The Description of the Human Body
(1647). Descartes’ body-as-sensing-machine concept allows for a clear divide between thinking
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and physical being. In both the rational realm and the physical realm there are objects that are
presented to the thinker. Those objects are divided into two categories: res cogitans and res
extensa (things of the cognition and things of the senses). This split is what determines what is
clear and certain. In a practical stance that has been adopted by most philosophers working from
the Cartesian paradigm, the tacit rule is as follows: If an object is determined to be of res
cogitans it is considered truer than objects of res extensa, as the senses are the source of frequent
deception and confusion. Working from this principle, most philosophers following the Cartesian
tradition favor “objective” pursuits— the fields of physics, mathematics, and biology, as
examples, tend to be those most readily associated with the Cartesian paradigm. What has been
left unsaid in Western philosophy, until now, is that the search for objective truth via this process
of divorcing subject and object, constitutes the very process by which Western philosophy has
identified subjective truths.
The function of dualism parallels the function of the object/subject divide by the means
of defining what could influence or deceive one’s reason. Descartes’ goal with dualism was to
eliminate the lenses of subjectivity so that one may clearly and distinctly see what was objective.
However, in order to eliminate the lenses, one must first identify and understand them. The
process of identifying the various lenses has blossomed into what is known today as the broader
philosophical concept of subjectivity. Subjective discourse focuses more on those lenses that are
so deeply ingrained that they may not even be eliminated, only understood.
Moreover, the study of subjectivity and its functions, limitations, and circumstances are
the basis of nearly every modern school of aesthetic philosophy. In a later section of this chapter,
we will delve deeper into the connections between subjectivity and aesthetic discourse. But in
brief, aesthetic and artistic movements such as post-colonialism, feminist art, and modernism all
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are predicated on the practice of sorting out what is objectively true and what is subjectively true.
Kant’s views on the sensus communus, for example, identify the aesthetic lens of common taste
and allow one to examine the functions and effects of the social codification of taste. Kant is one
(arguably the first after Descartes) among many in a network of philosophers working to hone in
on particular aspect of human existence so that they may better differentiate between objective
and subjective truths. As a more contemporary example, let us recall Judith Butler whose work
aims to dislodge gender from an objective, biological pigeonhole and to investigate the aesthetic
performances that convey gender. Both Kant and Butler’s discourses work operationally in
accordance with Descartes’ intentions for dualism. While the underlying principles of dualism
and subjectivity are different—one is a physically-based schema that aids in cognition, the other
is an epistemological categorization—they can be understood as serving the same function in our
times. This operational parallelism answers the question as to why dualism would be considered
a pillar at all. If the literal meaning has been debunked and an entirely new term (subjectivity)
has replaced it, then why include dualism in the four pillars? Simply put, it is because the spirit
of what Descartes intended with dualism—to identify what is of oneself and what is not of
oneself—is still today the driving principle of so much of Western philosophy, particularly that
of aesthetics.
It must be stated that my intention is not to revive Descartes’ ontological or scientific
arguments regarding dualism. Descartes intended mind/body dualism in the most literal sense.
He truly believed the thinking being to be completely independent from her physical body. In our
time, the field of neuroscience has debunked this reading of dualism. The overwhelming
evidence supports mind and body as connected in ways that are still largely beyond our
understanding. Yet when we approach dualism operationally, we find that Descartes’ concept of
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the mind (both brain and mental function) as the seat of the individual has not waivered over
time. The overall concept remains the same in both anatomical and philosophical discourse. Nor
have we abandoned the stripping away of subjective lenses from our data gathering processes.
What has largely been eschewed since Descartes’ time is the idea that the workings of the body
and emotions cannot or do not inform reason, particularly the workings of sensation. While
scientists still do not equate sensation with “truth”—that is to say sensation is still known to be
deceptive—they do now understand that sensations, particularly strong aesthetic sensations, are
linked to much more than Descartes anticipated. Antonio Damasio elegantly crystalizes the
modern take on Descartes’ views:
This is Descartes' error: the abyssal separation between body and mind, between
the sizable, dimensioned, mechanically operated, infinitely divisible body stuff,
on the one hand, and the unsizable, undimensioned, un-pushpullable, nondivisible
mind stuff; the suggestion that reasoning, and moral judgment, and the suffering
that comes from physical pain or emotional upheaval might exist separately from
the body. Specifically: the separation of the most refined operations of mind from
the structure and operation of a biological organism. (249-50)
Aside from Damasio’s biologically driven study of the brain’s mechanism for reason
versus emotions, G. Gabrielle Starr, in her recent book, Feeling Beauty: the Neuroscience of
Aesthetics, addresses where the worlds of philosophy, epistemology, and neuroscience collide in
reference to aesthetics. The newest imaging research shows evidence that the same portions of
the brain that are active when new information is introduced via reading or other cognitive
methods, are also active when a strong aesthetic experience is presented to the brain. Her
research is conducted on the premise that the anatomical means of cognition (neuro-electrical
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activity) and the “willful” or psychological means of cognition (the directives of the thinking
self) are still to be separately observed, but are indeed tied together by various means. This
separate understanding of the activities of the mind and brain is the next incarnation of
mind/body dualism. Dualism encompasses multiple ideas such as the object/subjectivity, as well
as the schematic (if not literal) separation of the mental functions and physical functions of the
brain. As such it is still a useful means of contextualizing the discussions at hand.

Mechanistic World View
The cogito and dualism pair together, both as guiding principles and practical stances that
establish a paradigm of the self. Descartes also established a second pair of pillars that
schematize the objective world—specifically the objective world as observed by thinking beings.
The guiding principle regarding objective truths is Descartes’ idea that the world is structured
like a machine. Descartes believed that all matter was interactively correlated, like cogs in a
clock-work mechanism. The whole of this mechanism comprises the natural world. All matter,
including the matter of the human body behaves in accordance to purpose and physical law,
according to the mechanistic worldview.

21
More than a view of the natural world, Descartes’ mechanistic worldview pertains to the
human body and its experiences as well. In Treatise on Man, Descartes describes his views of the
body: “I make the supposition that the body is nothing else but a statue or earthen machine, that
God has willed to form entire, in order to make it as similar to us as is possible” (Treatise 1)
Describing the various organs of the body as pumps, furnaces, etc. Descartes removes any
mysticism associated with the body—a move that put him squarely at odds with Aristotelean
schematics of human physiology. From this vantage point of the body as machine, the thinking
being is able to materially, rather than spiritually, investigate human biology. This same
viewpoint holds for the whole of the natural world, giving reason an initial means of
understanding phenomena.
The mechanistic worldview is very much alive, as the sciences to this day approach
research from statistical and mathematical standpoints. Interest in identifying patterns of
occurrence, cyclical trends, likelihood of events, etc. are all contingent upon a mechanistic
worldview that can be approached, understood, communicated, and codified by the rational
mind. Descartes’ developed the “apparatus concept” of mathesis universalis as a means of setting
down this system of epistemology. In the grand history of epistemic scholarship, no other system
for inquiry and conclusion has ever been so successful. Philosophically, the mechanistic
worldview has received criticism in terms of the limitations of what can be called a mechanism.
Questions as to whether a mechanism can evolve beyond its original purpose or design also arise.
These criticisms, often paired with ethical questions about human will or the definitions of
artificial intelligence, may be seen as prescient in light of how much science and technology
today push the bounds of automation9, as well as human existence10. These questions, however,
do not negate the mechanistic worldview. They instead expand upon it. As such, the mechanistic
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worldview is overall the most prevalent and most useful contemporary means of enframing the
world around us.
Descartes’ mechanistic worldview has a practical value in relation to inquiries of the
mind. It directs one’s attentions towards metaphysics and physics (the most mechanistic and
mathematically-compatible of the sciences). The preliminary understanding of the world as a
mechanism makes attending to the mechanical (physical and functional) aspects of the object at
hand an easy first step. If one can gain even a rudimentary understanding of physics and
mathematics, then inquiry into further studies may be pursued with a “roadmap” of sorts in
place. The thinker can then proceed from what is physical or material onwards to other
characteristics such as function or causality. This has the effect of reinforcing the Cartesian “tree
of knowledge” (discussed below in the section on mathesis universalis) as the most valid and
accessible approach to understanding the world. In this epistemological schematic, Descartes
posits that once knowledge of metaphysics and physics were solidified, knowledge of all other
areas of life would then be made readily available to res cogitan. As stated in the above section
on dualism, objects of res cogitan are deemed by Descartes as more true than other objects.
A simple case can be made that this particular pillar of the paradigm need not exclude
aesthetics and the arts from its purview: If the world is mechanistic in nature, and aesthetics and
the arts are a part of this world, then they can be understood. The “can” of this last statement was
quickly developed into “should” by Kant. His argument, simply put, is that it behooves the
thinker to understand any objects that it can identify, and that those objects may most usefully be
understood in terms of purpose in the mechanistic world. For Kant, what “can” be done “should”
be done not because it is a moral obligation, but because it is fruitful, useful, and conducive to
reason. To see “purposiveness” (Zweckmaßigkeit) in the natural world is illuminating or

23
congenial to various sorts of human doing. But perceiving “purposiveness” in how the parts of
nature fit together is not the same as seeing an overall purpose (Zweck)—such as glorification of
God or redemption of humankind. From Kant’s perspective, reason cannot affirm purpose,
though it infer “purposiveness” as a heuristic device to elements in a whole that is analyzed.
Moreover, doing so is in practice useful for humans. Hence the slogan of the 3rd critique:
“purposiveness without purpose” (Zweckmaßigkeit ohne Zweck).
It should be understood that for Kant purpose is not necessarily a “natural” characteristic
of an object. In some cases it is a quality granted to an object by human perceptions and
cognition alone. Thus Kant makes room for the human-making aspect of judgement. Kant
connects cognition and practice by the function of judgement. The function of judgement is then
connected with morality by the need for sensus communus, or communal sense of good taste.
Judgements of taste are in this way given the ability to determine the success or failure (as a
mechanistic view would so delineate) of a work of art. By granting such lofty significance to
judgement (particularly those of taste), Kant has opened up a gateway to aesthetics that was
quickly followed by those interested in aesthetic discourse (Hegel, Schiller, et al). To be brief, by
determining judgement (including judgements of taste) as a supplement to pure and practical
reason, he determined judgement to be purposeful. Its purpose is to inform us of what we might
most usefully take as structuring the world as we perceive and experience it. For example, we
cannot know through reason that history is moving toward a “kingdom of ends” (a world
community in which all people are treated as ends in themselves rather than as just means to our
ends), but we can know through practical reasons (ethics) that people should be so treated, and so
it is useful for us to presuppose, as a regulative idea, that history is so moving, and to judge as
though such movement were possible, actual, and desirable. In this sense, morality is introduced
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into the paradigm for knowledge as a more immediate need. As such, Kant’s views on aesthetics
draw directly from Descartes’ pillar of a mechanistic worldview. While Kant’s aesthetic theory
has undergone much criticism, the take-away that still holds true today is that as identifiable
objects of study, the arts and aesthetics are just as worthy of the inquisitive gaze of reason as any
other objects of study.

Mathesis Universalis
Having now established the first three pillars of the Cartesian paradigm that situate the
self (the cogito) in reference to the self (its existence and boundaries as described by dualism), as
well as a guiding principle for reason’s inquiries into the world around it, we must discuss
Descartes’ practical approach to discerning what is revealed by the mechanistic worldview.
Mathesis universalis is the most complex pillar, for it encompasses three major facets of
epistemology:
1.) the knowledge at hand
2.) the means of testing and codifying that knowledge
3.) A proper mode of expressing that knowledge
Descartes’ omission of aesthetic discourse from his paradigm generally most profoundly impacts
how this last pillar is conceptualized and explicated. Moreover, this exclusion has been
traditionally upheld by those philosophers working on similar projects (systems of universalized
epistemology) after Descartes. I argue that this tradition of exclusion is an unnecessary
consequence of the pillar, one that has influenced later epistemological schemas. Indeed so
strong is the influence that it has kept scholars from recognizing how unnecessary the omission
is.
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To flesh out fully this concept we must begin by characterizing the type of knowledge
Descartes expected to establish with mathesis universalis. As his own pursuits were rooted in
natural philosophy (what we would now understand as the hard sciences) Descartes’ primary
interest would have been directed towards propositional knowledge. Recalling that the abstract
objects of res cogitans are, for Descartes the most objective objects, it follows that the kind of
propositions that are stated mathematically are ideal. Knowledge of the natural world, as it is full
of material mechanisms highlighted by the third pillar, becomes idealized by Descartes as
mathematicalized propositions. It was Descartes’ belief that once the function, purpose, and
cause of each mechanism in the natural world could be concretized by means beyond doubt, then
knowledge of those mechanisms would inform reason. Once reason was tutored by such
knowledge, it would then be able to pursue any other inquiries or tasks at hand including those
addressing practical and ethical dilemmas. This expectation is predicated on the belief that the
world, as mechanistic, is predictable and lawful—therefore human beings, as mechanisms, will
also be so.
What is neglected with the idea of mathesis universalis are those types of knowledge that
are not predicated on what is predictable and lawful, but still fit into the paradigm of a
mechanistic worldview. Knowledge of the subjective aspects of human existence is one of the
most significant types to be excluded. For each of the previous three pillars, I have shown clear
connections to aesthetic discourse. The last pillar, mathesis universalis, is the pillar that has the
most profound disconnection from aesthetics. The reasons are two-fold:
1.) Descartes did not intend for mathesis universalis to be about concepts beyond

propositional knowledge
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2.) Those who have inherited the project of universalizing knowledge by some means or

other have largely maintained an exclusion of aesthetics, though they need not.
Beyond seeking the knowledge that this approach might gain, Descartes intended
mathesis universalis to encompass the means by which reason tests the veracity of knowledge
and the mode of expressing that knowledge to a broader society. This is evidenced by the fact
that his writings on epistemology were always paired with writings on method and modalities of
inquiry. The first appearance of mathesis universalis is in Rule IV of the manuscript for Rules for
the Direction of the Mind—a text that went unpublished in Descartes’ lifetime, but gained
popularity with European philosophers once Gottfried Leibniz obtained a copy of the manuscript
from the sale of items from Descartes’ estate. Rule IV is one of over twenty rules that direct
reason on scientific methodology and proofs. Thus, to define mathesis universalis as simply a
method for acquiring discrete items of knowledge would be to remove it from the contexts of
Descartes’ larger intentions and the role he saw “mathesis” playing in the realization of those
intentions.
Most have interpreted Descartes’ preference for reason and the thinking mind to mean
that all philosophical attentions should be given to the reduction of knowledge to
mathematicalized expressions. Such reduction would exclude sensory data, and thus
marginalizes concepts of taste, beauty, and quality. Stressing how important it was the scientific
community unite under one universalized program of knowledge, Descartes requires a honing of
the mind, but neglects to address a honing of the senses.

The Constitution of an Aesthetic Program
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Before discussing how the Cartesian paradigm excludes aesthetics, we must define what
an aesthetic program denotes. An aesthetic program refers to philosophical discourse that is
concerned with relating truth, cognition, or practical concerns with one or more qualitative
concepts. Many of these concepts are difficult to define clearly, and are often disputed, but for
our purposes I will offer broadly accepted definitions. As I do so, it will become apparent that
much of our contemporary understanding of aesthetics is dependent upon the Cartesian pillars,
even though aesthetics is excluded from the paradigm they articulate.
It is difficult to reconstruct Descartes’ original meaning without falling into anachronism.
We are possessed of the knowledge of philosophers whose work would not have arisen but for
the advent of Cartesian philosophy, but was not envisioned by it. In Chapter 3, we will address
Descartes’ explicit views on concepts we associate with aesthetics, though they are brief in
articulation and generally undeveloped. Rather than attempt to recover what aesthetic concepts
might have meant to Descartes, in these next sections I will focus instead on how much Western
philosophical discourse about aesthetics presupposes and builds upon the Cartesian paradigm.
First, however, some brief definitions of those concepts that comprise an aesthetic program need
to be delineated. Of all the concepts that are germane to aesthetics, five stand out as most
significant in reference to their connections to Descartes work: beauty, expression, subjectivity,
sense perception, and judgment.
Beauty can be understood by two means: that which is good or that which is pleasurable.
In Descartes’ own time the ancient Greek concept of kalos was the most prevalent starting place
for reflection on beauty. Kalos denotes a combination of pleasure, nobility, and goodness. The
means by which one defines what is pleasurable, noble, and/or good are the subject of much
debate. Some philosophers find harmony or perfection to be at the heart of the matter—Plato in
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the Republic takes this stance—and others find steadfast ethical or moral convictions to be the
source of beauty (this is Aristotle’s stance). As both philosophers’ beliefs about beauty
disseminated into Western philosophy both pleasure and goodness became extricable from
notions of beauty. This dual acceptance gave rise to a socially upheld concept whose habituation
assumes the status of a “common sense”—a sense upheld by shared participation in a natural
world in which reason-sense conjunctions were embedded. The natural world could not reach
reason without the senses, however. This meant that, for Descartes, all representations of the
natural world given to reason were tainted by a commerce with a “sense” in which socially
naturalized concepts played crucial, but unacknowledged, roles. Further, Descartes associated
existence in nature with susceptibility to the influence not just of socially normative concepts but
also of our unreliable physical, perceptual senses. Both the senses and the constitution of one’s
common sense are thus (and still to this day are) the cause of philosophical contention and
irresolution. Descartes would have discounted aesthetic discourse, for he was aware that socially
upheld truths are not necessarily universal truths. As universal truth was at the center of his
focus, it is unsurprising that the concept of beauty was overlooked.
We move next to the aesthetic concept of expression. Expression warrants special
attention as it is accorded a prominent place in the Cartesian paradigm already. The term
expression can have two meanings in philosophical discourse—one referring to the statement of
a given language at hand and the other referring to the specific conveyance of the matter,
typically by an emotion, in non-linguistic forms. Simply put, expression can mean what you are
stating or how you are stating it. Expression, in terms of an aesthetic program, most often refers
to the idea of stating what is not readily communicable by language. Many philosophers
interested in aesthetics have approached the concept of art as expression (sometimes referred to
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as aesthetic expression). Benedetto Croce (1866-1952), as an example, believes aesthetic
expression to be the means of expressing what is not yet intelligible to reason11—an idea that is
touted as oppositional to Descartes’ views on reason12. However, Descartes’ ideas of what occurs
before reason can process representations given to it were never elucidated during his lifetime.
As such, this perceived opposition is only valid if one confines oneself to what Descartes said,
literally, on the matter, as opposed to considering what, operationally, is put into play.
As it happens, Descartes was indeed very interested in expression beyond language, but
his interests were aimed at epistemology. As discussed above, Descartes felt the most objective
(and therefor, the truest) knowledge one could obtain was that which came from abstract
reasoning. The “language” of mathematics offers a form of expression that is consistently
abstract, is characteristically precise, and is easier to translate from person to person. It was
naturally his preferred means of expressing truth. There is a certain tradition in post-Cartesian
philosophy, discussed in Chapter 4, which continues to maintain that mathematics is the ideal
means of expressing knowledge. However, the term mathesis does not mean mathematics.
Derived from the Greek manthano, it means what can be known and what can be taught—in
short, knowledge. Mathesis universalis translates to “universal knowledge” and I will in later
sections demonstrate how philosophers since Descartes have chosen to interpret and pursue the
project of creating universal knowledge. For the moment it is sufficient to say that mathematics
has a reductive nature and its intangibility leaves much of the natural world beyond its purview.
As Descartes’ interests were primarily aimed toward objective truths of the natural world, these
shortcomings would not have been considered by him a hindrance. The reliance upon
mathematics in the hard sciences persists today and it is difficult to imagine a better means of
proving or disproving theory. That said, mathematics is an ill-suited language for expressing
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qualitative and subjective data. Emotional reference, sense-experience, and subjective
circumstances are beyond the purview of mathematic expression.
The next concept that needs defining for aesthetic programs is subjectivity. As discussed
briefly above in the section on dualism, subjectivity refers to the idea that individuals may be
possessed of truths that are unique to their own existence. The circumstances of one’s own
attitudes, experiences, language, and schematics of being all influence the appearance of truth. In
post-Cartesian discourse, subjectivity becomes important to aesthetic discourse as the arts so
often involve expressions of subjective aspects. This is so much the case that, in a move
unforeseen by Descartes when establishing his four pillars, most modern thinkers understand
subjectivity to be integral to aesthetic discourse. Subjectivity as a concept presupposes the
Cartesian paradigm as it is dependent upon the concept of an object/subject dichotomy upheld by
Descartes’ mind/body dualism. This is the case because dualism (in relation to human nature) is
implied by and homologous with the subject/object divide. What follows from the homology is
that the rational mind is (or should be) characteristically objective and universal, as is the
physical body—which for Descartes functions like a machine. The rational mind and the
physical body are the common denominators of human existence and therefor are easily
approached in this way. However, the impress of the body –via sensation and emotion—upon the
mind creates mental activity that is subjective and particular. One’s sensations, reactions,
memories, etc. are characteristically individual. Seen in this way, aesthetics becomes the proper
sphere of the subjective. In this way, we find aesthetics to be dependent upon the Cartesian
paradigm, for it describes a realm of knowledge separate from Descartes’ mathesis universalis.
Once again we are seeing the limitations of Descartes’ original epistemological paradigm as it
has been traditionally, and erroneously, understood.
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In part the error derives from Descartes’ omissions. Descartes imagined the subjective
realm of body and misperception as hindering reason in certain ways. He believed that erroneous
sensations and traditions gave rise to fragmented, particularized forms of thinking. He felt that
once universals were established, then the eventual study of subjective matters would be a
question of categorical organization and labeling. We now objectively know that concepts such
as race, gender, language, etc. are subjective qualities that shape reason in ways similar to the a
priori. These concepts were not acknowledged as influential to one’s thinking before Descartes’
work and therefor the Cartesian notion of mathesis universalis also did not acknowledge them.
Yet these are the very concepts that have found increasing consideration in aesthetic programs
involving the subjective. Philosophers that are influential to the course of Western philosophy,
such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, find the specificities of one’s own existence (one’s time
in history, gender, native language, etc.) to be significantly influential on our views on beauty,
morality, and even so far as to influence one’s metaphysical understanding of the natural world.
Our fourth term related to subjectivity that often arises in aesthetic discourse is senseperception, sometimes referred to as sense experience. The mechanisms of the senses and
sensations in themselves can vary from person to person. More importantly, the senses can easily
be fooled. This being the case, how can one establish truth by means of sense-perception? While
debate has been carried out by empiricists and rationalists for centuries, another approach to
sense perception was picked up on by Descartes—a mechanistic understanding of the processes
by which the physical body feeds information into the theater of the mind. The level to which
one trusts sense perception and the many ways by which it can vary from person to person is a
matter whose conceptualization is closely tied to Descartes’ mechanistic world-view. If the
world is clock-work, and the body a machine within that clockwork, then the differences
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between senses and the means of deception of those senses can be understood in terms of that
same clock-work. Thus Descartes, and many of his contemporaries and philosophicaldescendants, chose to occupy their time studying the most prevalent of the human senses—the
sense of sight or optics. The visual sense is given special priority by Descartes as he included a
special treatment of the subject (the Dioptrics) in his Discourse on Method. As Discourse is the
text in which Descartes set down his methodology for scientific inquiry and his epistemological
schemas, Descartes concerned himself largely with the mechanisms at play in visual sensation
(how the information outside was making its way inside the mind). Though the theories on the
substance of light developed in the Dioptrics has proven to be inaccurate, the fact remains that
Descartes innately understood that the visual sense is significant to the development of
knowledge.
The final concept we must explore to properly understand aesthetic programs is
judgement. It is difficult to approach the topic of Descartes and judgement with referencing
Immanuel Kant. As we discuss Kant and his ideas about judgment it is important to bear in mind
that he is considered one of the most (if not the most) significant “disciples” of the Cartesian
paradigm. Descartes’ work on the subjects of reason, scientific theory, and of course the four
pillars discussed above are foundational to Kantian philosophy. This being the case, I devote the
next entire section to the connections between Descartes, Kant, and the concept of judgement.

Kant’s Aesthetics and Their Relationship to the Cartesian Paradigm
By the time Kant had published his critiques, Descartes’ own work had garnered much
controversy and received academic rejection. It is generally acknowledged that Kant, while not
rejecting Descartes outright, makes some significant moves away from the original premises of
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the Cartesian paradigm. Kant perceived Cartesian skepticism as problematic as it denied the
value of sense experience. Via the three critiques, he established a means to reconcile what is
typically perceived as the “Cartesian problem”—the discordance between sense and reason. Kant
establishes that the mind is possessed of inherent structures that rule over the perceptions of the
senses as well as those of reason. Thus the mind (reason) and the senses are necessary to
establish the truths of the mechanistic world. But Kant does not grant us a full grasp of these
truths, and states the “things in themselves” (noumena) are untenable in the mind, and only the
representations of things in themselves (phenomena) are truly available to both the mind and
senses.
Kant’s paradigm provides a unique space for judgment, granting it an intermediary role
between reason and the senses—effectively creating a bridge between mind and body that does
not negate Descartes’ stance that we experience life through dualism. Simply put, Kant
determines judgement to be a qualitative concept involving a distinct sense of discernment that
includes aesthetic evaluation. The aesthetic elements of judgement take two primary
modalities—the analysis of the beautiful and the experience of the sublime. The third critique
includes analytics of both modes—concepts that are certainly more subjective than judgements
concerning truths about the natural world. The inclusion of these two analytics opened
philosophic discourse for aesthetic concepts and their relationship to morality. Kant’s efforts to
fully encompass all aspects of judgement are in keeping with the Cartesian paradigm as they are
working form a universal model and enter into speculative teleological reasoning, which conveys
a mechanistic worldview. Kant’s introduction of the concept of judgement to the separated
realms of sense and reason is a first step towards acknowledging a “human making” aspect to the
establishment of truths.
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If reason is separate from sensation and requires judgement to negotiate between the
two—and we acknowledge that judgement is a skill that is shaped by a specific sensus
communus—then it logically follows that the truths established in this manner are in some ways
“human made.” In terms of our discussion of aesthetics and the Cartesian paradigm, this is the
most significant divergence from Descartes’ original conception of the paradigm. However this
divergence does not negate the four pillars of the paradigm in any way. A thinking being can still
work from the fundamental fact of their existence (the cogito), can accept that the world is
mechanistic and objective in nature, can accept that knowledge can be universally codified and
communicated, and can understand that in order to generate that knowledge one must establish
the boundaries of object and subject (dualism). The introduction of judgement simply adds an
awareness of some of the subjective factors at play in the establishment of knowledge.

The Arts and Knowledge
To conclude this chapter, a brief discussion about the relationships between art,
aesthetics, and epistemology is warranted. Art in itself is separate from aesthetics, but is a
particular concern for aesthetic programs. Some charge aesthetics with the task of defining what
art is while others would argue that experience of art must inform aesthetic discourse, and so
come prior to it. Simply put, the arts can either be considered the cause of an aesthetic program
or the subject of critique of an aesthetic program. Each one of these aspects has direct ties to the
models of truth and knowledge, making an aesthetic program germane to discussions of
epistemology (knowledge). As knowledge is also a subject with disputed definitions, this avenue
too presents difficulties for understanding precisely what is at stake in an aesthetic program. For
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our purposes it is simplest to state that aesthetic programs relate to knowledge in an informative
manner that can move in one of two dynamics:
1.) From a specific group’s (philosophic, social, historical etc.) broader philosophic

stances towards evaluations and interpretations of individual artworks, or
2.) Artworks that move towards the themes, questions, and stakes of broader aesthetic

principles that pertain to a philosophic movement.
Both dynamics address concepts of beauty, expression, subjectivity, sense perception,
and judgment. This dissertation will work largely from the former (discourse informing the arts),
but will address the latter (the arts informing discourse) in the fourth chapter on the work of
Joseph Wright of Derby.
It must be stated that the term “aesthetics” did not properly enter philosophic discourse
until the mid-eighteenth century with the work of Alexander Baumgarten. It would be
anachronistic to think that a philosopher working in the seventeenth century such as Descartes
could have conceived of a full-fledged aesthetic program. However it is also illogical to assume
that aesthetic concepts were not addressed at all. Nor does it stand that Descartes would oppose
the consideration of aesthetic concepts. In Chapter 3, we will discuss in depth Descartes’ implied
conceptions of beauty, the soul, and expression, as these three aspects of an aesthetic program
are in small ways directly addressed by Cartesian texts.
This first chapter contextualizes the discussion of the next by legitimizing aesthetics as a
concern for Descartes and his “descendants.” I argue that the traditional exclusion of aesthetics
from Cartesian discourse is unnecessary and in no way fundamental to the operations of the
Cartesian paradigm. Inversely, I argue that there is no need to reject or exclude Cartesian
discourse from aesthetic discussions. In the next chapter, I evaluate the secondary literature and
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adjacent philosophic discussions concerning Descartes and aesthetics. In so doing, I will show
that the traditional understanding of the Cartesian paradigm as disinclined towards aesthetics
comes from one of two views on the matter:
1.) Descartes unwittingly omitted aesthetics and the subjective studies13 from his
program.
2.) He purposefully excluded such subject matters from his work.
My own view is that Descartes’ omission is only evident in hindsight by those aware of the
subjective studies as they have grown into the modern consciousness since the advent of the
Cartesian paradigm. This leads me to understand that had aesthetics been a subject matter at all
during Descartes’ time, he would most certainly have addressed aesthetic concepts if for no other
reason than he was working towards the universalization of all knowledge. As Descartes himself
did not define his own concepts of beauty and expression as they relate to truth, we must take not
a literal, but an operational stance when working to fill the aesthetic void left in the paradigm.
The next chapter delves into the work of several scholars who have also taken note of Descartes’
omission.
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CHAPTER 2

Connecting Descartes to Aesthetics
It is typical for philosophic discourse to examine the various “conversations” connected
to a given philosopher, as philosophy is not understood as ex nihilo discourse, but as revealing
dialogue among thinkers. Although this dissertation examines one philosopher so closely, I
would be remiss in not addressing those predecessors who influenced Descartes, secondary
literature concerning the Cartesian paradigm, and the work of philosophers who wrote in
opposition to the paradigm. First I will investigate the relationship between Descartes’
philosophy and the work that variously influenced it. Second, I will introduce three
contemporary works that invite Descartes’ work and aesthetic discourse into direct dialogue.
Third, and last, I will discuss those who are generally viewed as Descartes’ largest philosophic
opponents.
It is generally accepted that St Augustine, Plato, and Aristotle are chief among those
Descartes’ work most directly answers. In the first section of this chapter, I discuss each of these
influences, highlighting how the lack of attention Descartes gives to aesthetics makes him an
outlier among his fellow philosophers. His omission of aesthetics and the arts takes on a
particular significance when one considers that each of the major philosophical influences upon
him gave considerable attention to aesthetic concepts. In the second section, I review three
articles that offer new points for consideration when tying the Cartesian paradigm to aesthetics
by various means. Collectively these essays are a part of a contemporary reconsideration of
Descartes’ work that enriches our own discussion of Descartes’ neglect of aesthetics in his
account of knowledge. In the last section, it will be made evident that the grounds upon which
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later thinkers rejected the Cartesian paradigm were deeply affiliated with rejection of Descartes’
choice of omitting considerations of aesthetic and qualitative value from his paradigm of
knowledge-acquisition and assessment.

The Aesthetic Positions of Descartes’ Influences
The centrality of questions related to aesthetics (questions of quality, beauty, and
assessment of art) to Descartes’ most significant predecessors makes his lack of interest in those
subjects all the more remarkable. Beauty, in particular, plays a key role for each of these men in
their treatments of the well-being of the soul. As the work of the three philosophers discussed
here is so important to Western philosophy that they rightly have had entire libraries devoted to
their philosophic works, I will keep expositions on their views brief and germane to this
dissertation.
Each of the philosophical currents that Descartes draws from (Classical and Augustinian
philosophy) contain schemas that address, and in some cases establish, aesthetic concepts for
Western philosophy. This would have provided Descartes with ample reason to have developed
his own approach to aesthetics. I will demonstrate how he shifts the schemas developed by his
predecessors in directions that generate the possibility of modern philosophical discourses on
aesthetics, despite his own neglect of the aesthetic-relevant aspects of the discourse of his
predecessors. I will reserve for chapter 3 in-depth discussions of how concepts such as mimesis
for Plato and significant forms in Aristotle—concepts that are generally understood as
underpinning anti-aesthetic discourse—lose credence once Descartes fleshes out the four pillars
of his paradigm. Now, however, I will offer a brief overview that serves the dual purpose of
situating Descartes as a participant within the grander conversation of philosophy, and of
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illustrating how his own contributions alter the understandings of concepts inherited from
classical thought.
Most of the secondary literature that connects Descartes to Classical-era philosophers is
centered upon Descartes’ rejection of scholasticism and old models of cognition. Names such as
Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine inevitably arise, and the overall goal of these commentaries is to
determine which pieces of the old philosophy he kept, modified, or dismissed.14 However,
commentary seldom notes that while each of the three most important philosophical influences
upon Descartes gave considerable attention to aesthetic concepts, he himself chose to remain
largely mute on that subject. Augustine, as will be discussed further below, viewed beauty as a
purely objective and measurable quality that originates with God. Since Descartes’ interests
largely targeted objective truths, (though his idea of objectivity differs greatly from Augustine),
it is curious that he did not generate his own set of characteristics, or indeed refer to any
characteristics of beauty. Descartes’ omission of matters relating to aesthetics could conceivably
be attributed to his general focus on the natural sciences; however, he drew heavily upon
Classical antiquity’s two major philosophers when he devised his own model of the soul. The
Cartesian model reflects similar concerns to those of Plato and Aristotle, but while both Plato
and Aristotle were compelled to address aesthetics in relation to the well-being of the soul,
Descartes only mentions such things in passing in his own personal correspondence.

Augustine and Descartes
Augustine (354-430 AD) figures as one of the most important influences upon Cartesian
theory, if not by direct means. As Margaret Wilson notes in her article “Descartes and
Augustine,” Descartes denied any prior knowledge of Augustine’s work whenever others pointed
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out similarities between its claims and his own. However, as Augustinian thought permeated
discourse in the West for the thousand years preceding Descartes’ own lifetime, it is hardly
credible that Descartes would not have been at least well-acquainted with the broad outlines of
Augustinian philosophy, even if he never read any primary Augustinian texts.
Augustine’s complex views on the natural world, the soul, and beauty, though developed
over numerous texts, reveal a persistent and enduring interest in aesthetic concepts. He viewed
the world as originating with God, and felt it was best to view nature from as near to God’s
viewpoint as possible. As a consequence, he developed a unique way of objectifying the world
that did not entirely dismiss Plato’s idealism, but still complied with Catholic doctrine. He uses
the term divine illumination to refer to a kind of objectification predicated upon viewing the
natural world to be a product of God’s will. Consequently any genuine or full knowledge of the
world was contingent, for Augustine, upon God’s grace. As all things are objects of creation,
they possess only objective characteristics. Beauty, as a substance, is no exception. For
Augustine, an object is beautiful if it has unity, rhythm, is proportional and symmetrical, and is
in due order.15 Each of these qualities can be clearly and distinctly determined, and therefore are
not subjective in nature.
As beauty is an objective substance for Augustine (just as an object can be red, heavy, or
soft it can also be beautiful), so our interaction with beauty will also be objective. In order to
hone your idea of the beautiful, you come to see it as an attribute of the divine—by communing
with the divine, one communes with the beautiful. However the inverse is not true for Augustine.
Communing with what is perceived as beautiful does not assure one of communion with the
divine. Too often we attribute the characteristic to a substance (Augustine uses the example of a
beautiful woman) without understanding that beauty as substance (comprised of the
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characteristics listed above) is separate from the woman but not separate from God. In this way,
Augustine, like Plato before him, felt beauty could potentially be a trap—misdirecting one away
from the path to God. This danger largely applies to sensual beauty, which is apt to manifest
itself in ways apart from or beyond the mathematicalized relations by which beauty as harmony
should be determined: one may have these qualities of harmony and sweetness in body, but not
soul, and one’s having them in soul is a pale imitation of how the pious realize them and how
God exemplifies them.16
Descartes’ own preference for things that are “clear and distinct” as well as his focus on
those objects that are easily mastered by means of mathematics appear to be informed by and
valorize the very criteria championed by Augustine. Indeed, Augustine’s conception of unity
(that which is whole and distinct) and of “due order” can be viewed as the same as, or coextensive with, that which is clear to the mind—that in which no parts of the whole are out of
harmony or due proportion with others.

Plato and Descartes
Descartes, like Plato, is leery of what will confuse the soul and attributes confusion to
sensorial deception. However, as we will discuss later, what Descartes believes can potentially
confuse the soul is markedly different from what Plato postulates. Plato worked to establish the
clear and distinct Ideal Forms (eidos) as the measure of all things. He understood all units of
perception to have degrees of separation from the Ideal. Each successive step away from the
ideal warranted incrementally less credence. Like Plato, Descartes worked to isolate objective17
truths with clarity and distinction, and he felt that every step away from objectivity only
increased confusion. The difference is that Descartes’ work seeks out representations of truths
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that could be easily grasped by the mind, while Platonic theory takes up the characteristics of
truth as its goal. Descartes abandons the project of possessing knowledge beyond what can be
represented to reason. Instead, he devotes his attentions to the clarification of representationmediated knowledge, the dissemination of such knowledge, and the perfection of the modes by
which it might be expressed. He in effect shuns the desire to possess eidos in favor of enriching
the quality of that which can be known through engagement with the natural world. What
replaces the eidos for Descartes are concepts that he takes to be innate to the thinking subject.
These bases of cognition are, for Descartes, the true “things in themselves.” As such they are to
be applied to the representations of the natural world. Those representations are apprehended
within the theater of the mind. In this way, what is rational is applied to what is natural, as
opposed to the Platonic model, where the ideal is applied to the natural.18
Rather than taking philosophical inquiry to be a means of “stepping closer” to
unattainable and divine truth, Descartes sought to make it a vehicle for expanding and improving
the quality of those truths that could be grasped by the thinking mind. Descartes was insistent
that we should pursue that which is clear and distinct. Those are both qualitative characteristics.
It can easily be understood that Descartes intended to improve the pursuit of, the codification of,
and the communication of knowledge by his insistence that the thinking mind must work with
the structures already present within it. That improving the quality of knowledge was a central
motivation for Descartes is not at all conjecture. It is a documented intention made explicitly in
the first statements of Rules19. By noting the importance of this goal in organizing Descartes’
project, we are led to see how an implied aesthetic program, despite the absence of a conscious
intention on his part, might arise from the forms of thinking his work sets in motion. If one
understands the Cartesian paradigm as a campaign of qualitative improvements, then a need to
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develop fully the definitions of those qualities is imperative. This being the case, we may
understand how the elaboration of a Cartesian aesthetic program might contribute to the goal of
improving clarity and distinctiveness of knowledge.
Moreover, Descartes’ projects for improving the quality of knowledge involves moving
beyond previous limitations imposed upon qualitative concepts by his predecessors. Instead of
focusing on finding airtight definitions for concepts such as beauty, he makes an ideal of openended expansion of capacities for the discernment of beauty. For Descartes, beauty could not
only be a matter of comparison to ideals, but also would need to be a matter of discernment on
the part of the thinking subject.
Most interestingly, Plato also alludes to the importance of discernment (judgement), but
still in relation to hierarchies and ideals. Throughout The Republic, Plato describes certain kinds
of poetry and imitation as facilitating the soul’s harmony and others as disrupting and confusing
to the soul. Because Plato discounts the possibility that poetic expression may foster originality
and so new knowledge, his discussions of poetics are limited to considerations of the imitation of
ideal forms and the goodness of the imitators. In Book III of The Republic (398a-b), Plato
describes poetry as potentially valuable, but only when it depicts a good man imitating other
good men, as this would not require the actor to know more than himself:
It seems, then, that if a man, who through clever training can become anything
and imitate anything should arrive in our city, wanting to give a performance of
his poems, we should bow down before him as someone holy, wonderful, and
pleasing, but we should pour myrrh on his head, crown him with wreaths, and
send him away to another city. But, for our own good, we ourselves should
employ a more austere and less pleasure-giving poet and storyteller, one who
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would imitate the speech of a decent person and who would tell his stories in
accordance with the patterns we laid down when we first undertook the education
of our soldiers (74).
Plato’s argument in the above passage is that, since only a god could rightly discern what
is good in multiple fields, or in all of them, when people seem able to do this (as with the
versatile poet) they are frauds, and dangerous ones. Descartes’ paradigm moves away from
Ideals and divine hierarchies, redirecting one’s discernment towards the objects at hand rather
than the propriety or fidelity of particular artistic representations of a field or a person judging on
the basis of expert knowledge. Reason must work to understand and judge only the objects
presented to it as objects. Descartes’ radicalized individualism (the Cogito and dualism) liberate
the soul from the need to identify objects as nearer or further from goodness. More simply,
cognition is now to understand objects as either clear or unclear. As Descartes saw no need for
cognition to concern itself with artistic representations of knowledge or of knowledgeable
people, the criteria for judgments was seen by him as unnecessary to develop. Perhaps this can
account for Descartes’ lack of interest in the discernment of “good” taste. But given all this, it is
strange then that Descartes consistently calls for the preference of what is qualitatively clear and
distinct in his methodological writings without providing aesthetic guidelines for what
constitutes those qualities.

Aristotle and Descartes
Intrinsic in the Aristotelian modeling of the natural world is a certain relationship to the
arts that is important to our discussion of Descartes’ immediate influences. Dennis Des Chene
touches on this relationship and its relevancy to Descartes briefly in the last section of his chapter
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of the Blackwell Companion to Descartes, entitled “Aristotelian Natural Philosophy: Body,
Cause, Nature.” After describing Aristotelian natural philosophy as it was in Descartes’ lifetime
(that is to say as it had been added on to and changed by various scholars) Des Chene closes the
chapter with a section on the relationship between art and nature. “Art, even though it is said to
imitate nature, cannot serve as a model, because human production is by comparison with divine
creation secondary, superficial, and subordinate” (29). Des Chene makes it clear that for
Aristotle, the arts imitate nature, and are therefore secondary to nature. From this, Des Chene
infers that the forms of art are not, for Aristotle, the substantial forms of things but only their
figures (outward shapes) so they could be read by later commentators as superficial. Similarly,
he concludes that, for early modern scholastic philosophers, nature’s powers are subordinate to
God, while human industry is subordinate to both nature and God, so therefore art is subordinate
to Nature. Des Chene closes the chapter with an important distinction between this understanding
of Aristotelian natural philosophy and Descartes’ own understanding of the relationship to
between art and nature:
In Descartes’ natural philosophy, the subordinate relationship of art to nature is
not altogether rejected. But the difference between human and divine art no
longer turns on the all-or-nothing presence or absence of generative powers. It is
instead the difference between the finite and the indefinitely large, a difference in
number and intricacy of parts. Human art is only accidentally, not essentially,
subordinate to nature. The barrier between art and nature is thus displaced. Art is
as one might say, that which is actually made in accordance with our desires;
nature is that which is not, or which is only potentially so. (31)
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From Descartes’ relationship to Aristotelian natural philosophy we can infer a shift from
concerns of mimetic modeling to a more porous border between natural and human made
representations. Forms are all representational, and so what matters are not the characteristics on
any particular representation, but rather how well the representation points one toward, or brings
one closer to, the element of truth that is represented. If Descartes understood that man-made
representations could be just as informative as fully natural representations, however, then there
would be a natural space for the qualitative judgement of man-made representations. Though it is
most probable that Descartes would have focused upon considering mathematical models in
these terms, it is a natural “next step” that for images, poetics, etc., the characteristics of
particular representations, to become subject to the same scrutiny.
Important to understanding Descartes’ relationship to Aristotle is recognizing the shift
between viewing objects, in an Aristotelean manner, as having potentiality to viewing objects, in
a Cartesian manner, as having purpose in a mechanical model of “how things work.” Briefly,
potentiality refers to the idea of an object having a limited number of possible ways of existing in
the world. Actuality refers to the means (the action) by which that object fulfills a specific
possibility. These two concepts, in various forms, were upheld throughout medieval times until
the advent of Descartes’ four pillars. Most significantly the mechanistic worldview demands that
one examine not the potentiality of an object, but the purpose of that object in terms of its utility
within a larger structure. The questions shift from “what are the ways in which this object could
exist and is this particular occurrence real and natural?”—important questions for Aristotle—to
“what purpose does this object serve to the natural movements and laws of nature?” That said,
the Aristotelean model of art-as-catharsis could still hold true in the Cartesian paradigm.
Descartes’ conception of the soul, explained in detail in the next chapter, requires occasional acts
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of will overriding one’s passions. Such acts typically involve a divorcing of oneself from
emotions and affects. Catharsis could easily be one of those means. If Descartes maintained this
idea of the arts, then it may be why he chose to ignore the topic—he simply understood it to be a
long-ago solved problem. Yet his skepticism, mechanistic world view, and epistemological
schema of universal knowledge present problems for the cathartic view of the arts. Questions of
mechanism, universality, and efficacy arise. If an artwork does not universally, consistently, and
verifiably provide catharsis, for all how can it be said to do so? What are the conditions that must
exist before, during, and after catharsis? Are there other means of “righting” the soul that are
more universally effective? All of these questions remain unexplored in Descartes.

Filling the Aesthetic Void
As I conducted my research for this dissertation a few common threads became evident.
First that there is a need to connect subjective facts with universalized models of epistemology
like Descartes’. Secondly, isolated quotes and extrapolations appear to be the typical mode for
the latest commentaries connected with the Cartesian paradigm. Third, few scholars approach the
topic operationally—this significantly limits their expositions and interpretations, as Descartes
was largely silent on aesthetic matters. In this section I will present a series of works that have
offered means of bridging the gap between Descartes’ original work and concepts and/or new
viewpoints bearing upon contemporary aesthetic matters.
Mathesis universalis, as Descartes originally presented the concept, was intended for the
sciences—but Descartes understood the sciences to be all encompassing. That is to say, science
would establish knowledge of the natural world and, eventually, knowledge pertaining to human
existence. It was his understanding that the natural sciences would present—given a proper

48
ordered understanding of metaphysics, matter, mathematics, and then biology, all that is
necessary for understanding the world around us. The glaring omissions are those areas of study
germane to what I refer to as subjective facts. Subjective facts are characteristics like language,
culture, history, aesthetics, and other sociological “sciences.” While it may have been evident to
Descartes that universalized epistemology would need to encompass all languages (hence his
heavy emphasis on mathematics), he had not considered the fact that universalized epistemology
would need to encompass all genders, all classes, all countries of the globe. Nor had he
considered the knowledge-shaping power of language in the same light as those working in
socio-linguistics do today.
These points about subjective facts lead me to discuss a common approach in the
contemporary literature about Descartes. Many scholars work to prove their cases by pulling
small excerpts from Descartes’ original works and construing conclusions from the minutia.
While this is certainly a safe means of proving one’s argument, it is also a largely tepid means of
setting forth any practical philosophical discourse. By working through the Cartesian paradigm
as an operational system upon which Western philosophy is founded and built up from, rather
treating it as a collection of discrete philosophical claims, we can enrich our understanding of the
Cartesian paradigm’s application to our own moment in time.
Of course there are many who would dismiss Descartes and other philosophers for their
distinct white, male, and privileged views upon what the nature of universal entails. Even if one
were to conclude that Descartes’ paradigm was classist, racist, sexist, or in other ways
idiosyncratic, that does not preclude its continued value. It denotes required areas of renovation,
most certainly. But that is the broader point of my working operationally rather than literally. We
as contemporary thinkers must address the Cartesian paradigm in light of its shortcomings and
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omissions by means of enrichment, rather than dismissive critique. We must do so simply
because there is no returning to a time before Descartes.
As the purpose of this dissertation is primarily aimed at Descartes’ omission of aesthetics,
a field I understand to encompass qualitative concepts that inform all the social sciences, I will
keep this chapter germane to those works that attempt to constructively connect Descartes’ four
pillars to concepts of qualitative concern. Overall we encounter a theme of trying to fill aesthetic
voids in the paradigm, primarily the pillar of mathesis universalis. With these next two sections
(The Body as a Sensing Machine, and Mood and Objectivity) I will show how the “literal”
approach to adding qualitative considerations to the Cartesian paradigm works by discussing two
efforts to draw upon primary Cartesian material to support revisionary arguments. Cecilia
Sjoholm brings to light Descartes’ concepts of sensation as a possible means to explore the
relationship between Cartesian epistemology and aesthetics. Rene Rosfort and Giovanni
Stranghellini offer Descartes’ brief suggestions that mood influences reason as evidence that he
had some awareness of the directive effect of mood upon reasoning. Concluding the review of
contemporary commentary, I will consider Tamara Albertini’s essay “Crisis and Certainty of
Knowledge in Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) and Descartes (1596-1650)”, which provides a
fascinating comparison between two disparate philosophers—a comparison that reveals an
inherent need to pursue subjective knowledge.

The Body as a Sensing Machine
Cecilia Sjoholm’s article entitled “Descartes, Emotions and the Inner Life of the Subject”
presents a discussion of Passions of the Soul that works to tie together aesthetics, epistemology,
and the Cartesian paradigm. She provides the results of a thorough search through Descartes’
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oeuvre, and notes many small allusions to poetics, the arts, literature, etc. Her essay gives
evidence that Descartes had a certain level of awareness of poetry and literature (there is never a
specific reference of paintings). What we can gain from Sjoholm is an understanding that
Descartes did understand sensation to be an informative force for the presentation of material to
the theater of the mind, and that he understood that factors such as habit (and mood, as we shall
see next section) can be influential in shaping sensation’s tenor and force.
To begin her essay, Sjoholm offers a quote by Descartes in which she refers to his view
of the human body as an “aesthetic machine.” For the purpose of proper context, one must
understand that while Descartes prioritized those concepts that were innate to the mind, he did
not (and could not) isolate them as a lone means of cognition. He simply hierarchically idealized
them as preferable. The workings of abstraction and reason are closest to those innate concepts,
and therefore closest to his own most fundamental truth: cogito ergo sum. That said, the
sensations of the body were not to be ignored, as to do so would be to ignore the purpose of the
body all together. Corporeal sensation is necessary for the representation of the world to
cognition. It is not, however, to be viewed as the confirming source of knowledge.
Sjoholm cites Eric R Koch’s text The Aesthetic Body: Passion, Sensibility, and
Corporeality in Seventeenth Century Europe in her discussion of the tentative connections
between mind and body in Descartes’ thought:
As Erec Koch has argued, Descartes implies that the way in which body and mind
are connected depends on everyday life and the habits of a person. New habits
affect the flow of the animal spirits. They influence the associations of ideas,
which in turn affect the “aesthetic machine” of the physical, sensual, affective and
thinking body. Descartes makes clear that perceptions—of which passions are one
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kind—are corporally bound. In The Passions, the separation between mind and
body is posited less as an ontological fact than as an aid to understanding their
relations. (842)
Sjoholm acknowledges that while Descartes certainly was aware that sensation could affect
cognition, the capability of cognition to recognize those affects allows for relieving the body of
any influence on epistemology. She makes the following point later in the text: “Meditations
reduces the body to an unreal and virtual status (esp 82-107). Through this ‘erasure’ and
‘dehumanization’ of the body it ceases to be an integral part of the definition and existence of the
thinking subject” (108). Sjoholm connects Koch’s claim to Passions via the argument (as seen
above) of if the body is of the practical and everyday, it may in turn influence the habits of a
person and then physically be responsible for a different flow of the path of animal spirits. Along
with the second claim that perceptions are corporeally bound, Sjoholm then makes the case that
the separation of the mind and body is really only to be understood as a means to understand
their relationship. Sjoholm illuminates Descartes’ understanding that cognition is innately
capable of divorcing sensation from reason without rejecting the facts of sensation. His entire
paradigm, however, operationally requires the thinking subject to willfully separate cognition
from perception. The Passions of the Soul was intended as a means for the thinking individual to
negotiate perception, emotion, and sensation—that is to say to recognize them as factual objects,
not epistemological truths.
In order to analyze sensation’s operational role within the Cartesian paradigm, we must
understand the separation of reason from sensation not as a complete dismissal of sensation. But
at the same time we must understand the separation to be, paradoxically, what allows for the
study of aesthetic theory at all. Beyond literal references, particularly in the interest of avoiding
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anachronism, we must understand Descartes’ meaning behind the term “aesthetic” did not
contain reference to the arts, beauty, or qualitative concerns. His stance of recognizing sensations
(which encompassed what he would have understood by the term “aesthetics”) as factual objects
rooted in reality and not simply deception, would lead philosophers who came after him to pick
up the task of studying sensations. Of particular interest was the relationship of sensation to
beauty, the arts, etc. which denote sensations as significant and influential subjective facts.
Sjoholm’s work gives us an initial, if not complete, means of understanding the Cartesian
connection to some of our modern concepts of aesthetic philosophy.
Sjoholm observes that Koch, prior to his explanation of this phrase in terms of the
Cartesian paradigm explains how both Augustine and Pascal both posit the body as a “sensing
machine.” The phrase of “sensing machine” is more accurate in terms of how all three of these
original philosophers understood the body. While “sensing” is the physical task of taking in
information (all information must be internalized by the one or more of the senses), the term
“aesthetic” as Koch uses it cannot be associated with the mode of philosophy that concerns
concepts such as truth, beauty, common taste, and expression. These matters for all three thinkers
would be germane to cognition—that is to the thinking subject and not to the physical means by
which the mind is presented with and then intakes information. What Descartes (and his many
successors) posits by means of his overall operational and methodological framework, is that the
senses, while necessary and certainly influential to the acquisition of information, cannot have
say in the judgment of whether information so acquired is true or moral. Bearing this operational
stance in mind helps us to avoid attempts to assemble a full aesthetic “space” out of the few
loose quotes that Descartes’ primary material offers us. The aesthetic program one might develop
should instead be constructed on the backs of the work and history that has occurred since
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Descartes’ lifetime, though both that work and the history informing it are significantly shaped
by the four pillars of Cartesian paradigm and their pivotal role in modern Western philosophy.

Mood and Objectivity
Like the childhood game of Telephone, interpretations and critiques of original
philosophy often permit certain “grey” nuances of that philosophy to be colored over by
reductive shades of black and white. The general perception of the Cartesian paradigm is that it
maintains a rigid interest only in what may be perceived as objective and quantifiable. Aesthetic
theory, as a field generally interested in more subjective concepts, seems an unlikely addition to
the Cartesian paradigm. Yet there are several authors interested in the ways that these two
seemingly disparate topics can or do intersect. These scholars are working to restore subtleties
about the Cartesian paradigm that have been more or less erased from the Cartesian picture. Rene
Rosfort and Giovanni Stranghellini do precisely this by admitting the secondary concept of mood
to mediate between otherwise schismatically divided notions of “mind” and “body.” Their
argument, succinctly put, is that “Mood has consequences for intellectual method” (396). Mindbody dualism is certainly one of the more influential tenets of the Cartesian paradigm, although
the growing field of neuroscience allows us to think of mind-body division as a conceptual tool
rather than as a physical fact. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the positing of such dualism proves to be
an artificial tool of considerable utility, especially in sorting out internal workings of the subject.
Rosfort and Stranghellini argue in “In the Mood for Thought: Feeling and Thinking in
Philosophy” that to understand Descartes’ dualism as a literal division between terms and the
spheres they denote results from oversimplified interpretations of Descartes’ original writings on
the topic. Their initial intention is to approach dualism operationally by moving beyond literal
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interpretations of Descartes’ dualism so that qualitative concepts might be more readily tied to
the Cartesian paradigm. This move works to conserve Cartesian ideas, though in some ways their
argument remains incomplete.
Differentiating between feelings (in the scope of the body) and emotions (in the realm of
the mind) even while stressing that both feelings and emotions are affective characteristics of the
thinking subject, the co-authors discuss how these affective characteristics regulate rationality.
They do so by first addressing the thinking subject as an evolving subject, one produced through
a process of biological evolution unknown to Descartes.
The rational core of philosophical investigations and the philosophical faith in the
powers of logical analysis were suddenly challenged by the rationally blind forces
of causality at work in evolution. An evolutionary perspective accorded
explanatory significance to the animal aspect of human behavior at the cost of
diminishing rationality. Nowhere do the limits of rationality become more visible
than in the emotional aspects of human behavior. (398)
Many philosophers since the advent of Darwinian science have developed what are often
referred to as “Feeling Theories” that work under the paradigm of seeing an emotion as a
necessary, evolved mechanism that is specific to humanity (most make the case that animal
emotions greatly differ from our own). Descartes’ oeuvre, as rationally centered and preDarwinian, is then subject to a kind of dismissal in terms of “feeling theory.” In contrast to such
“feeling theory analysis” Rosfort and Stranghellini offer a way of preserving Cartesian theory by
means of restoring philosophical nuances within their writings, nuances that have been lost over
time. They point out that in Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, there is a small thread
still tying the body and mind together, thus preserving a unified model of the thinking subject.
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Descartes states:
But there is nothing which this nature teaches me more expressly [nor more
sensibly] than that I have a body which is adversely affected when I feel pain,
which has need of food or drink when I experience the feelings of hunger and
thirst, and so on; nor can I doubt there being some truth in all this. Nature also
teaches me by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am not only
lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am very closely united to it,
and so to speak so intermingled with it that I seem to compose with it one whole.
(Meditations 29)
This citation refers to the natural state of the mind within the body, and while this passage does
appear to discredit generalizations about Descartes’ conception of the mind-body schism
(Rosfort and Stranghellini’s intended argument), the passage that directly follows the above
section in Meditations reaffirms that sensation cannot be the sole source of certainty or truth—
though he does indicate that information communicated to the mind via the bodily sensations
may be more-or-less reliable as prompts to useful action:
But the nature here described truly teaches me to flee from things which cause the
sensation of pain, and seek after the things which communicate to me the
sentiment of pleasure and so forth; but I do not see that beyond this it teaches me
that from those diverse sense-perceptions we should ever form any conclusion
regarding things outside of us, without having [carefully and maturely] mentally
examined them beforehand. For it seems to me that it is mind alone, and not mind
and body in conjunction, that is requisite to a knowledge of the truth in regard to
such things. (29)
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As we can see, this intermingling of mind and body is precisely why Descartes chooses to
prioritize things of the mind as they are clear and precise, instead of bound to outside phenomena
which confuses and complicates concepts. This also coincides with the third rule of Rules for the
Direction of the Mind and the first meditation from Meditations on First Philosophy. These both
explicitly state that what is not plainly clear in and of itself is unfit as objective truth. Therefore
ideas, reasoning or concepts that cross between sensation and the mind are unfit for
consideration as truth. When we take these operational concerns into consideration, Rosfort and
Stranghellini’s first point (that the mind and body are, for Descartes, naturally one being) appears
to be an accurate account of Descartes’ first description of the mind and body, but the
extrapolation from this account is far-removed from the context of Descartes’ intentions. The
danger of presenting such quote-mining or “contextomies” as evidence is obvious. Presenting
evidence in such a way cannot serve the purpose of preservation of philosophical dialogue. It
instead overlooks the actual contributions that have been made by Descartes.
A second effort at conservation is made in “In the Mood” that offers more promise.
Rosfort and Stranghellini are working to prove that Descartes was aware that there is a certain
influence of affect (mood) on thinking. The co-authors provide a specific example from Passions
in which Descartes noted an influence of affect upon reason. They draw upon Descartes’ order of
the passions. The passions, as shall be discussed in the next chapter, are the movement of the
“animal spirits” across the body and pineal gland. This movement generates one or more of the
primitive passions. Rosfort and Stranghellini discuss “wonder” as unique among these passions:
Of the six primitive passions20, wonder (l’admiration) is the most basic, and the
most interesting for the purpose of this essay, in that it exemplifies the persistent
ambivalence of rational and bodily feelings at the center of our emotional life. …
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It is the sole passion that does not involve motion of the blood or the heart,
but that stirs only the activity of the brain, which is the seat of scientific
knowledge. As such it can be properly characterized as an intellectual passion,
since the sensible motions that it causes takes place in the brain and not among
the fluctuations of the somatic landscape of the body. (405)
Rosfort and Stranghellini endeavor to describe wonder as a mood that is neither rooted in
emotion nor tied to physiological movements of the spirits.
Where most emotions and feelings tend to focus our attention on what is going on
around us, moods are more like a background atmosphere. A mood normally does
not single out any specific feature of our experience; rather, it seems to suffuse
our experience as a whole with a certain affective hue or tinge, and thus to qualify
the way we experience the world, other people, and ourselves. (408)
This last statement is problematic in relation to their argument that wonder is influential
over the mind. For wonder, in order to not be “stultified” or “stupid” by Descartes’ own words,
must be directed at objects of clear scientific interest. Thus wonder must by nature single out
specific features of our experience. The way Rosfort and Stranghellini use this passage,
consequently, constitutes a surgical removal of nearly the whole of the Cartesian paradigm, for it
entirely passes over the fact of Descartes’ first rule of inquiry—that one must only seek out
answers to clear and specific problems that are directed towards a clear and specific
epistemological goal. Moreover, these goals should be pursued in a specified order described by
the Cartesian tree of knowledge discussed in previous sections of this dissertation. Put simply,
the mood of wonder, though more intellectually driven than Descartes’ other primitive passions,
is still an unprecise and un-universal aspect of experience to take account of when establishing
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knowledge by Cartesian means. Rosfort and Stranghellini have rightly identified wonder as
uniquely intellectual compared to the other five primitive passions stipulated by Descartes, but
the intellectual flavor of wonder does not make it any more clear or distinct than the others. The
tone of this article implies that Descartes held wonder to be a nearly whimsical state of mind.
The tone of Descartes’ writing (personal and professional) is anything but whimsical. Instead, it
makes constant and clear appeal for clarity, purposefulness, and orderly procedure. While it is
true that intellectual passion does often inspire inquiry, and therefore also the pursuit of clarity,
purposefulness, and order, Descartes does not mean for the thinking being to continue its
engagement with the passions once she has spurred the will onwards. It is in fact the case that he
intends for one to divorce oneself from such passions as soon as they are understood as such.
Though Rosfort and Stranghellini endeavor to imbue Descartes with a grasp of the
qualitative aspects of subjectivity that later philosophers argue influences rational thought, their
efforts nonetheless are aimed at adding a dimension to the Cartesian paradigm that allows for
consideration of subjective, qualitative factors when considering the characteristics of a given
inquiry. Once again we find a contemporary approach to Descartes that works in a
conservational mode, and yet is working to fill in an “aesthetic” gap in the Cartesian paradigm.
What becomes evident after reading Rosfort and Stranghellini, as well as Sjoholm, is that those
encountering the Cartesian paradigm crave a means to inquire about experience and all that
influences experience. Sjoholm is working with Eric Koch’s idea of understanding the body as a
kind of data processor that renders the world as representation to the thinking being. This is a
view of the body that allows reason to approach experience as merely lumped together, singular
examples of universalizable instances of sensation. On this account, the Cartesian split between
mind and body is upheld by her premise of the body as “sensing machine.” “In the Mood”
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pursues a narrow avenue within the primary Cartesian texts that would add another dimension to
the consideration of objects presented to the thinking mind—that of mood. Mood is given as a
circumstance that may in some way color rational conclusions. More importantly the authors’
attempt to show that Descartes had some awareness as to the “tinting” effect of mood on
conclusions.

Introspection as a Means of Objectivizing the Subjective
In the previous two sections of this chapter my overall intention has been to demonstrate
that there is a contemporary interest in connecting the work of Descartes to subjective concepts,
thus filling a perceptible void in the Cartesian paradigm. The arguments made by Sjoholm and
Rosfort and Stranghellini highlight ways in which contemporary interests in the subjective facts
of human existence stimulate desires to find in Descartes’ work more inclusive possibilities than
previous scholarship was inclined to grant it. Such is the same with Tamara Albertini’s article
“Crisis and Certainty of Knowledge in Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) and Descartes (1596-1650).” The
essay is aimed at comparing Descartes and Al-Ghazali’s introspections in an effort to highlight
their reliance on spirituality as a means to psychological wellbeing. What Albertini’s article
demonstrates in a way important for our discussion is that introspection (a concept typically
associated with subjectivity, and thus not typically with Descartes) is a valuable means of
differentiating the objective from the subjective. The process of identifying what is objective and
what is subjective, derived from dualism as discussed in chapter 1, need not always be purely
aimed at establishing objective knowledge. Albertini’s comparison reveals that subjective
knowledge, particularly of one’s psychological state, is a vital precursor to the pursuit of
objective knowledge. I will add to Albertini’s discussion by arguing that while Descartes and Al-
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Ghazali intended to guide their readers in separating the objective from the subjective in order
for the objective to be made clearer, the converse situation of the subjective becoming clearer
also necessarily occurs. Viewed in terms of this dual-directional interplay, “subjective objects”
can be studied by the same means as given by the Cartesian paradigm. The self becomes an
object and we may better understand the self when it is separate from what is external to the self,
even if this separation is purely theoretical. We understand that there cannot be a full dismissal
of the subjective, lest objective foundations crumble as well.
The topic of introspection is, despite the association of Descartes with pursuit of
objectivity, a prevalent theme found in the work of contemporary scholars addressing Cartesian
philosophy. A great deal of interest is directed at the intense, hyperbolic introspective meditation
that Descartes describes in Meditations on First Philosophy. I suspect that interest stems from a
sense of marvel at the bravery, hubris, or even the futility that is intrinsic to such a meditation.
Of course, introspective meditation has been prevalent in philosophy since the time of Socrates.
The Jesuit tradition of Ignatian Spirituality, in which Descartes was educated, emphasizes
meditation.21 Meditation, in this tradition is, directed at knowing God’s will rather than one’s
own. As a devout Catholic, Descartes began his own meditations with this aim in mind, yet he
employed detachment from structure and implemented intense doubt rather than the typical
resolute trust in a higher being. It is in light of this hyperbolic doubt that Descartes’ meditation is
seen as unique—nearly freakish—and as such, it is subject to scrutiny.
In contemporary society there are a number of possible reasons why such intense
introspection is not the norm. First, within the psychological arena there is the fear of losing
one’s self-certitude. When one detaches from the structures of everyday life (arbitrary or
otherwise), the ego becomes isolated, a state that is counter to the social nature of humanity.
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Such a state is thus abhorrent to the individual. Second, there is a socially upheld view that
introspection can lead to undesirable ethical and moral tendencies. Put plainly, the argument
could be made that such intense introspection inherently leads to narcissism and selfishness.
Third and last, with the advent of Post-Structuralism there is a distinct sense of disillusionment
with the idea of the arbitrary being overcome. This section will investigate ways in which the
introspective quality of Descartes could be conserved, or modified, for the benefit of aesthetic
philosophical discourse—all without abandoning the four major tenets of the Cartesian
paradigm. An objective worldview and the schema of objective knowledge (mathesis
universalis) remain intact, and in fact both are strengthened by introspection as it allows one to
differentiate what is objective from what is subjective. Mind-body dualism is made more robust
when one works to determine what “I” am verses what “I” am not, and one can gain such
knowledge not just through exploration of the objective world, but through investigations into
oneself. The Cogito, as the theoretical outcome of the meditation, is the only tenet that could
possibly be threatened by grand introspection. But as we see below, it is in fact fortified by
Descartes’ doubt.
Resistance to grander introspection is often grounded in fear of the self-destruction that
accompanies the dissolution of self-certitude. The idea that an intense inward gaze could reveal
more questions than answers, or could lead to a complete destruction of oneself, is not a product
of modernity. In her essay addressing introspection and Descartes, Albertini describes this same
trepidation over possible self-destruction in the works of Al-Ghazali, who wrote in the late
eleventh century. The comparison offered by Albertini shows that to doubt one’s own existence
is a condition unsuited for proper inquiry. Al-Ghazali charts an intellectual journey that begins
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with a hyperbolic sense of doubt very much like that found in Descartes’ Meditations. This
spiritual and psychological crisis is summarized in these terms:
The Munqidhmin al-Dal/l [sic] reveals how that search eventually turned into an
agonizing quest. Al-Ghazali, the most celebrated scholar and teacher of his
time…. ultimately felt that the only thing he could be certain of was his upcoming
physical and mental collapse. Apparently, he realized that the more he
accumulated objective knowledge the less he found himself convinced of the
knowability of anything. … (1)
This preamble to his deep introspection is remarkably similar to that found in Descartes’
Meditations. Descartes specifically states the need to be stripped of all prejudices and
authoritatively informed knowledge in order to find any kind of certain knowledge. While
neither I nor Albertini infer that Descartes had any knowledge of Al-Ghazali, comparing them
reveals the importance for both of subjective inquiry as a means to support objective inquiry.
What both thinkers find is that their respective knowledge of subjectivity (their own religious
beliefs in God) are the saving grace of their self-certitude—an objective piece of knowledge.
Albertini states,
Descartes' famous description of a self-doubting itself in the Meditations has,
after all, often been interpreted as a device introduced for the sole purpose of
demonstrating that a skeptical position is intellectually unbearable-since it is
impossible to be certain of one's un-certainty without thereby already overcoming
skepticism. (2)
Albertini is of course referring to the passage from Meditations in which Descartes
grapples with existential crisis.22 The moments, in both Descartes and Al-Ghazali, of existential
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anxiety followed by resolve to clarify and revisit after illuminate the most important ways in
which the Cartesian paradigm remains so valuable. In moments of existential crisis, both thinkers
will themselves to a fundamental acceptance of their own existence on the basis of claiming that
any other alternative undermines the qualitative character of their existence.
In our current, highly pluralized state of existence today, a similar abhorrence of skeptical
introspection can be found for similar reasons. In a pluralistic society, there are multiple views
on any given subject, so it logically follows that there will be some point in an individual’s
intellectual and spiritual path where the gaze must be turned inward in order to sort out what is
true from the individual’s stand point. Descartes expressed some trepidation of his own inward
gaze in the First Meditation, yet he quickly overcomes this fear in the name of truth.23
From Descartes (and Al-Ghazali) we are assured that such fears of the loss of the self are
unfounded. What is evident, foremost, however, is that there must be a stripping away of that
which does not come from the self. Albertini cross-examines the two scholars’ methodologies in
this first exercise of introspection below.
Descartes develops his famous four rules (only the first of which is relevant for
the present inquiry): The first rule was never to accept anything as true that I did
not evidently know to be such: that is to say, carefully to avoid all precipitation
and prejudice, and to include in my judgments nothing more than that which
would present itself to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I were to have no
occasion to put it in doubt. (Discourse on Method, Part Two, 7, p. 15) Without
any question, Descartes is as fierce and rigorous in establishing certainty as AlGhazali: what is (still) dubitable or only probable cannot be said to be true.
Nevertheless, the clearing of unvalidated opinions and sensational perceptions is
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not expected to unravel one's original-religious-basis. What it provides is the
unhindered working of reason that for Descartes is invested best in mathematicsto the extent that the clarity and distinctness of thought achieved in arithmetic and
geometry become the measure for reliable knowledge. (7)
Albertini has brought to light a second historical example of hyperbolic doubt that,
although preceded by fear of the destruction of the ego, is overcome by a sense of willful
security—a security that in the case of both men is rooted in their religion. Recalling that
Descartes describes the law and “custom of the land” to be the source of knowledge when reason
fails us, we begin to see how he and Al-Ghazali have generated their self-certitude from the laws
and customs of the religion in which they were raised. Albertini notes this same point, but also
furthers its reach by stating that there could be no other way to conquer the skeptical question
than to remove oneself and see what remains before or after the self has been expunged. Below
she describes how God is the logical conclusion for those immersed in a religious culture.
Moreover, one needs to realize that the Cartesian mise-en-scene of a Self
doubting itself is ironically, the necessary preparatory stage leading to the
eventual defeat of skepticism. Not even excluding himself as the object of doubt
is what allows Descartes ultimately to set up our human rational ability as the
basis of certainty. Thinking. “… and here I discover what properly belongs to
myself. This alone is inseparable from me. I am—I exist: this is certain; but how
often? As often as I think. (Meditations, II, p. 136)” (7) … One finds Descartes
linking self-knowledge to the knowledge of God. In the Meditations one learns,
thus, that by scrutinizing one's thinking one discovers ideas of such clarity and
distinctness that they can only be innate. For instance, the epistemologically
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reliable 'idea' of the sun is not the one perceived through one's senses, but the one
rendered possible through the use of geometry and arithmetic that are epistemic
tools produced by the human mind. In that sense, the mathematically established
idea of the sun is innate. It is in this context that Descartes claims that there is no
idea as clear and more distinct as the idea of God and that we, therefore, have an
even more intimate knowledge of God than of ourselves” (8-9)
Albertini makes a case for the conservation of Cartesian introspection for the benefit of
spiritual security. If one sheds all knowledge of the day-to-day world, even the fact of one’s own
existence, then what will follow—in Albertini’s logical sequence—is a better sense of one’s self
and place in the universe. Put simply, to lose oneself is to find oneself.
It is worth noting that the practice of the skeptical meditation does not yield universally
similar results. When the philosophical atmosphere for both Al-Ghazali and Descartes is
considered, their interest in self-certitude is readily understood, and yet their legacy to
philosophy is strikingly polarized. Both thinkers were rebelling against the “incoherence24” (AlGhazali’s term) of the dominant Aristotelian philosophies of their times. Unlike Descartes, AlGhazali concluded that faith outweighed reason, and returned to religiously-grounded selfhood.
His work presaged the turn away from philosophy in favor of religious traditionalism in the
Islamic world, whereas Descartes’ skepticism concluded in the rise of secularism and the
European enlightenment. In view of the radical differences of their cultural-historical effects, the
similarities between them are all the more intriguing.

Heidegger’s Four Principles Opposing the Cartesian Paradigm
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It is of course worth addressing the work of those philosophers who appear to directly
oppose that of Descartes. As I have argued in the first chapter, the Cartesian paradigm is
foundational to modern Western philosophy, but there are scholars who oppose some, or even
all, of the four pillars. In this chapter, I will make the argument that despite their opposition,
these philosophers cannot fully jettison from their own work the lineage of Western philosophy
that runs through Descartes. Martin Heidegger is the most important in terms of the depth of his
opposition. He objects to the Cartesian paradigm because of its dualism (the object/subject
divide), yet I will argue that his own work cannot transcend the “Cartesian-ness” of the modern
western world. Both his own analysis of aesthetics, and his idealized means of aesthetics and the
way he views modern aesthetics, depend upon the Cartesian pillars in both its negative and
positive work. In engaging the Cartesian paradigm in the specific arena of aesthetics, albeit in a
stringently critical manner, Heidegger is unique among Western philosophers contemplating the
work of Descartes.
To flesh out Heidegger’s critique of modern aesthetics, and indeed modern life generally,
we must start by defining the word “subjectivism.” Subjectivism is the idea that knowledge is
only subjective and that objective knowledge is an impossibility. For Heidegger, this has been
the modern paradigm of knowledge since the Enlightenment. He finds Descartes’ schism of mind
and body, and thus of object and subject, to be an “unnatural” way of understanding the world.
He argues that in our contemporary times we approach the “five phenomena” of science,
technology, culture, aesthetics, and religion in terms of the subject/object divide. He views this
as objectionable as it displaces Dasein from these objects in ways that alienate parts of Dasein’s
being from itself. He finds the subjectivist understanding of oneself to be existentially
incomplete, and improper to Dasein’s way of being in the world. Heidegger’s disdain for the
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Cartesian paradigm is neatly summarized in The Age of the World Picture: “Through Descartes,
realism is first put in the position of having to prove the reality of the outer world, of having to
save that which is as such” (178/139) This statement is made in reference to Cartesian
metaphysics specifically, but it is easily translated to the four pillars. Simply put, if one does not
need to prove (or conversely doubt then prove) any part of one’s world (natural, subjective, or
otherwise) then the need for a primary principle of existence (the cogito), a means of identifying
oneself vs what is not of oneself (dualism), is not necessary, nor is it necessarily beneficial to
understand the world as mechanistic and possessed of objective knowledge.
To eschew Descartes’ skepticism of reality, for Heidegger, is to negate the whole of the
Cartesian paradigm. Yet, is it not true that Heidegger is himself exercising a kind of skepticism?
He doubts the veracity of objective knowledge, and finds that, for himself (subjectively) the idea
of objective knowledge to be an impossibility. Heidegger’s call to question the schemas of
modernity, though methodologically inverted from Descartes, still bear striking similarity to the
hyperbolic doubt that Descartes exercised in Mediations. Both philosophers turned their
attentions to the broader “fabrics” of one’s existence. As it happens, the two men’s historical
chronology afforded them two very different logical conclusions. One found that through
rational practices predicated on doubt, the thinking being can discern truths in the world around
her. The other found through ontological practices predicated on doubt that Dasein can discern
her existence authentically.
Heidegger, however, knows the futility of eschewing the Cartesian paradigm. He writes
of the difficulty of undoing modernity: “Descartes can be overcome only through the
overcoming of that which he himself founded, only through the overcoming of modern, and that
means at the same time Western, metaphysics” (140/180). Heidegger vaguely proposes a more
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“unified” worldview, a point of view that does not depend upon the need for verifying reality via
objective means. Four anthropocentric principles by Heidegger are to provide a way of
overcoming modernity:
1. The manner and mode in which man is man, Le., is himself; the manner of the
coming to presence [Wesensart] of selfhood, which is not at all synonymous with Iness, but rather is determined out of the relation to Being as such.
2. The interpretation of the coming to presence [Wesauslegung] of the Being of
whatever is.
3. The delineation of the coming to presence [Wesensentwurfl of truth.
4. The sense in which, in any given instance, man is measure.
None of these essential moments in a fundamental metaphysical position may be
understood apart from the others. Each one always betokens, from the outset, the whole
of a fundamental metaphysical position. Precisely why and in what respect these four
moments sustain and structure in advance a fundamental metaphysical position as such is
a question that can no longer be asked or answered from out of metaphysics and by
means of metaphysics. (145/184)
These four principles may initially appear to contradict the Cartesian paradigm, but they are in
fact only additions to it. The first principle is intended to reject the idea of the self as an isolated,
singular being, and propose the self as a being subject to its own moment and circumstance of
being. The overall goal of the two philosophers appears to be the same, however, as one is
working to objectively prove the existence of the self, while the other is working to
phenomenologically state the existence of the self. The end result of both inquiries is the same.
Both philosophers determine that they must give an initial guarantee of the self to progress with
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their respective paradigms. That is to say, both men must satisfy the decorum of providing the
mind with a sense of ease as to its own existence—a move that is truly Cartesian in nature. While
Descartes sought to objectively prove one’s existence, Heidegger worked to delineate the
conditions of one’s existence—but the end results are the same. The self provides itself with a
sense of security as to her factuality and as to her sense of how to proceed with inquiry.
Operationally Heidegger proceeds precisely in Descartes’ footsteps by constructing a
worldview that is predicated on the self-as-such. The second principle of Heidegger’s cited
above is meant to be a rejection of dualism by accepting “whatever is” rather than a clearly
delineated dual realms of “what is I” and “what is not I.” For Heidegger, anything that is given to
Dasein exists. However, Cartesian ontology (I must exist because God does not deceive) does
not negate ontological investigations in these terms. In fact, in order for Dasein to reveal itself,
one must first understand that Dasein exists, and that she exists in a world. Dasein and Dasein’s
world (time) are different objects of the same existence. Descartes did not call into question the
veracity of subjective knowledge, only the universality of it.
The third principle is meant to replace a mechanistic worldview. Instead of understanding
truth as something that can be understood by reason, it is instead presented as something Dasein
can be “in the presence of.” Heidegger’s rejection of a mechanistic worldview has a distinctively
conservative tone to it. Throughout his entire body of work Heidegger reveals an on-going
disdain for what he perceives the hubris of the modern thinker’s goal of objective knowledge.
But his dislike for modernity carries with it a dislike for materialistic thinking –science and
technology, for Heidegger are materialistic approaches by contemporary standards— that can be
understood as a direct reflection of the Conservative revolutionary movement of his time. Simply
put, his work reflects the disillusionment with urban, liberal, and commercial life. But his

70
critique is formed in the same pitch as Descartes’ hyperbolic meditation: the pitch of doubt.
Heidegger doubts objective knowledge on the grounds of what he terms correspondence: the
concept of ideas, beliefs, and thoughts as truthfully, or more accurately, correctly corresponding
to objects in the real world. He is in effect questioning the “truth-ness” of scientific knowledge,
largely based on what he views as its corruptive influence on his own idealized, more organic,
and decidedly “working-class” mode of existence. His argument in no way calls into question
scientific truths. It only calls into question, in a conservative manner, the benefit of it to
humanity.
The fourth and final principle is given above would both reject and replace mathesis
universalis. As previously noted above, when Heidegger writes an explicit treatment of mathesis
universalis (Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics), he conspicuously drops the
“universalis” during his discussion. As he was dubious about objective knowledge (and
conversely about subjective knowledge), it is unsurprising that he would view the concept of
mathesis universalis as another “enframement” to be overcome. To overcome mathesis
universalis, he proposes Dasein “study” what she is in primary epistemic contact with—that
which is at hand. The argument that Dasein should only concern itself with this kind of localized
knowledge is, in our contemporary age especially, a radical restriction of one’s scope of inquiry.
The very idea is akin to erasing history. Descartes’ vision for mathesis universalis, of humanity
working towards a body of knowledge about the natural world, has been strongly established in
the West. The idea that such a foundation would be overcome, or even that it should be, has the
flavor of nostalgia for an age of existence that cannot be re-discovered.
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Heidegger and Aesthetics
As this dissertation’s overall focus is aesthetics, I will limit my account of Heidegger’s
work to his views on the Cartesian pillars and aesthetics—two fields he unexpectedly unites via a
strong critique. Heidegger views artworks created since the Enlightenment as a symptom of the
subjectivism begat by the Cartesian paradigm. Put simply, he finds the aestheticization of the arts
to be the cause for the artworks made. The general supposition he wishes to question is that the
artwork is the object and that the viewer is the subject, and the business of sensation is the
central concern of aesthetics. It is through the “aestheticization” of art that we understand art as
such within modernity. The attitude towards art that modern aesthetics maintains is that art is
contained within the full scope of aesthetics—meaning that it is kept in specific arenas, forms,
and studied in terms that are enframed by the concepts of the science of aesthetics. Heidegger
finds this to be an impoverished way of approaching art. Indeed, to “approach” art at all is an
abhorrent idea for Heidegger.
For him, art is not aesthetics, but instead has become aestheticized, and in so doing has
pushed to the margins of awareness by its specialization, its lack of a universal system of
expression, and by the innumerable empty artistic gestures that occur in our culture (for example,
the beading of one’s hand-bag or the decoration of one’s home, no matter how elaborate or
interesting, would be empty gestures for Heidegger). Technology (and Heidegger does place our
current understanding and creation of art in the realm of technology) and science are merely
means to control every minute aspect of our lives, as if that control would serve some greater
purpose. Recalling that the Cartesian subject/object relationship is the underlying principle of
nearly all philosophy during Heidegger’s time, Heidegger makes the case that from such a
dichotomy, human kind has engaged in a never-ending attempt to bring all that is sensible to it
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under our control. In “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger spells out plainly that
subjectivism has taken on a nearly religious status in the modern era, “Everything depends on
our manipulating technology in the proper manner as a means. We will, as we say, “get” the
technology “spiritually in hand.” We will master it. The will to mastery becomes all the more
urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control” (Heidegger “Technology” 2).
Heidegger recalls Nietzsche’s “will to power” with this account of the process of
enframing described in “Technology.” Enframing (gestell), for Heidegger, means the application
of technology not just as a means to a particular end, but instead as part of the enframed fabric of
existence. What is revealed as truth must first be enframed, meaning that it had to have a way to
exist in the world, more specifically, must have a way to be understood and seen as existing for
the thinking-being. “Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand,
indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering” (7). Heidegger criticizes
the idealism that pervaded continental philosophies for centuries via his concept of enframing.
The aestheticization of the arts, however, is a unique topic to approach with this critique, as the
arts are specifically human-made (opposed to human-discovered) for human-consumption. In a
concise summary of this key concept for Heidegger, philosophy scholar Iain Thomson
crystallizes the subjectivist underpinnings of modern philosophy:
In this way, modern philosophy lays the conceptual groundwork for subjectivism,
the “worldview” in which an intrinsically-meaningless objective realm (“nature”)
is separated epistemically from isolated, value-bestowing, self-certain subjects,
and so needs to be mastered through the relentless epistemological, normative,
and practical activities of these subjects. (Thomson 5)
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Returning to Heidegger’s specific critique of aesthetics, it is important to note that he
does not entirely dismiss the subject/object dichotomy. Indeed, it is a crucial part of his ideas of
how artworks can transform one’s state of being. For Kant and other idealists, the subject/object
relationship is the given state of things at all times. For Heidegger, the subject/object relationship
is only revealed at moments when Dasein is isolated from and reflective of the objects of its
world via a disruption in its normal, “hands-on” (zuhanden) state of being. When objects are
revealed by small, ephemeral moments of this type of disruption of the norm is when the truth of
one’s subjective being is revealed. Heidegger’s conception of the arts, therefore, does not fully
dismiss the object/subject divide, but only seeks to convey that the knowledge gained from this
experience is non-universal—in other words it is subject to the conditions and assumptions of
one’s time and place.
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CHAPTER 3

Descartes and Beauty
“Poetry is the guardian of the non-trivial, a thunderstorm of aphorisms, sibling to the
philosophical fragment. But the reverse is also true: As long as philosophical thought cannot
avoid falling back on metaphors, similes, and symbols, it remains, however loosely, bound up
with poetry, and indebted to it.” – Durs Grunbein, Descartes’ Devil
Descartes, with his isolation of the soul in its own volitions, effectively disrupts the
discussion of societal good. Within this chapter, I will examine Descartes’ model of the soul, his
conceptions of the good, and present his limited views on poetics, all as a means to define what
precisely a Cartesian aesthetic program might entail. The Cartesian model situates poetics in
terms of the individual as well as within society, and it holds a provisional space for cultural
customs in regards to epistemic practice. I will argue that Descartes’ treatment of the soul is
incomplete because of its neglect of creative expression. While biographical evidence reveals
that for Descartes personally poetry does hold some value to the soul, his canonical writings have
little to say about why the arts should be appreciated. Through a detailed examination of his
ethical and moral propositions, we can extrapolate the beginnings of a Cartesian aesthetic
program, as well as identify gaps in the Cartesian paradigm that invite aesthetic discourse.
Further still, I maintain that while Descartes viewed mathematics as epitomizing the universal on
the theoretical side of human existence, he relies on cultural knowledge to provide practical
advice when theoretical knowledge is lacking, an acknowledgment provides space in his model
for the study and appreciation of the arts. This chapter delves heavily into Descartes’ own model
of the soul and his scant writings on the topic of morality. In conclusion, I will make the case
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that Descartes does hold some small esteem for the cultural aspects of humanity, and thus
provides a space for the study of the arts as a practical form of knowledge.

The Cartesian Model of the Soul: A Synthesis of Plato and Aristotle
The two most prevalent models of the soul during Descartes’ lifetime would have been
those of Plato and Aristotle. Descartes synthesizes the two models, forming an inward-movingout model rather than the more dichotomous top-down (Plato) or bottom-up (Aristotle) schemas.
With this synthesis, there are windows of opportunity for aesthetic discourse. Descartes’ model
of the soul shares similarities with Plato’s on several points:
(1) reason rules over sensation;
(2) sensations are not to be trusted;
(3) the truths that govern reason serve to penetrate the sensorial realms, giving us

knowledge that transcends time and context;25
(4) their respective models of knowledge are mathematical in nature.

For Plato, reason is placed hierarchically over the separate parts of the soul, whereas for
Descartes it is inseparable from appetite. But reason should rule over the passions that govern
them in both models. Moreover, both thinkers shared mistrust of the senses. While describing the
conditions necessary for one to realize truth, Descartes prescribes a shedding of the senses’
influence over observation and thought, likening their attributes to those of a villain-like
character:
I shall consider myself as having no hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses,
but as having falsely believed that I had all these things. I shall stubbornly persist
in this train of thought; and even if I can’t learn any truth, I shall at least do what I
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can do, which is to be on my guard against accepting any falsehoods, so that the
deceiver—however powerful and cunning he may be—will be unable to affect me
in the slightest. (Meditations 3).
Further, for both Plato and Descartes, truth (and thus knowledge) must go beyond the
sensorial—in other words truth must be abstract, while knowledge must be mathematical in
nature.26 Likewise, Plato’s truths Forms, were mathematical in nature (523d-525b, Republic27).
For Descartes truth necessitated an axiomatic, geometric mode of explication.28
The similarities between the Cartesian and the Platonic souls are enough to make one
presume that Descartes, like Plato, would be dismissive of aesthetic concerns. However, none of
these similarities uphold Plato’s charge against mimesis, nor do any of these aspects necessitate a
full dismissal of the arts or of qualitative concepts generally. Reason ruling over sensation does
not negate sensation. Instead it reassigns sensation from being an immediate authority on truth to
being an object of consideration in terms of the mechanisms at play when sensation does direct
the mind, as well as the source of what one can rightfully discern from sensation. Consider
Descartes’ own interest in the subject of Optics. His interests were in determining the
mechanisms of the human eye, as well as the properties of light. By turning his attentions to
these subjects, Descartes was working to provide refinement to the thinking mind’s
understanding of its own vision. This work to refine sensory intuition via a sound basis of
mechanical knowledge allows for the dismissal of Plato’s charge of mimesis.
In Book X of Republic Plato charges the arts with mimesis—that is to say, with being
mimetic of Ideals rather than the Ideal themselves, and therefore a corruptive force. Art objects
are twice removed from the ideal, whereas objects of craft—a table for example—is only one
step removed. The table is less corrupt than the painting of the table as it is not inherently
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materially false. This charge of mimesis could be carried over to the Cartesian paradigm, as the
arts are sensorial, and sensorial information is not rational information, and is therefore not a
means to determine knowledge. However, Descartes makes a significant break with Plato in
terms of charges of mimesis. Deborah J. Brown’s essay, entitled “Descartes on True and False
Ideas” helps us to illuminate this break from Plato. Though her own discussion is centered on the
Objections and Responses portion of Meditations, her references to the question of material
falsity are germane to the topic of corruptive mimesis. Brown refers to the exchange between
Antoine Arnauld and Descartes, working through the problem of “no things” in which the
objective nature of cold is at stake. The debate centers upon the idea of cold being an absence of
heat, or its being a thing in and of itself. Brown establishes the basis of her review in the
principles provided by the Meditations, properly rooting her claim in the overall operations of
the Cartesian paradigm. She states first and foremost that, “We learn from the Sixth Mediation
that the primary function of sensation is to deliver us the world not so as to know it but to
navigate it successfully as embodied agents” (197). Brown then moves to the Cartesian approach
to material falsity: “The falsity of such ideas [of cold] rests with their being ‘referred’ to as
something other than that of which they are ideas” (207). Simply put, the representation of the
sensation to the mind is what is at stake, not a determination of truth in the sensation itself.
Brown avers that for Descartes all that the thinking being may take awareness of in the natural
world are equally representations to res cogitans. “All ideas are true and positive because
‘weather cold is a positive thing or an absence does not affect the idea I have of it” (207).
Brown concludes that sensations, be they caused by non-things, voids, or illusion, are for
Descartes legitimate representations for res cogitans, but only if they are understood as positive
objects: “If cold is a privation, when the idea of cold represents bodies as modified in a positive
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way, the idea will be materially false but not, on that account, harmful to the union. Nor will it be
uninformative. The falsity of such ideas renders them unfit for incorporation in physics, but
necessary for everyday life and our understanding of our place in the material world” (211).
What is implied, but never acknowledged with the above statement is the idea that
mimesis of a thing, even if it turns out to be no-thing, is not cause for dismissal. If the eye is
fooled by a representation of a table, the trick of the eye is a positive object in terms of the
body’s reaction. Therefore, it is an object worthy of inquiry. What is more, once understood as
an illusion it is a cause for further investigation as it is an indicator of a gap in knowledge and
discourse. Sensorial representations that are not immediately evident are veritable “markers” for
further inquiry with the provision that the metaphysical and physical knowledge that are at play
are properly established. In this case, the corruption that Plato associated with mimetic objects
(art or otherwise) can no longer be considered as merely confusing or distracting forces. Mimesis
is now a cause for further investigation as to the means, function, and causes of the mimetic
behavior. If mimetic activity is clear of the charge of mimesis, then the mimetic properties of
painting, for example, (Plato’s bête noire) are to be revisited in terms of the applied skill and
means that would generate such an object. A thinking person’s inquiries must now, by necessity,
move towards the study of painting on all the aspects of its generation—inclusive of the artist,
the era at hand, the techniques employed, the discourse that preceded the piece, etc. The
dismissal of the Platonic view of mimesis combined with the Cartesian objective world view (a
mechanistic and knowable universe), necessitates a niche for the study of the arts as objects.
This objectification of the arts, however, will not satisfy all. It does little to address the
Aristotelian view of poetics as a means of catharsis, nor does it free the arts from the bonds of
“proper forms” (recall that Aristotle’s Poetics is a practical guide to the proper ways of creating
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poetry). The objectification described above only serves art objects as products, not processes.
There is little room for acknowledging the arts as having a function beyond objects that pique
curiosity via their technical creation and sensorial effects. However, Descartes addresses
Aristotelean philosophy by means of the foundation of Cartesian epistemology—metaphysics—
and it is on this subject matter we see a second schism from Classical philosophy in the Cartesian
paradigm. Descartes’ modeling of the soul will free not only objects from charges of mimesis,
but will also challenge the Aristotelian conception of experience as bound by memory and
cognition. This divorce from the Aristotelean model of experience has effects on the morality
that Aristotle connected to cathartic poetic experience.
While Plato determined the basis of the soul to be directly linked to ideals beyond the
physical body, Aristotle found the basis for the soul to be seated in the functions of memory and
cognition. Cartesian dualism, the basis for Descartes’ model of the soul, begins with a
declaration of guiding principles, not precisely akin to Plato’s in Republic II, in which Plato
declares that the principle of justice guides one’s understanding of the soul. Five principles shape
the unfolding of Descartes’ claims, claims linked together by strict sequences of logical
predication modeled upon geometric deductive reasoning. Different from Plato’s, these five
principles are not directly linked to any pre-existing notion of morality. The Cartesian principles
for defining the soul are: completeness, essentiality, uniqueness, comprehensiveness, and
exclusivity.29 In Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes utilizes these principles to construct
his model of the soul as seated in thinking (doubting, specifically). The planting of the individual
soul into subjectivity is contra to Aristotle in that experience is no longer defined in the sense of
everyday experience, but in the sense of all that the mind may sense, including its own
machinations (a key point for Descartes modeling of the body as a machine30). The soul is then

80
split into the two distinct components: the mind (res cogitan), and all that is external to the mind
taken in by the senses (res extensa). This overturning of the classical notion of experience into
the sense’s representation of experience serves as the anchor of modernity in innumerable ways
(reference Chapter 1). Most importantly, Descartes’ dismissal of Aristotelean metaphysics comes
with the establishment of his own epistemological paradigm.
Aristotle connects experience with the counterparts of memory and perception in
Metaphysics and in both of the Analytics. He separates experience into two kinds, a primitive
kind of the sort that we share with animals, and a higher kind that is preparatory for reason. (see
Aristotle’s Analytic Posterior II 19) When this higher form of experience is joined by rationality,
there can be a generation of knowledge. In the essay “Aristotle’s Notion of Experience,” Pavel
Gregorić and Filip Grgić demonstrate that for Aristotle experience requires a single cognizant
disposition. They describe it thus:
By contrast, we have distinguished between experience and basic rationality,
finding some evidence for this distinction in APo. II.19. This distinction enabled
us to take experience, in all its forms, as a single cognitive disposition. It is a
single cognitive disposition because it has to do, in all its forms, with
accumulation of facts concerning particulars. If experience is coupled with
rationality, facts can be organized by means of universals and formulated in
universal propositions. (30)
The Cartesian concept of experience frees cognition from artificial structures of idealism.
Gregor Schiemann, in his essay Contexts of Nature According to Aristotle and Descartes, opens
this topic elegantly with the following description of the Cartesian understanding of experience:
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The privileged context of experience for Descartes' concept of nature is one's own
inner self experience. From the point of view of cultural history, this approach
reflects the initial release of the individual from preordained frames of reference.
The individual turns away from everyday life toward her or his inner world,
which is present only mentally. The inner world is the domain of more or less
conscious thoughts, sensations, feelings and moods - a field of experience in
which the bodily, the mental, and their combinations occur. (Schiemann 70)
Modernity is the manifestation of this turning inwards. The centralization of the
doubting/thinking subject as a being capable of generating its own knowledge of its experience is
the basis for the significant growth in the fields of psychology, philosophy, and innumerable
aesthetic movements. From the above we can see that individual experience guided by chaotic
movements of animal spirits is the framework from which one, through means inherently
available to oneself, is granted autonomy from culturally upheld concepts. This view of the soul
as “self-contained” carries the implication that catharsis be likewise of a unique and self-made
character. Put simply, if res cogitan is unique in its completeness, then it follows that those
mechanisms that serve to purge a unique soul would also be unique. As modernity is grounded
upon this individualistic turn, we will find that the socially operated means of catharsis that was
Aristotle’s famed pardon for poetics cannot be upheld in a Cartesian paradigm. Recall that
Descartes finds the desires of the soul so un-universal as to ascribe to them a chaotic nature,
broiling about in a human body like bubbles in a champagne glass. Therefore, it will follow that
the means to “righting” the soul could also not be universal. Therefore, the strictly dictated
themes, forms, and other prescriptive requirements that Aristotle lays out for poetics are divested
of their “universal” quality.
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The Characteristics of the Cartesian Soul
Descartes views the soul as unfixed in disposition but changes arise solely by actions of a
physical nature. He sets the metaphysical and physical boundaries of the soul as follows in
Passions of the Soul,
I note that anything that happens is generally labelled by philosophers as a
‘passion’ with regard to the subject to which it happens and an ‘action’ with
regard to whatever brings it about that it happens. Thus, although the agent and
patient—the maker and the undergoer—are often quite different, an action and
passion are always a single thing that has these two names because of the two
different subjects to which it may be related. (1)
Passions are clearly the realm of the thinking subject. Actions, though they may not
always be external to the thinking subject, are clearly outside the bounds of the theater of the
mind. Descartes elaborates upon these definitions, giving us passions caused by will and
passions caused by perception:
There are two main kinds of thoughts—actions of the soul and passions of the
soul. The ones I call ‘actions’ are all our volitions, ·i.e. acts of the will·, because
we experience them as coming directly from our soul with, apparently, no input
from anything else. On the other hand, our various perceptions or items of
knowledge can be called the soul’s “passions”—taking this word in a very general
sense—because they are often not “actively” made by our soul but rather
“passively” received by the soul from the things that they represent. (5)
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Descartes gives the subject the new feature of the will as separate from emotions. He
describes the will as also being of two kinds: “actions of the soul that aim only at something in
the soul itself, as when we will to love God or in any way to apply our mind to some object that
isn’t material; and actions of the soul that aim at some event in our body, as when we will to
walk” (6). In a later passage he makes the more declarative statement as to the position of the
will:
But the will is by its nature so free that it can’t ever be constrained. Of the two
kinds of thought I distinguished in the soul in article 17—its actions, i.e. its
volitions, and its passions, taking this word in its broadest sense to include every
kind of perception —the actions are absolutely within the soul’s power and can’t
be changed by the body except indirectly, whereas the passions are absolutely
dependent on the bodily events that produce them, and can’t be changed by the
soul except indirectly, with the exception of cases where the soul is itself their
cause. All that the soul actively does is this: it wills to do something x, and that
brings it about that the little gland to which it is closely joined moves in the way
needed to produce the doing of x. (12)
Prior to his conception of the soul and its will, we may affirm that, prior to Cartesian
theory, from Augustine to Aquinas to Luther, the soul was subject to God. Since Descartes, the
soul is subject to its will and the will is largely subject to perceptions—perceptions which
Descartes also divides into two sorts, those of the body (sensations) and those of the soul. Here is
where imagination (the perceptions of the soul) enters his paradigm and proves to be key to our
understanding the Cartesian Soul:
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The ones [imaginings] caused by the soul are our perceptions of our volitions and
of all the imaginings or other thoughts that depend on them. We can’t will
anything without thereby perceiving that we are willing it—that’s for sure. And
although our soul is active in willing, it is passive in its perception of that action.
But because this perception is really one and the same thing as the volition, and
names are always based on whatever sounds better, we usually don’t call it a
‘passion’ but an ‘action.’ (6)
Descartes is quick to dismiss the meaning of certain types of irrational imaginings—
dreams and day dreams— as if they were a form of imbalance brought about by a passivity of the
soul,31 but later discusses them in more depth, referring to them as passions of the soul. These
types of thoughts are described as “perceptions, sensations or commotions of the soul which we
relate particularly to the soul, and are caused, maintained and strengthened by some movement
of the spirits”32 (Passions 8). Descartes prefers the term “commotions” as it best describes the
chaotic actions of the animal spirits.33 The preceding section of Passions of the Soul presents a
particularly idiosyncratic discussion of the Pineal gland as being the seat of the soul and the
source of all internal thoughts.34 Sidestepping Descartes’ incomplete understanding of anatomy,
what we must take from Descartes’ position for the sake of our discussion is two-fold:
(1) For Descartes, there is materiality to thoughts and imaginings to be found in the body
(2) the body and mind are linked by perceptions of the senses.
As thoughts are material in nature they cannot be in and of themselves corrupt, nor can they be
understood as beyond our understanding—as material parts of our mechanistic world they are
under the auspices of mathesis universalis. They in themselves must someday (when the proper
metaphysical, physical, and mechanical means are established) become subject to inquiry. The
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control Descartes grants the mind over the body is not a natural order so much as a practiced skill
of identification of the various objects presented to it. This is cultivated by the will, as he
mentions several times throughout Passions people who are slow, stupid or weak-willed in terms
of their passions.

Cartesian Morality and Virtue
While Descartes never gives an in-depth discussion of morality in any of his major texts,
he does provide some small details as to his ideas of the good. The Cartesian soul contains within
it nearly all that is needed for negotiating the greatest good, practicing virtue and attaining
happiness—Descartes’ final end of the good.
Reason is cultivated by the investigation of the sciences, which “yield that pleasure,
which is found in the contemplation of truth, practically the only joy in life that is complete and
untroubled by any pain” (Rules, 22). Descartes establishes res cogitan as possessed of all that it
needs, not only for reason, but for moral judgement as well. By connecting moral judgement and
epistemology in this way, the good must also be understood as tied to epistemology. Put simply,
the way to develop one’s reason is to pursue as much knowledge as possible so that reason may
be best informed. When reason is well developed, the good will become evident to reason. Ergo
the good is epistemologically informed, putting Descartes’ ethics in line with that of Aristotle:
the realization of a happy life ought to be the pursuit of natural philosophy.
It is possible to argue that Descartes’ insistence on the universal truths of science (a top
down approach) as the source of knowledge that informs reason could be construed as more
Platonic in nature. But the significant difference of Descartes’ universals from those of Plato is
that Descartes situates his universals in the knowledge of this life (physics and metaphysics),
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rather than in divine ideals that are unknowable during the course of a natural human life35. This
is not to say that experience of this life is the source of knowledge, as the beginning of
Descartes’ Meditations clearly shows mistrust for the senses. Knowledge is instead to be
abstracted from the natural world, and the truths of the divine are to be considered in the “next
life,” as Descartes writes at the end of the third meditation.36

Descartes believes that the knowledge necessary for reason to negotiate the good is specifically
ordered. Descartes uses the metaphor of a tree to describe this order, beginning from its roots and
growing upward- a notable inversion of Plato’s order of things.
The roots of this tree are metaphysics, followed by the trunk of physics, and capped with
the branches of the practical sciences of medicine, mechanics, and highest of these branches,
morality. For the wisdom of morality, we must first solidify the wisdom of all of the lower parts
of knowledge. This perhaps gives us insight into why Descartes himself never tackled in detail
the topic of ethics, as he felt that one first had to master the knowledge of metaphysics and
physics—a task that certainly spans a lifetime. More telling of his silence is a passage from a
letter to his friend Pierre Hector Chanut. Recalling the rigorous maintenance of specialization of
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labor of Plato’s Republic, he writes of his lack of a right to consider such a topic: “I believe only
sovereigns, or those authorized by them, have the right to concern themselves with regulating the
morals of other people” (Descartes Correspondence 203). Despite the absence of a definitive text
on the topic we can still extract a clear ethical standpoint that is reminiscent of both Plato and
Aristotle. Donald Rutherford in his essay Descartes’ Ethics succinctly captures the implications
of Descartes’ scant writings on the subject, “If Descartes limits the role of philosophy in
determining specific moral rules, he nonetheless upholds the ancients’ conception of philosophy
as the search for a wisdom sufficient for happiness. It is in this sense that ethics remains central
to Descartes’ philosophy.”
While it is true that Descartes radically changes the conception of the good as being
geared towards the individual soul rather than the soul amidst the city-state as it was for both
Plato and Aristotle, Descartes nonetheless does insist that if one follows the order of knowledge
to discover truth, reason will be so well informed that the good will be clearly evident. As
Descartes was deeply entrenched in the study and completion of the first two levels of
knowledge, his feeling of being unqualified to generate an original moral code discounts his
obligation to direct the soul in some way. Descartes does humbly offer a framework for the time
being, one that he never viewed himself as having finished. Still he sketched this provisional
moral code, found in Part II of Discourse on Method:
(1) The first was to obey the laws and customs of my country, holding constantly to
the religion in which by God’s grace I had been instructed from my childhood,
and governing myself in all other matters—·i.e. all the ones not settled by the law
of the land or my religion·—on the basis of the most moderate and least extreme
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opinions, the opinions commonly accepted in practice by the most sensible of the
people with whom I would have to live. (Descartes, Discourse 11)
(2) My second maxim was to be as firm and decisive in my actions as I could, and to
follow even the most doubtful opinions, once I had adopted them, as constantly as
if they had been quite certain. (Ibid)
(3) My third maxim was to try always to master myself rather than fortune, and
change my desires rather than changing how things stand in the world. (Descartes,
Discourse 12)
(4) Finally, to conclude this moral code, I decided to review the various occupations
of human life, so as to try to choose the best. Without wanting to say anything
about other people’s occupations, I thought it would be best for me to continue
with the very one I was then engaged in, and devote my whole life to cultivating
my reason and advancing as far as I could in the knowledge of the truth, following
my self-imposed method. Since beginning to use this method I had felt such
extreme satisfactions that I didn’t think one could enjoy any sweeter or purer ones
in this life. (Ibid)
From the above, in particular the first three maxims, we can see Descartes recollecting
Aristotle’s couching of the good in terms of virtue as a perfected control of the will requiring a
sound judgment informed by reason. This is crystallized in Part III of Discourse on Method.
For our will tends to pursue (or avoid) only what our intellect represents as good
(or bad), so all we need in order to act well is to judge well; and judging as well as
we can is all we need to act as well as we can—that is to say, to acquire all the
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virtues and in general all the other attainable goods. With this certainty, one
cannot fail to be happy. (13)
This articulated an idea of virtue as a comportment of the will as informed by reason’s
bons sens (good judgment) so as to move towards happiness. All that is necessary for the proper
conditioning of the will is already possessed by reason. Sound judgements allow the pursuit of
individual happiness, which is the greatest good.
Notably missing from his theory is a discussion of the social aspects to virtue and
happiness, as well as any explicit acknowledgment of poetics or human expression. Plato and
Aristotle maintained their discussions of the good on a social plane, with poetics informing the
soul (in respectively undesirable and desirable ways) and with the individual soul being
explicitly part of a collective of souls (the kallipolis or the acropolis). Descartes’ isolation of the
individual via his rationally directed and epistemologically informed moral stance makes
generating any kind of social codes and norms very difficult. Of particular interest to this
dissertation is the problem of expression. As individual thinking beings begin to determine
criteria for moral judgments, the Cartesian paradigm limits their expression of their findings to
those modes of language that suit the more immediate needs of knowledge—recall that a
Cartesian moral stance must first be epistemologically informed, therefore questions of
knowledge must first be answered. By putting a priority on knowledge of the natural world that
is universal in nature—meaning that it must be expressible in a universal manner such as
mathematics—Descartes fails to foresee that as the good is inextricably tied to the individual, a
means of expressing the good as an individual, rather than as a universal good, must be granted.
He has essentially left a gap in the means of expression for res cogitans. By granting res cogitans
the skills of reason and with the will to focus that reason on making sound judgments of all
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objects presented to it (provided that first all necessary knowledge of those objects has been
established), Descartes has made the will self-contained in the individual, and therefore, not
universal. One’s judgements as to how to impose the will upon the world will inevitably be
unique to each individual. It is difficult to determine whether he assumed that all thinking beings
would arrive at the same moral conclusions, as the knowledge used to inform those conclusions
would be universal; or if he even considered that different thinking beings could arrive at
different or conflicting, but still logical and epistemically informed, moral conclusions.
With this we find a distinct hole in the Cartesian paradigm that could be filled with the
introduction of a Cartesian aesthetic program. If individual judgements were granted
1.) A means of expression
2.) A means of judging the quality of those expressions, the concerns of the non-

universality of said individual expressions could be ameliorated while still
maintaining the Cartesian paradigm.
It is arguable that this is what Kant aimed to do with his third Critique. By establishing the
finality of form, Kant determined that art objects are universally reduced in such ways that easily
facilitate a universal understanding of individualistic expressions. However, this is not wholly
true to the Cartesian paradigm of the good—Kant’s conception of the good is predicated on
fundamental cosmopolitanism and is not based on individual judgements.

Cartesian Practical Ethics
The practical problems of a self-contained, and individual, moral compass described
above are somewhat addressed in several of Descartes’ major works, but never in a satisfactory
manner. In Mediations, for example, we see a distinct casting off of practicalities as he
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undertakes the exercise of reduction and with such Descartes identifies a paradox that
necessitates virtue as a guiding force. To begin, he posits that the will must assent to truth when
it is clear and distinct, but when it is not so plain one must suspend judgment: “If when I don’t
perceive the truth vividly and clearly enough I simply suspend judgment, it’s clear that I am
behaving correctly and avoiding error. It is a misuse of my free will to have an opinion in such
cases: if I choose the wrong side I shall be in error” (21). Within the theoretical context of the
Meditations, this guideline is sound, but in reality indecision or indifference is often impossible.
Of importance is the problem that there will be in life an inevitable lack of knowledge on some
subject that requires our judgment. As we shall see from Descartes’ correspondence with
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, he finds virtue (and the maintenance of health as productive of
virtue) to be the sole remedy for this aporia.
In the letters from the summer of 1645, Descartes distinguishes for the Princess the
differences between the good, happiness, and finality of the good. Virtue (the supreme good) is
entirely dependent on free will and is in itself alone sufficient for happiness. Happiness is the
natural product of virtue as “we cannot ever practice any virtue—that is to say, do what our
reason tells us we should do—without receiving satisfaction and pleasure from doing so”
(Correspondence 30). Descartes creates a correspondence principle for the final end of the good
by equating happiness and virtue. “Virtue is the target at which we ought to aim, but happiness is
the prize that induces us to fire at it” (34). From this we can see a resolution of the paradox
described above. Rutherford provides an eloquent précis:
As Descartes defines it, virtue depends upon the employment of reason. While it
is conceivable that one might have a “firm and constant will” to do something
without having examined whether it is the right thing to do, one cannot have a
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firm and constant will to do what is judged to be the best, unless one is capable of
judging what the best is. Thus, virtue presupposes knowledge of the relative
goodness of ends, and this knowledge Descartes assigns to reason. (Rutherford 7)
With the development of this theoretical stance on the good, virtue, and happiness,
Descartes compiles a second, more elaborate set of six principles (“the truths most useful to us”)
in Meditations. Adhering to the model of the tree of knowledge, the first two principles concern
metaphysics,37 and the next three physics and its three subsequent branches.38 The sixth and final
principle is more practically inclined, making it directly germane to our discussion:
I have only this to add, that we ought to examine in detail all the customs of the
place where we are living, so as to see how far they should be followed. Although
we can’t have certain demonstrations of everything, we ought to make choices
and (in matters of custom) embrace the opinions that seem the most probable.
Why? So that when there’s a need for action we won’t be irresolute; because
nothing causes regret and repentance except irresolution. (Correspondence 30)
The language Descartes employs here is significant. The imperative of “ought” implies a
clear ethical obligation in Descartes’ view. The use of “custom” vs. an alternative of, for
example, “law” offers a distinct doorway by which aesthetics may enter into considerations of
Cartesian morality. Custom is defined as the particular way of doing something as specific to a
place, time, or society. Wrapped within this of course would be the customs that are aesthetically
informed such as the arts, poetry, theater, etc. As we recall Descartes’ tree of knowledge, we will
remember that no specific branch that pertains to the study of humanities, and yet here is a direct
call for the study of culture. Descartes does not imply that true knowledge can or should be
generated from the study of culture yet with this last principle we find an interesting pathway
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into the moral practicalities of living within a society of individual thinkers. It is indisputable that
to study custom (or culture to use the modern term), one must study history, religion, literature,
and, most notably for our discussion, the arts.

Descartes’ Views on Poetry as Medicine
Descartes viewed the universe and all of its trappings as clockwork mechanisms. His
views on the human body were no different. In this section we will explore the branch of
medicine as it has been described in Descartes’ tree of knowledge and the enfolded cultural
aspects therein. As stated above, Descartes intended each of these branches as modes of natural
philosophy, but I argue that within each branch there is a practical need for the study of culture.
Descartes states that in matters of which no rational knowledge is to be had, one must turn
towards “the custom” of the land for information as to how to proceed. Within the branch of
medicine, we find a distinct tie to poetry and to Aristotelean conceptions of poetics as a tool for
righting oneself. The branch of medicine is where Descartes believes one finds the maintenance
of the mind’s well-being, as well as that of the body. He states in Part 6 of Discourse on Method
that fundamental to reason is “…the preservation of health, which is certainly the chief good and
the basis for all the other goods in this life. The mind depends so much on the state of the bodily
organs that if there is to be found a means of making men in general wiser and cleverer than they
have been so far, I believe we should look for it in medicine” (Discourse 24-5).
From this nascent definition of psychology (a sphere of medicine that certainly is
indebted to Cartesian dualism) we must proceed to those activities that Descartes would find as
beneficial to the mind. As discussed in previous sections of this essay, Descartes firmly
advocates a detachment from the senses as the inferences of reason. Yet when examining the two
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brief allusions to poetry found in his oeuvre, we can see that Descartes does credit momentary
indulgence of the emotions via aesthetic acts, with medicinally quieting the passions of the soul.
The first is found in Discourse on Method39 in which he takes a clearly Platonic stance on
historical accounts (the first sentence shuns any misdirection for the sake of expression) and
makes a passive gesture of poetry as beyond his natural skill:
And even the most accurate histories, if they don’t alter or exaggerate things’
importance so as to provide a better ‘read’, are likely to falsify things in a
different way: such histories omit most of the meaner and the less striking factors
in a situation, so that what they do include appears in a false light, looking
grander than it really was. And a result of that is that those who regulate their
conduct by examples drawn from these works are liable to fall into the excesses of
the knights-errant in our tales of chivalry, and make plans that they haven’t the
power to carry out. I valued oratory and loved poetry; but I thought that each of
these was a mental gift rather than something to be achieved through study.
People with the strongest reasoning and the most skill at ordering their thoughts
so as to make them clear and intelligible are always the most persuasive, even if
they speak only a provincial dialect and have never learned rhetoric. And those
who have the most pleasing fancies and know how to express them with the most
embellishment and sweetness would be the best poets even if they knew nothing
of poetry as a discipline. (Discourse 4)
The description of a poetic talent as a “mental gift” is most telling when taken in
conjunction with Descartes’ description of reason as being god-given. In Meditations, Descartes
describes this conclusion:
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It seems as though we were shown that all that which can be known of God may
be made evident by means which are not derived from anywhere but from
ourselves, and from the simple consideration of the nature of our minds. Hence I
thought it not beside my purpose to inquire how this is so, and how God may be
more easily and certainly known than the things of the world. (Meditations 1)
If reason is a gift from God so that we may know him better, then Descartes, as a
determinist, should find that the mental gift of a poetic mind serves some purpose as well. For
Descartes, reason is the capacity to know and govern oneself as an individual in accordance with
the laws of nature and God. The ethical moral code that he prescribes also calls for a study of the
customs of the land, something that is not necessarily rational in nature. It follows then that we
must also hold a capacity for understanding ourselves as social machines. It could be argued that
a natural talent for poetry could be understood as parallel to a natural talent for reasoning—that it
is a means to know ourselves in terms of one another. This reading of a small excerpt of
Meditations opens yet another window for a Cartesian aesthetic program.
Descartes also specifically mentions poetics as an occupation in a letter to Princess
Elisabeth of Bohemia from 1649. There he makes a noteworthy comment on the Princess’
inclination to write verse while confined to her bed due to illness:
So you wanted to compose verses during your illness! That reminds me of
Socrates, who (according to Plato) had a similar desire when he was in prison. I
believe this poetic mood results from a strong agitation of the animal spirits. In
someone who doesn’t have a serenely stable mind, this agitation could completely
disorient the imagination; but in someone with a more stable mind it merely
warms things up a little and creates a desire to compose poetry. I take this
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tendency to be the mark of a mind that is stronger and nobler than that of the
ordinary person. (Correspondence 67)
Descartes is stating here that poetic expression is a result of agitated spirits, and that only one
already strong of mind is capable of engaging in this enterprise without peril. Here we see a
merging of Platonic and Aristotelian views on poetry. On one hand poetry can disturb the mind
even further, similarly to Plato’s corruption of reason. On the other hand, one who is strong in
the mind (a virtue to be achieved) can utilize poetry to calm the animal spirits when agitated by
circumstance. We recall that a key point for Descartes is that there is materiality to the
imaginings of the body.
From this we can gather that there must be a certain physical state for creativity. Durs
Grunbein elucidates this point:
…in the context of speaking of verse, a word lights up, inclination—meaning a
certain disposition or leaning—which opens up a whole spectrum of scientific
associations: from the geometry of conic sections,…to the deviations of a
quivering compass needle from the horizontal, in a word: inclination. This implies
that the mind as well must stand at a particular angle of inclination to the course
of everyday life, be it due to sudden exaltation or racking illness, euphoria or
dejection. Whether elated or depressed, the mind must be in a certain mood (the
body slightly bent, perhaps, as in Albrecht Durer’s engraving of the brooding
angel), only then will the organism be jogged into creativity. For lines of verse to
begin to flow, the tedium of a life numbed by habit must be interrupted—by some
sudden event, however small, that shakes it up. Poetry cannot be written to order.
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What is clear here is that Grunbein takes Descartes’ assurances of the normalcy of writing poetry
when in despair as an announcement of the disorder that must first be present to incline one (one
of a strong mind, remember) to write poetry. We recall that for Descartes the body is a machine,
and if the imaginings of the mind are material in nature, it follows that, for Descartes, the
business of making art would be medicinal in nature. As Grunbein posits, “Poetry can be both a
drug and a remedy” (21). How poetry may be an effective salve for the troubled mind is
described in a letter from Descartes to his friend Mersenne concerning the concept of beauty.

Descartes on Beauty
Descartes barely touches upon beauty in his oeuvre. A single letter to his colleague Marin
Mersenne in the spring of 1630 sheds only the dimmest of light upon Descartes’ idea of beauty.
Descartes responds to his friend’s request for a definition of beauty:
You ask whether there’s a discoverable essence of beauty. … But in general
‘beautiful’ and ‘pleasing’ each signify merely a relation between our judgement
and an object; and because men’s judgements are so various, there can’t be any
definite standard of beauty or pleasingness. (Correspondence 13)
He then quotes himself from his treatment on music in Compendium Musicae,
Among the objects of the senses, those most pleasing to the mind are neither the
easiest to perceive nor the hardest, but the ones that are not so easy to perceive
that they don’t fully satisfy the natural inclination of the senses towards their
objects and not so hard to perceive that they tire the senses. (ibid)
He then explains to Mersenne what he means by “easiest to perceive nor the hardest” by means
of an imagined garden. He states that if there are only one or two shapes in the garden then the
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pattern as a whole will be easier to take in, but other people may prefer that there be more shapes
to make the garden pleasing. “The one that pleases most people can be called the most beautiful,
period; but there’s no way of fixing what this is” (ibid). He continues on to make a connection
between memory and beauty, positing that the emotions stirred by beauty are attached to the
emotions experienced when seeing similar beauty prior in our lives, making beauty a completely
subjective experience. “What inclines some people to dance may incline others to weep. This is
purely because it stirs up ideas in our memory: those who have enjoyed dancing to a certain tune
feel a new wish to dance the moment they hear a similar one” (ibid)
Though insufficiently detailed, we can gather from these remarks some workable
knowledge of Descartes’ greater views on beauty. First is the physiological effect beauty must
have upon the soul. Since Descartes views memory as contained in the ‘animal spirits’ that cause
the passions of the soul, memory is material in nature. It follows from the above then that beauty
can make an impression upon our physical being which would situate beauty in the realm of
medicine as its effects are to be found in the body.
Second, we can gather that as impressions of beauty are unique to every individual, they
are indefinite and unclear and thus cannot be relied upon to generate a true essence of the
beautiful. It is at this point we recall that Descartes defers judgments that lack clear and present
truth to the culture at large. Therefore, we are reminded yet again of the “aesthetics shaped hole”
in the Cartesian paradigm. As there is no consideration in the Cartesian epistemological
hierarchy for the culture, let alone one the arts specifically, we are left wanting the means,
methodologies, and modes of expression that would adequately pair such inquiries to the
Cartesian paradigm.
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With this discussion of beauty and the small concessions made in his ethical writings
discussed above, it can be deduced that Descartes’ abstention from creating an original moral
code is in part owing to the incomplete nature of a purely theoretical philosophy such as his own.
Descartes believed that his qualifications as a maker of moral codes fell short due a lack of
knowledge of natural philosophy, but from the above it can be seen that a more complete
knowledge of culture is required for an accurate moral compass.
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CHAPTER 4

Introduction
Of the four pillars of the Cartesian paradigm, mathesis universalis presents some of the biggest
challenges to aesthetic theory in terms of how the epistemological concept derived from mathesis
universalis has been interpreted by later philosophers in ways that work against recognizing and
pursuing possibilities for aesthetic theory internal to that paradigm. In this chapter, I discuss in
detail how Western epistemology has, since Descartes, continually and unnecessarily
marginalized types of knowledge germane to the arts and aesthetic philosophy when under the
influence of the Cartesian paradigm.
It is worth making a statement of my personal epistemological views at this juncture. I
advocate for a pluralistic understanding of knowledge and epistemic practices.40 I do not mean to
say that there are parallel means of generating knowledge—lines of thinking that never cross
paths. I mean to say that the various paradigms of epistemology intersect, influence, and inform
one another. This confluence is not only observable; it is also beneficial. Throughout the history
of epistemological approaches, there is a consistent theme of unwarranted marginalization and
exclusion of “other” modes of discovering and/or creating knowledge. This practice of
exclusivity impoverishes any epistemological paradigm. This is especially evident in how
treatments of epistemology rooted in the Cartesian paradigm and central to the thinking behind
the scientific revolution marginalize the arts by perceiving them to be epistemically irrelevant.
They overlook the fact that knowledge and experience of the arts provides a kind of second order
knowledge that is essential for understanding ourselves as thinking beings. As seen in Chapter 3,
Descartes himself understood knowledge of culture and custom (which would include aesthetic
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schemas and the arts) to be essential for those moments when objective knowledge was not at
hand.
As I present the history of universal language programs—a key component of mathesis
universalis—I voice my objections to two assumptions that are traditionally made by those
developing these programs:
1.) That all valuable knowledge is propositional
2.) That a reductive paradigm of knowledge creates universal knowledge.
The first objection I develop by means of exposing those epistemological practices that are
marginalized by traditional Western concepts of knowledge. The second objection I make by
means of rejecting any authoritative voice that would state that there is only one means by which
knowledge is generated, and that any such means can accurately carry the label of “universal.”
My exposition of the history of universal language games toward the end of this chapter is
geared towards an analysis of the dynamics of the epistemological practices that follow in the
original “footsteps” of Descartes’ vision of mathesis universalis.

Mathesis Universalis and the Exclusion of Aesthetic Philosophy
Mathesis universalis has been traditionally understood as an epistemological practice
exclusively interested in propositional knowledge. As such, those working on the project of
mathesis universalis have traditionally excluded and/or marginalized types of knowledge that do
not fall under the auspices of the proposition. As the overall topic at hand in this dissertation is
aesthetics, I will discuss different views concerning the relationship between aesthetic
philosophies and Western epistemological paradigms. Philosophers who critique and/or oppose
traditional Western epistemic programs—namely Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt—object
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to mathesis universalis largely in terms of its claim to “universality.” Rather than addressing the
whole of their respective philosophies, I will keep focused on the concept of poiesis as they have
both developed it, as well as on their respective views concerning the means of generating
knowledge. The concept of poiesis opens to view a hitherto undiscussed epistemological
potential, one that has been overlooked by those working within the traditional bounds of the
Cartesian paradigm.
For poiesis, the epistemic dynamic at hand is one of creation rather than of discovery.
Propositional knowledge has typically been understood more as universal knowledge than as
other types of knowledge. This is due to the assumption that “discoverable knowledge” could be
found out equally and similarly by any thinking being. However propositional knowledge is not
the only knowledge of value in the Cartesian paradigm, as was noted in Chapter 3. That said,
historically the methods employed in validating and expressing scientific (propositional)
knowledge have been the consistent model for epistemic practices in the West, though
knowledge of other types can be at stake. To clarify what is meant by this discovery/making
contrast, these next sections delve into the tendencies within philosophy to consider only
“discovery” work rather than to recognize an aesthetic, or “created,” dimension of knowledge
acquisition. In so doing, those tendencies limit how the concept of knowledge is understood,
with consequences detrimental to the theorizing of modern epistemology. I will argue that the
concept that knowledge must be only something “discoverable” is erroneously limiting, and the
prevalence of this concept does significant harm to modern Western ways of theorizing both
knowledge and its acquisition.

Picking Up. Vs. Setting Down Knowledge

103
Descartes idealizes knowledge as something that can be either gathered or gained—
picked up, as it were—and then codified by means of mathematics—mathematical notation
(either algebraic or geometric) being for Descartes the most universal and precise language
available. As discussed in Chapter 1, we must recall that Descartes’ pillar of mathesis universalis
is predicated on an objective worldview, which in turn is predicated on an object/subject divide
and a certainty of self. The pillar of mathesis universalis can be understood as, dynamically, a
process of organization and codification of facts, laws, taxonomies, and patterns about the
natural world—the natural world as inhabited by the thinking subject. For this reason, Descartes
would have understood a piece of information about the natural world, like gender for example,
to be information that was to be gained and not created.
In the last two centuries, however, there has been a remarkable shift in ideas about the
conditions and circumstances that shape the mind’s view of the natural world. Many of the
concepts that for Descartes were presumed to be set down by nature, and so were viewed as
simply being there for the human mind to pick up, comprehend, and then exploit, are now
understood to be created by culture and custom. Judith Butler, for example, considers gender to
be not a scientific or biological fact, but rather a cultural construction. This is a prime (if not
particularly contentious) example of the types of knowledge that need not be viewed as simply
picked up from the natural world. Thanks to Butler’s groundbreaking book, Gender Trouble
(1990), we now can understand that information about gender need not be knowledge to be
gained—but rather might be knowledge created and set down by culture and individual
performance. This is knowledge of the natural world that is not picked up and then set down. It is
knowledge made via performance, which is then set down. In other words, the knowledge can be
created and upheld aesthetically.
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As a counter-example, the laws of Newtonian natural physics were discovered (picked
up) and then set down in terms that could be cemented by some significant means. In this case
the knowledge wasn’t created, but the means to set it down (to codify or inculcate) were created.
The mathematical language that those laws could be expressed in had to be generated by the
human capability for abstraction, and the means to test and prove (or more importantly disprove)
had to be established and solidified by a culture of people who also believed the natural world
conforms to a codified system of logic and is objective in nature. In the case of Newtonian
natural law, both circumstances are met. In the case of Butler, gender (the knowledge at hand) is
set down by the norms and customs of those in power, which is then maintained by performative
practices41 of individuals. The trouble is, performance, unlike science, which has an explicitly
described program of means and methodology, is not possessed of a universally codified means
of expression nor a methodology of proving or disproving the knowledge at hand.
As discussed in the previous chapter, we understand that the conception of the soul as it
is set down by the Cartesian paradigm is incomplete. There is a clear call on Descartes’ part for a
means of expressing the soul but none is ever provided, which leaves a glaring hole in the
Cartesian paradigm. I maintain that this incompleteness of the Cartesian paradigm is the driving
force behind those philosophers who inherit the project of creating a truly universal system of
explaining the natural world. In contemplating these facts, I am compelled to discuss the
significant means by which knowledge is set down. In this chapter I work through the most
authoritative means of setting down knowledge in place today, which is largely the
mathematicised systems of universal expression and universal logic that have developed in the
wake of the Cartesian paradigm. I begin this discussion with an examination of the claims of
both rationalists and empiricists. Each camp finds that knowledge is to be gained, not created,
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and each of their approaches both underscores the concepts of picking up and setting down
knowledge. I will next posit poiesis (particularly in relation to the art of painting) as a significant
means of creating and setting down knowledge. Following that, I will elaborate on the kinds of
knowledge that poiesis can and cannot establish.

Empiricism Vs. Rationalism Germane to Aesthetics
Philosophy is literally translated as “love of wisdom.” All philosophical questions
germinate from the study of truth, or what we know as truth (knowledge). Aesthetics, while
specifically focusing on the relationship between knowledge and concepts such as quality,
experience, beauty, and creative will, must also in some way support answers to the broader
questions of philosophy: What is the nature of knowledge? What are the limitations of
knowledge? How do we gain knowledge? The last of these questions is of particular importance
to aesthetic philosophy and springs forth from the very old debate between empiricism and
rationalism. In these oppositional viewpoints, knowledge can only be gained (picked up) by
limited means. In the rationalist camp there is a great emphasis on the “innateness” of certain
structural concepts (the a priori) and as such knowledge is formed based on those innate (and
universal) structures. In the empiricist camp, there is an insistence on a posteriori as the primary
source of knowledge, and therefore knowledge is often contingent upon the many facets of one’s
experience. But neither camp understands knowledge as something that can be created. They
both work from the original premise that knowledge is gained. They both understand knowledge
as that which is picked up and not that which was set down. Neither rationalist nor empiricist
theses speak of the crafting of knowledge. It is through this exclusion of the idea that knowledge
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might be made rather than found that leads to the marginalization of aesthetic discourse from the
larger discussion of epistemology.
An examination of the epistemological theses of these two groups reveals that
knowledge, for both empiricists and rationalists, is by definition gathered, albeit by radically
different means—by either some innate programming of human cognition or by the information
conveyed through sensorial experience. Neither means includes material about knowledge that is
created, yet neither means precludes such knowledge. In the interest of concision on the topic of
these theses—a topic that could be (and has been) explained extensively—I offer a summation
based on Peter Markie’s expertise on the subject42. In the camp of rationalism, five basic theses
arise. To be considered rationalist you must agree with at least one. The more radical the
rationalism, the more of these will be warranted as true. The variable “S” is used to describe an
area of investigation.
1. The Intuition/Deduction Thesis: Some propositions in a particular subject area, S, are
knowable by us by intuition alone; still others are knowable by being deduced from
intuited propositions.
2. The Innate Knowledge Thesis: We have knowledge of some truths in a particular
subject area, S, as part of our rational nature.
3. The Innate Concept Thesis: We have some of the concepts we employ in a particular
subject area, S, as part of our rational nature
4. The Indispensability of Reason Thesis: The knowledge we gain in subject area, S, by
intuition and deduction, as well as the ideas and instances of knowledge in S that are
innate to us, could not have been gained by us through sense experience.
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5. The Superiority of Reason Thesis: The knowledge we gain in subject area S by
intuition and deduction, or have innately, is superior to any knowledge gained by
sense experience.
Empiricism has, truly, only one thesis to follow and it is more rejection than stance: “We have no
source of knowledge in S, or for the concepts we use in S, other than sense experience.” Markie
makes quick work of the counterclaims of empiricism to the rationalist theses: To reject 1 and 2,
empiricists claim that insofar as we have knowledge in the subject, our knowledge is a posteriori,
dependent upon sense experience. To reject 3, they propose that sense experience is our only
source of ideas. To reject 4 and 5, empiricists hold that it is understood that reason alone does not
give us any knowledge, certainly not any superior knowledge.
Markie does note that not all rationalist theses must be discarded for an empirical
argument for epistemic nihilism:
Empiricists generally reject the Indispensability of Reason thesis, though they
need not. The Empiricism thesis does not entail that we have empirical
knowledge. It entails that knowledge can only be gained, if at all, by experience.
Empiricists may assert, as some do for some subjects, that the rationalists are
correct to claim that experience cannot give us knowledge. The conclusion they
draw from this rationalist lesson is that we do not know at all. (Markie 1.2)
What should be understood about the debate between these two philosophical standpoints is that
they are not always in opposition. The field of mathematics, for example, is largely dominated by
rationalist discourse, and empirical evidence plays a secondary role. Aesthetics, being so deeply
couched in terms of the qualitative, is dominated by empiricist discourse. The imagined scenario
of a fiercely debated, polarized disputation on this topic is largely due to the historical narrative
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of the rise of the Cartesian paradigm until the advent of Kantian philosophy. Any real
contemporary debate between these two camps comes down to the question of superiority when
determining truths about the world beyond our cognition.
As demonstrated by the above discussion of epistemological theses, the two camps are
aligned in that they both understand knowledge as picked up (“gained” is their own terminology)
and are silent on the idea that knowledge can be created by any means. Though empiricists do
grant the influence of subjective circumstances tremendous sway over our points of view, and
thus over what we take to be knowledge, they do by and large accept the premise that the laws of
the natural universe are objects that exist prior to our understanding of them.
What neither camp discusses, however, is the validity of information that is fully artificial
or arbitrary, but just as real as any law of physics. Simply put, the idea that knowledge that is
arbitrarily or artificially made, no matter how useful or expressive of reality it may be, is not
considered knowledge at all and therefore is taken as unable to represent truth. This is because
both camps are proceeding from the idea that knowledge of the natural world is precursory
(primum) to cognition’s observation or engagement. But as no “chicken-or-the-egg-type”
discussion over what came first ever yields a satisfactory solution, it is time that this schema of
superiority over that which is primum be abandoned for a more realistic understanding of
knowledge.
The assumption for scientists has traditionally been that they are pursuing what pre-exists
our observation and engagement. The idea is that those objects that are artificial do not possess
the same neutrality—meaning that they are unaffected by human intervention or observation—as
those objects that are of the natural world. Belief in this neutrality of the natural world around
cognition, along with the belief that cognition is only observing the world around itself, is
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fundamental to the Cartesian paradigm. However, one may easily acknowledge that those
schemas that serve to catalogue, express, and codify knowledge are created by the human
consciousness without disrupting the Cartesian paradigm. Descartes’ call for a system enabling
the generation of knowledge in Rule IV confirms that he did not intend the thinking being to
simply stumble across the means of organizing knowledge. He intended for human beings to
create that means. Since Descartes’ time, much attention has been given to commentary on the
means of “knowing.”
Most significantly, it is now understood that the cognitions that preceded one’s
existence—that is to say the means by which those before you have understood the world- have
as much to do with our own understanding of the world as our own contemporary observations
and experimentations. More importantly we can understand that the pre-rational cognitions of the
mind, both individually and collectively, shape the formation of rational knowledge. This last
revelation is discussed in depth in the later sections of this chapter. For now, it is sufficient to
understand that though the Cartesian paradigm understood knowledge as that which is
discovered, it does not preclude or exclude the study of knowledge that is created. As an
example, the field of Art History is dedicated to the study of (and the relationships between) the
cognitive processes, philosophical discourse, physical methodology, and material structure of
objects made by human means. It is a field, therefore, comprised entirely of observations and
knowledge about that which is created.

Epistemology and Aesthetics
Knowledge, as it is today, is Cartesian in nature—driven by science, and aimed at being
objective. It seeks knowledge that is discovered, though it does not necessarily need to exclude
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created knowledge. The epistemological paradigms developed towards the project of mathesis
universalis that are in place today (discussed in depth in this chapter) continually marginalize and
exclude subjective and created knowledge. Simply put, they are generally suited for objective
and scientific knowledge.
Most philosophers, contemporary or otherwise, don’t readily associate objective and
scientific knowledge with the arts and aesthetic concepts. But when objective knowledge is
broken down into the two major categories of propositional and revelatory knowledge (discussed
below) we find that works of art often are studied for their revelatory value. However, the
concept of revelatory knowledge is difficult to define and provides only a limited means to
include the arts and aesthetics in the traditional understanding of mathesis universalis. In these
next paragraphs, I will show how a new paradigm on the concept of revelatory knowledge and
the art of painting, developed by James M Thompson, reveals an unexpected epistemological
contribution to the Cartesian pillar of mathesis universalis from Martin Heidegger—one of
Descartes’ most vocal opponents.
In order to better define revelatory knowledge, a very brief explanation of contemporary
epistemology is necessary. The paradigm of knowledge as it is understood today (largely
established by Descartes, Hegel43, and Schopenhauer44 ) allows for two basic types of objective
knowledge: that which is propositional, and that which is revelatory. Propositional knowledge
invokes words such as: concept, premise, principle, hypothesis, etc. This is the type of
knowledge that can be imagined as tangible (though it is very often theoretical), robust, and
structurally integral to scientific fields. It is typically narrow in scope and specific in its
application. Revelatory knowledge is less readily defined. Perspective, relativity, and causality
are terms that pepper the scholarship concerning revelatory knowledge. While the character of
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what can be at stake in revelatory knowledge varies (social conditions, historical contexts, moral
implications, etc.) we can find a common element within a broader dynamic. All articulations of
this type of knowledge involve a widening of the scope and “stepping back” from established
discourse. It should be stated that propositional and revelatory knowledge are not oppositional in
nature. They are integral and create a cooperative check-and-balance relationship. One can use
propositional knowledge to verify revelatory knowledge. Revelatory knowledge provides a
measure of the validity of propositional knowledge. Both can inform moral judgements, although
most often the revelatory serves to critique the structure and consequences of the propositional
(read: scientific) epistemological schemas.
A most valuable resource for this discussion is Thompson’s treatment of revelatory
knowledge germane to the topic of painting. Painting and Knowledge: The Revelation Theory is
helpful in illuminating the properties of both propositional and revelatory knowledge, as well as
their respective roles in the scope of contemporary aesthetic dialogue. Though he largely
approaches claims made by existentialist philosophers such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, his
essay contributes greatly to our discussion of mathesis universalis. What is most interesting is
that in his approach to illuminating the many means by which revelatory knowledge might be
gathered from a painting, Thompson unknowingly makes Heidegger a contributor to Descartes’
project of mathesis universalis.
I will briefly sketch Thompson’s schema. Not only does it add leverage to my argument
that Thompson makes an unwitting Cartesian-ally of Heidegger’s aesthetic views, it provides a
concise explanation as to what the phrase “other types of knowledge” might entail. Thompson
states that for revelatory knowledge to be gained from a painting, it must fit specific criteria,
particularly in relationship to philosophy and science. He first establishes an impermeable line
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between propositional knowledge and revelatory knowledge. Works containing revelatory
knowledge either do not contain propositions, or any propositions they may contain are not the
main source of cognitive value. If contrast may be drawn between showing and stating,
revelatory knowledge belongs more to the showing idiom. Typically, revelationists claim that
what cannot be stated in straightforward propositional form can be revealed in painting and other
art forms. Conversely, that which can be revealed in painting cannot be translated into an
equivalent propositional form (Thompson 211-12). Thompson next subdivides revelatory
knowledge into two types:
Type A.) That which reveals a slant, or particular point of view
Type B.) That which reveals things “how they are, not just how they may be looked at.”
Knowledge of Type B requires no defense or evidence, and can be, by Thompson’s reasoning,
either rational or empirical in nature. Philosophers such as Schopenhauer, Heidegger, and
Merleau-Ponty all draw upon this idea, as they all postulate that experiential intuition guides our
understandings of the world and ourselves.
The overall character of Thompson’s careful examination of revelatory knowledge
(specifically on the topic of paintings) is, in essence, a warning against hasty declarations of
Type B knowledge. Claims of Type B knowledge, as Thompson sees it, are difficult to validate
since verification through traditional analytic means (false positives, for example) is nigh
impossible. The purpose of his discussion is to provide a set of litmus tests that scholars should
apply when claiming a painting offers this or that type of knowledge. He classifies the ways a
painting might hold Type B revelatory knowledge as such: visual qualities, characteristics,
essences, recurrent characteristics, a transcendent reality, the nature of man, and a quality of
experience. That paintings can reveal visual qualities that might otherwise be missed outside of
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the context of the work is an easily granted claim, but one that does not apply to all paintings.
Characteristics of objects, people, and situations, as of essences and recurrent characteristics, are
certainly revelatory, but arguably in the sense of Type A knowledge- they may only reveal a
specific view or circumstance. The idea that paintings can transcend reality (à la Schopenhauer
and Hegel) is also of Type A, as the nature of reality (not to mention that which would transcend
it) is still a disputed topic. All of these only serve to reveal points of view or observations of
specific subjects by those in familiar proximity to the work of art.
I find Thompson’s disregard of Type A to be unnecessary, however. As socio-political
and social-psychological paradigms have been developed since the time of Descartes, and largely
due to the Cartesian paradigm (as we discussed in Chapter 1), establishing and communicating
points of view ought to be understood as a valuable epistemological endeavor. The knowledge
provided, though not universal in nature, is objective by its singular, specific, and finite
characteristics. Propositional statements are also meant to be singular, specific, and finite. As
such it would seem that Type A knowledge would provide historical and political value, which
should not be easily disregarded. That said, it is universally objective types of knowledge
Thompson is concerned with, and his last two means of Type B knowledge have more to offer
our discourse concerning Descartes. As such, I will make my objections to Thompsons’s
disregard for “viewpoints” as stated above. The last two categories of Type B revelatory
knowledge (the nature of man and quality of experience—also referred to as ontological orders
by Thompson) are of particular interest to the aims of this dissertation. Thus, I will pursue them
in more depth in these next paragraphs.
Within Thompson’s analysis of the ontological orders (quality of experience and the
nature of man) of revelatory knowledge there is a tacit acknowledgement that knowledge is made
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rather than created. For this particular means of generating knowledge, he largely refers to
Heidegger’s position on the arts, developed in The Origin of the Work of Art (1950). Knowledge
about the “objective order or quality in experience,” Thompson claims, is based upon
Heidegger’s own paradigms of Reality. Briefly, Heidegger developed the idea that paintings not
only reveal “what is,” but that they can also produce “what is.” His famed examination of Van
Gogh’s A Pair of Shoes reveals a tension between “earth” and “world” that in the end generates a
kind of knowledge that pertains to both. World denotes the ontological state specific to some
sphere of being (a family, a career, a social strata, etc.), and earth being the physical background
upon which “worlding” occurs. There is a nearly mystical blending of materiality, intuition, and
purpose with this conception of art. But what Thomson’s analysis reveals as unique to Heidegger
is the idea that instead of art revealing some already existent truth, art is the setting down of
truth—changing the mode of knowledge from that what must be discovered to that what can be
made.
While it is not surprising that Heidegger would approach knowledge in such a way, it is
important to note that Thompson’s essay is not a critique of the views of philosophers—it is
foremost a means of establishing the types of revelatory knowledge that may be gleaned from a
painting. The acknowledgement of the validity of Heidegger’s approach towards the arts as a
contributing means of gathering objective, revelatory knowledge—that is to say, contributing to
the project of mathesis universalis—is established by Thompson’s work on the modes of
revelatory knowledge available from paintings. Simply put, I argue that Thompson (perhaps
unknowingly) is acknowledging that Heidegger—though generally opposed to the
objective/subjective modeling of knowledge that is the backbone of mathesis universalis—has
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contributed to the concept of objective knowledge through understanding the arts as sometimes
offering revelatory knowledge.

Poiesis as an Epistemological Practice
Up to this point in the Chapter we have briefly examined the structural elements of
contemporary Western epistemology (built upon the Cartesian pillar of mathesis universalis) and
the varied relationships to types of objective knowledge that are created rather than discovered.
Through this discussion we have pointed out several avenues through which one might amend
the Cartesian project of mathesis universalis to include aesthetic concepts and the arts. However,
each of the various avenues presented in this chapter and the previous three are often highly
limited in scope and/or application. For example, Thompson’s work on revelatory knowledge
from above is solely germane to painting. Many of the means by which he elucidates “testing”
for the presence of revelatory knowledge could only be applied to the visual arts, leaving nonvisual art forms such as music, poetry, literature, etc. outside the proper scope of his paradigm.
As discussed in Chapter 2, ties are made between Descartes and contemporary subjective studies
do exist, but their development is often limited to a passing acknowledgement. With this next
section I will explore the concept of Poiesis as a more robust means of including aesthetic
discourse within the pillar of mathesis universalis.
It is at this point we must turn to the idea of universals and universalization, as this
presents the largest problem to inclusion of aesthetic discourse in this most prevalent pillar of the
Cartesian paradigm. What is difficult to reconcile to the original intentions of mathesis
universalis is the specificity of aesthetics and the arts in relation to individuals, different cultures,
and even different historical eras of the same culture. This individualistic quality makes the
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challenge of “universal” knowledge most difficult. Even Thompson, in the essay discussed
above, acknowledges this challenge, by bringing up the problem I would refer to as the “all
paintings vs. some paintings dilemma.” He puts it simply as this question: “Is it really the case
that all paintings have a cognitive, revelatory significance?” (216). Thompson is referring to the
idea that it is not universal knowledge if it is only the truth in only some instances. He also
touches on the limitations of revelatory knowledge as verifiable by traditional means—the wellknown scientific means of false positives, empirical research, etc. are not means by which one
can validate claims of revelatory knowledge. So having established that objective revelatory
knowledge can be gained by the arts, but only when specific criteria are met, I now turn to the
concept of “universal” knowledge, as it was a key part of Descartes’ vision for epistemology and
an area that has largely been left unconsidered as a means of connecting aesthetics and Cartesian
epistemology.
Universalization of knowledge can be accomplished by practices of inclusion or practices
of exclusion. One can either decide to exclude or marginalize some knowledge in order to make
a paradigm work, or one can work to shape the paradigm to fit all knowledge. In both cases, the
general aim of universalization is to make knowledge consistent, fixed, and readily available. In
the hard sciences universalization is generally reductive and necessarily exclusory—due largely
to the radical rationalism and hyperbolic doubt of Rene Descartes. All the systems of
universalization from Descartes’ original idea of mathesis universalis onwards have attempted to
excise the unnecessary, the complex, and the unclear from view in order to establish a uniformity
of expectation, procedure, and results. The scientist removes nearly all of what is already there
in search of what is always there. Universality for the sciences is thus an act of exclusion. This
exclusivity has had a tremendous impact upon the consciousness of the West. But as discussed
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above, it has been largely aimed at knowledge “discovery.” And while certain opportunities
appear throughout the development of mathesis universalis since Descartes’ time, there has been
little attention paid to formulating a paradigm of universalized created knowledge.
In the previous section we established, thanks to the work of Thompson, that Heidegger,
though opposed to the concept of mathesis universalis, establishes a means to contribute to it. In
this next section we find that it is again Heidegger, Descartes’ most avid opponent, who leads the
way for a further and more grandiose contribution to Western epistemology with the
development of his concept of poiesis.

Poiesis as Knowledge Making
Poiesis is the making and setting down of revelatory knowledge— more specifically the
making of the units of mathesis. Mathesis, means that which can be learned as well as that which
can be taught45. The term, which encompasses both actions of learning and teaching, also refers
to the systematic laying down of knowledge. It is the moment when a decision about the shape,
character, and positioning of a unit of knowledge is made, and that unit of knowledge is mortared
into its proper place in the structure of what we contemporarily understand to be mathesis
universalis. Descartes’ conception of mathesis universalis did not include outlets for the making
of knowledge. But as discussed above, revelatory knowledge constitutes a second order type of
knowledge that informs us of ourselves. It is not knowledge that is only discovered; it is more
often knowledge that is created. As an investigation of what is entailed in the creation of
knowledge is warranted, we turn now to the concept of poiesis.
Derived from the ancient Greek term ποιέω, which means "to make," poiesis also means
“setting forth” and holds connotations of “moving of the world forward.” In the Symposium,
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Diotima (Plato) describes how mortals strive for immortality in relation to poiesis. "Such a
movement can occur in three kinds of poiesis: (1) Natural poiesis through sexual procreation, (2)
poiesis in the city through the attainment of heroic fame, and, finally, (3) poiesis in the soul
through the cultivation of virtue and knowledge." Plato is describing three means to gain
historical immortality (fame), but in our contemporary minds the axiomatic and irrefutable are all
that we understand by “immortal.” Immortality, in terms of epistemology, is really only granted
to the fixed and confirmed, and I dare say, the useful. Laws of physics are granted immortality
when they are proven axiomatic and irrefutable, and therefore foundational in nature.
If one accepts this contemporary view of immortality, then these three processes—
originally described as the processes by which immortal beauty is made—need to be updated as
well. Fully renovated these three means are:
1.) Synthesis (the merging of at least two existent objects; these two objects can be

rational or empirical in nature)
2.) Empiricism (experimentation and observation)
3.) Abstraction (rationalism, mathematical modeling, and, often, imagination).

As Plato’s conception of beauty, it can be agreed, had little to do with visual or sensorial
pleasure, the beauty he refers to must be understood as that which is perfectly harmonious (i.e.
Ideal). In our modern sense of epistemology, that which is harmonious is that which is clear,
certain, and unwavering. As it may seem a stretch to be moving from a description of the coping
mechanisms of mortals that Diotima describes to the means of epistemology, let us be reminded
that the sciences pursue that which is always true, despite the passages of time. Ergo, science is
the pursuit of that which is eternal despite a human being’s ephemeral nature. Owing to Plato’s
derision of the arts as mimetic and thus in principle they are unclear and misleading, the arts
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have naturally been neglected as a means of knowledge making. Revelatory knowledge
(differing from the propositional knowledge of science) is a necessary pursuit as it informs moral
and ethical practices. As Descartes believed that morality would necessarily follow in the wake
of a complete grasp of the natural world, he gave privilege to scientific knowledge. However,
despite clearly defining what does and does not constitute the means of propositional (scientific)
inquiry, Descartes did not address the proper means of revelatory inquiry, but instead simply
states that where rationalism fails us, we are to turn to the laws and customs “at hand”. As moral
and ethical practices cannot be informed by the sciences, until the sciences are “complete” one
must then rely upon culturally informed practices. The arts would almost certainly fall into that
category. As such, painting is a means of expressing or creating revelatory knowledge.
While I propose a new way of viewing poiesis as the act of making knowledge, it is
necessary to address those philosophers who have fleshed out the contemporary definition of the
term poiesis. Most notable and most recent are Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt, though
their viewpoints on the term carry different connotations. Heidegger instills a mystique around
poiesis as that which reveals, and thus allows Dasein (human existence) to carry on. Arendt
views poiesis as among those first movements away from the bondage of labor as a means to
biological ends. In the following sections I will unpack both philosopher’s use of the term poiesis
and relate the two definitions to the specific arena of painting.

Poiesis as the Antithesis of Mathesis
Heidegger models his schema of Dasein’s being to include the concepts of “world” and
“earth.” Earth is the physical realm upon which our being must take place. This inclusion of the
material keeps Dasein grounded and avoids nihilistic tendencies towards the sciences. Earth, for
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Heidegger, would be the realm of propositional knowledge. World is the realm of the revelatory
where knowledge is not necessarily only gathered (as Descartes would have understood
knowledge to be) but can be created by certain acts of will—acts such as making art. The act of
making art is an act of poiesis, but not the only act of poiesis. It is easy to see how one could
hastily equate the words mathesis and mathematics, for example, but mathematics is only a small
piece of mathesis. Similarly, an incomplete equation between poiesis and poetics is often made.
However, I will argue in the sections to follow that poiesis is the act of moving the “world” (the
ontological state of Dasein) forward through the establishment of some piece of knowledge. The
establishment of propositional knowledge, for the last four centuries at least, is accomplished
through scientific methodology established by the Cartesian paradigm. As the Cartesian
paradigm made no remark on revelatory knowledge, there is more contention to be had on the
proper ways to establish revelatory knowledge. Heidegger as well as Hannah Arendt will extend
the discourse about poiesis, adding to our understanding of this term.
Heidegger shows a consistent backwards gaze in terms of the historical unfolding of
philosophy—ever idolizing those who came before the “event” of Socrates (Plato). Heidegger
also acknowledges that the course of philosophy, as it would concern ontology, has been equally
redirected by the Cartesian paradigm, and by its trappings of hierarchical order, mathesis
universalis, and strictly rationalist epistemology. The question of whether Plato or Descartes
holds more responsibility for contemporary conditions is a topic for discussion elsewhere, but
what is intriguing about both is their dismissal of poetics as an unreliable source of truth about
this world—a point Heidegger sidesteps neatly by implying that art does not reveal this world,
but another “world.” Heidegger is particularly enamored with poiesis as an example of preSocratic philosophical discourse. Ever looking for the “thing-that-was-before-it-was-covered-
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over,” the nature of his work is to mine revelatory knowledge (as phenomenology and ontology
are his domains) for those moments of disclosures of Being. Alexander Di Pippo crystallizes
Heidegger’s interest in the idea of poiesis:
Poiesis is a mode of disclosure (a-letheia) of Being which is conceptually broader
than, and so can assume the modality of, either philosophical or poetical
discourse. Otherwise put: the concept of poiesis furnishes the analogical unity of
the poet and philosopher. Poiesis becomes the original site of Being's disclosure,
whether this becomes thematic in the case of the philosopher or unthematic in the
case of the poet. (3)
Specifically poiesis is one of the many acts by which Dasein (the experience of being that
is particular to humans) transcends what Heidegger feels is the modern condition—referring to
Being as that which is undisclosed, covered over by the subject/object dichotomy, positivism,
and technological domination. For Heidegger, the world (welt) is not a mere parade of objects
that the mind encounters. Nor is it something that contains them both. For Dasein, world is the
space of significance (Bedeutsamskeit) by which it directs itself in its concerned dealings—these
being biological needs, social interactions, family life, etc. The space of significance refers to the
paradigm under scrutiny. This is the conservative angle of Heidegger’s philosophy. He desires a
revealing of that which was at a time before Descartes’ dualism and before Plato’s criticism.
“There only is a world because Dasein, in its basic constitution, is worldly (Weltlich). Thus, the
unitary phenomenon of poiesis belonging to the worldliness of Dasein's Self displaces a subjectobject dualism” (Di Pippo 8).
The subject/object dualism of the Cartesian paradigm is a feature of the facticity of being
for contemporary humanity. Facticity refers to the ascribed, preset conditions of human
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existence, such as language, political atmosphere, and geography. In terms of the individual,
facticity—referred to by Heidegger as thrown-ness—is revealed by mood. By Heidegger’s own
paradigm of Dasein, however, the thrown-ness of our Being does not allow for a return to a
unified existential experience. There can be no re-unification of object and subject due to the
thrown-ness of our contemporary existence. Only revelation of Being-at-present can allow for
any real reflection and action. In art, a form of poiesis, those revelations are made possible by the
opening of a world beyond ours in which our being can be revealed. Poiesis is intimately tied
with material and production. In production, the artisan not only shapes his or her material such
that it embodies the projected model, but in so doing also liberates this material from its
dependence on the artisan until, when it eventually achieves this likeness, it obtains an
independent being-in-itself. Until this fulfillment obtains, the object is not fully present to itself.
Since achieving this presence is the telos of production, presence-at-handness is not only an
integral component of the production process but it is also the productive intention (Di Pippo
13).
It is through art that Dasein encounters materials as being-at-present (Vorhandensein: one
may liken this to a moment of clarity about Dasein’s being) rather than being-at-hand
(Zuhanden: one may liken this to a moment of equipmental-ness). The former is tied directly
Heidegger’s idea of moments that allow a revealing of Dasein to itself. It is beyond
everydayness. The latter is tied to the Western philosophic tradition and understands means of
production as means of being-in-the-world. It is entwined with everydayness and does little to
reveal Dasein to itself. This indicates that there is an inherent sense of critique and revelation to
Heidegger’s poiesis.
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Poiesis by this account cannot provide knowledge of a propositional nature. Nor would it
need to. There is nothing to indicate that poiesis in this sense could provide concrete, fixed
knowledge of an objective worldview. What poiesis can facilitate is a revealing of what is
(necessarily by definition of Dasein) temporarily so for Dasein—and particularly revealing the
world as it is in relation to Dasein. In Mathematics, Metaphysics, and Modernism , Heidegger
states simply: “Mathesis means learning, mathemata what is learnable… The mathemata is about
things which we already know…The mathematical is that evident aspect of things within which
we are always already moving and according to which we experience them as things at all, and
as such things” (251-4). The mathematical is the fundamental position we take towards things by
which we take up things as already given to us, and as they must and should be given.”
Heidegger credits Newton with our first understanding of “modern sciences” as they are now as
he tried to establish “principia”—first principles. “All great insights and discoveries are not only
usually thought by several people at the same time, they must also be rethought in that unique
effort to truly say the same thing about the same thing” (257). Yet the advent and persistence of
the mathematical can be traced to Descartes, well before Newton.
For Hannah Arendt, poiesis is strongly tied to her ideas of humanity as a working species.
As Arendt’s work does not form as tightly-knit of a system of philosophy as her mentors’
(Heidegger and Karl Jaspers), we must work from the available references to poiesis in her
writings, primarily those found in The Human Condition (1958). Largely focused on political
ontology, she sees humanity in three basic modes: labor, work, and action. In this tripartite
hierarchy, Labor (animal laborans) is the first state of being. It is associated with all the
biological necessities of life and generates nothing of permanence. It is what maintains the
human being as a slave, as it stands in direct contradiction of human freedom when a person
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must be constantly concerned with the banal. This is opposed to Marx’s view of labor as the
linchpin of humanity’s power. She instead understands labor to be more akin to a survival state.
The arts belong to Arendt’s second mode of existence: work or homo faber.
Encompassing both techne and poiesis, in this mode humanity is separating itself from the
natural world. “He/she is the builder of walls (both physical and cultural) which divide the
human realm from that of nature and provide a stable context (a "common world") of spaces and
institutions within which human life can unfold” (2.iii) This includes making buildings, laws, the
arts etc. It is a clear break from labor as it is humanity shaping the world to its own intentions
and plans rather than in response to biological needs. Work is a public matter as it is governed by
humanity as opposed to those biological needs of labor, which remain largely private in scale in
this modality. Work is not yet political and not yet the true manifestation of freedom, but is an
important precursor to the ultimate mode of the political: action.
This third and final mode of humanity, action (zoon politikon), is Arendt’s idealistic state
of being in which work is no longer a means to an end (thus tying it to purposiveness) but an end
in itself. “The fundamental defining quality of action is its ineliminable [sic] freedom, its status
as an end in itself and so as subordinate to nothing outside itself. Arendt argues that it is a
mistake to take freedom to be primarily an inner, contemplative or private phenomenon, for it is
in fact active, worldly and public” (Yar, 2.iii). In contrast, for Heidegger, poiesis can be a
moment of clarity through a united experience of subject and object, but requires a level of
remove from the equipmental that is difficult to achieve in practice. It requires a remove from the
everyday that is so unnatural that, while it may reveal something about being, does not allow for
easy assimilations of those revelations.
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In the case of both Heidegger and Arendt, the philosophers require a kind of remove from
the everyday that is difficult to reconcile in real practice. For Heidegger, only when
equipmentality is removed do we approach poiesis. The knowledge given by poiesis would then
only apply to the ontological, and would not provide information about the natural world—only
a scenario of being in the natural world. Arrendt moves in a similar fashion by declaring that
poiesis is a means of removing oppressive features (such as labor control and dependency upon
labor). Both assume that poiesis is a concept reserved for aesthetics and neither gives credence to
the idea that poiesis could be a means of communicating or establishing knowledge. In essence,
they are limited by their own conception of what poiesis can entail. Heidegger and Arendt both
limit poiesis to the making of art, and not the making of knowledge. In this dissertation, I posit
poiesis as a means of setting down knowledge, just as universal languages are means of setting
down knowledge.

Wordsworth
Poetry is the first and last of all knowledge—it is as immortal as the heart of man.
If the labours [sic] of Men of science should ever create any material revolution,
direct or indirect, in our condition, and in the impressions which we habitually
receive, the Poet will sleep then no more than at present; he will be ready to
follow the steps of the Man of science, not only in those general indirect effects,
but he will be at his side, carrying sensation into the midst of the objects of
science itself. The remotest discoveries of the Chemist, the Botanist, or the
Mineralogist, will be as proper objects of the Poet’s art as any upon which it can
be employed, if the time should ever come when these things shall be familiar to
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us, and the relations under which they are contemplated by the followers of these
respective sciences shall be manifestly and palpably material to us as enjoying
and suffering beings. If the time should ever come when what is now called
science, thus familiarized to men, shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of
flesh and blood, the Poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration, and
will welcome the Being thus produced, as a dear and genuine inmate of the
household of man. (Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads)
For the purposes of this dissertation there is a presumed synchronicity to certain terms,
particularly in the context of Descartes’ lifetime. Mathematics, science, and philosophy, until the
mid-nineteenth century, had yet to be truly specialized from one another, especially in terms of
epistemological merit. All of these fields, known to us today to be separate pursuits, were still
entwined in the concept of philosophy. In Wordsworth’s Romantic Age, objectivity and science
were shunned in favor of emotion and individualism in what some would consider a pendulum
swing of human interest.
Wordsworth seems to exactly understand what is at stake with the conception of Poiesis
as knowledge making. From the above quote we see that Wordsworth understands that the
efforts of creating, materializing, and setting down knowledge requires skills beyond that
typically attributed to those who seek out objective knowledge. As such, he acknowledges the
incompleteness of an epistemological paradigm that does not include those concepts germane to
creating and to solidifying knowledge. Rather than simply pointing out the incomplete nature of
mathesis universalis, he provides the completing piece in naming “the Poet”: “If the time should
ever come when what is now called science, thus familiarized to men, shall be ready to put on, as
it were, a form of flesh and blood, the Poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration.”
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It has been argued by some that science, as Descartes would have understood it to be, is reaching
a terminus as far as knowledge of the natural world. They would say that the kind of mapping
that mathesis universalis was originally intended to accomplish has largely been achieved. That
is to say, the universalis (that which is objective about the natural world in terms of physics,
mathematics, chemistry, and biology) has been sufficiently (though not completely) “set down”
that our attentions, as inquirers, must be turned to that which is objective though not necessarily
universal.

Mathesis Universalis and the Systems of Universalization
The normative function that mathesis universalis has maintained over not only the hard
sciences but academia as whole has been consistently at the expense of aesthetic discourse. In
this section I will unpack the progression of mathesis universalis, and the subsequent influential
systems of universalization and related concepts of universality that have developed in the wake
of the Cartesian paradigm. As Descartes put out the call for the development of a mathesis
universalis, it is important to bear in mind that his conception of this term is tripartite. He meant
it to encompass a body of fundamental knowledge, a strict method of inquiry that guarantees
certainty, and a codified means of expression. Of the three, the means of expression has been
given the most privilege in terms of philosophical discourse. The development of a universal
language that best accounts for all that can be expressed (or should be expressed) is a project that
has squarely divided philosophers.
Each successive system of universal language has created limitations and exclusions as to
what is the proper realm of philosophy and what can be understood as purely scientific. The
progression of systems of universalization result in Wittgenstein’s seventh proposition of the
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Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: “Of that which we cannot speak we must remain silent.” I must
raise the question as to why it took so long for systems of logic to state that those objects,
concepts, and memes that cannot fit into the propositions of formal logic must not be approached
by the systems of formal logic. Most Wittgenstein scholars re-interpret the phrase to mean that
“which cannot be stated, must be shown.” I cannot help but feel that what is really at stake in this
proposition is a field of expertise. It should be stated as “Of that which we are not suited to
determine, we must not.”
Wittgenstein is defining the limitations of scientific inquiry at the borders of meaning and
the visual. In answer to the Cartesian demand for clarity, for universalize method, and for a
precise means of expression, Wittgenstein states that the scientific community has no means,
method, or legitimacy in visual discourse. This statement comes on the heels of centuries of
continual development of systems of universalization that began with Descartes’ call for (if not
design and implementation of) a mathesis universalis. Progressing next from Leibniz’s
successive efforts to reduce all phenomenon to a catalog of symbols, then to Frege and Husserl’s
schism on the linguistic implications of logic, and ending with the Vienna Circle’s (primarily
Wittgenstein’s) rejection of metaphysics and morality as valid scientific programs, one can
watch the continual folding and reshaping of the “universal blanket”—each philosopher works to
stretch the fabric of his own methodologies far enough to cover all the modes of human inquiry
and expression. Each eventually falls short of true universality. The troublesome topics of
metaphysics and morality are most often the sticking points in these discussions, with the many
modes of logic and epistemology falling short of viability in these arenas. In other instances,
such as the Vienna Circle, the modes of epistemology deny any connection to morality at all.

129
I will argue that mathesis universalis has been continually approached from dynamics of
“knowledge collection” without consideration to the framework of “knowledge making.” In this
section, I work through the developments of universal logic starting with Descartes’ mathesis
universalis and concluding with the Vienna Circle. After Kant, it became obvious that a
universalized means of expressing truths was inadequate, as it conveyed nothing of the processes
by which one arrives at truth beyond what can be mathematically expressed. In these next
sections I explore the means by which philosophers working in the Cartesian tradition of creating
a sound system for the discoveries of truths developed related interests in logic, languages, and
processes by which truths beyond abstraction are maintained and validated. In the following
discussions I will point out how each new step in the systems of formal logic, developed by the
finest logicians in the Western world, fails to incorporate theoretical grounds for the molding of
and laying down of knowledge units. The continual focus upon “what must come before” the
acceptance of knowledge (the primum) has led to a kind of stalemate of philosophical discourse.
By positioning poiesis as a necessary opposite to mathesis, we may open a window enabling
perception of the value of forms and modes of knowledge that before were obscured by the
demands for (a certain kind of) rigorous logic.

Beginning with Descartes
Returning to Descartes, we note that Rule IV of Rules for the Direction of the Mind
states, “There is need of a method for investigating the truth about things (Anscombe and Geach,
157).” Descartes was referring to mathesis universalis, the idea that what can be taught and
learned as concrete propositional knowledge requires a universalization of means as well of
expression. This idea can be understood as threefold for the sake of this dissertation: it refers to
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the language of scientific expression, the methodology of scientific inquiry, as well as the
concretized fundamental knowledge itself. A detailed examination of the history of the term
reveals disputes as to whether the term exclusively means “mathematical expression” in a literal
sense, or if it refers to a more general system of scientific inquiry. Historically, most have
preferred the latter definition. There are roots in the Jesuit tradition as well as the early
Renaissance that pre-date Descartes’ conception of this term,46 but for the sake of this
dissertation, Descartes is the natural starting point for exploration of this concept.
Mathesis universalis is at once a method for seeking knowledge and a mode of
expressing knowledge. The method involves a denial of what is unclear and a precise moving
through of the following steps.
1.) Accept as true only what is indubitable: This implies a disregard to sensory
perceptions, a radical wariness of the physical world as an epistemological source,
and an acceptance that one is not necessarily being deceived by the senses or the
objective world, but that one’s senses and intuitions on representations are not
how foundational knowledge is gained. Foundational knowledge is key for
Descartes as he believed that all subsequent knowledge can be surmised from
sound rational premises47.
2.) Divide every question into manageable parts.
3.) Begin with the simplest issues and ascend to the more complex.
4.) Review frequently enough to retain the whole argument at once.
The Cartesian process works much like a sieve. There is a scooping up of what is there,
and then a specific and orderly process of eliminating that which does not fit into the holes of the
sieve. What does not fit are the sensorial and the assumptive—qualitative data, as a rule, with
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specific and organic forms that will not pass through the square holes of Cartesian doubt. The
justification for this subtractive process is that it provides proof to oneself (to res cogitans) that
things are as they are. The dogmatism of the scholastic48 tradition does not provide a reliable
basis for demystifying notions that have no sound logic for a thinking self. Rather than being
revolutionary, Descartes intended his method to be reformative. Philosophers after Descartes’
lifetime found that mathesis universalis, while methodologically sound, required a better mode
of expression than the algebraic or geometric proofs as those phrases alone fail to encompass the
scope of observable life. Mathesis universalis provides procedures and means for what can be
understood as proper scientific inquiry and proper scientific discourse. What it does not do is
determine anything to be dogmatic or fixed in nature. The clarity and categorical nature of math
does not require one to know the thing-in-itself, only purely abstract representations. In terms of
a model of procedure, mathesis universalis is to be used only in terms of that which is clear,
rather than that which is assumed a priori. It works to achieve the highest level of detached
clarity towards why and how we can understand things, specifically laws (objective and separate
from ourselves), to be true.
In contemporary philosophy it is largely agreed that Descartes’ conception of mathesis
universalis, combined with the radical rationalism of the Cogito, fails to adequately support
those “softer” sciences that require the admission of singular circumstances (such as language,
gender, age, class, language, etc.49) and marginalizes those conceptions of quality that would be
encompassed by aesthetics (see previous chapter on Descartes for a more in depth discussion of
this marginalization). This occurs because of the lack of attention to the practical aspects of
scientific inquiry. While the utmost effort is given to removing all bias and possible
misunderstandings within the communication and data of science, mathesis universalis as
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Descartes composed it, lacks any discussion of the practical aspects of proper scientific research
and communication. What are the proper settings for research? Who can properly conduct
research? What are the proper contexts (beyond clarity) that are required for research? None of
these questions are addressed in the Cartesian mathesis universalis. The extreme rationalism of
Descartes assumes that there is no knowledge beyond the rational representations of experience
as it can be universalized for communication to the broader scientific community. It is a
“making-same-through-elimination”. The authority Descartes exercises to establish this
universalization is that of one “free from all bias.”
As discussed above, this methodology marginalizes the arts, for they are not features of
the “natural world”. It could be said that perhaps, given enough time to establish the fundamental
fields of knowledge, Descartes would have eventually turned his sights on the arts. However,
two things prevent this interpretation. First, Descartes’ system of mathematicization has no
means of including aesthetic qualities (or qualities of any variety). Second, Descartes shows little
regard for the arts in any of his works, personal or professional. This second point is discussed in
depth in Chapter 3, which explores discussion of aesthetics in Descartes’ oeuvre. When I state
that mathesis universalis has no means of including aesthetics, I refer to the two major
roadblocks that prevent it: 1.) if knowledge is to be gathered not made, as it is understood to be
in the Cartesian paradigm, then artworks (which are by all intents manmade) cannot be
considered as being of the natural world, and 2.) It would indeed be a self-defeating enterprise to
attempt to discuss aesthetics (the philosophical discourse of quality) in terms of reduced symbols
or generic axioms. This is not to say it could not be done. Of course one could conduct
discussions of the arts or of beauty in the language of numbers and functional symbols. But the
subjective nature of meaning is not and could not be accounted for. The symbols would not be
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truly universal. What is lacking in both of these modalities is an option to create truth or impart
meaning. The rational mind is (or ought to be) according to the Cartesian model purely passive
in its collection of knowledge. The knowledge is primum (there first) and the mind might only
respond to it. Bio-evolution models of knowledge more prevalent today have largely debunked
this “stimuli and response” mode of epistemology.
Since Descartes’ lifetime, other philosophers have responded to the call for a system of
epistemology that works towards a kind of total knowledge of our world. Each in turn added
some means or considerations for knowledge so that they might expand the “universality” of this
most important pillar of the Cartesian paradigm.

Leibniz and Universal Calculus
As with Descartes, Leibniz makes the assumption that knowledge is gathered, not made.
In a further development of the gathering paradigm, Leibniz grants significance to the atomistic
nature of knowledge units—meaning is derived from the arrangement of certain fundamental or
“atomic” knowledge units. This provides a small gap wherein context and reference can in some
cases be revealed, however the use of reductive symbols limits the depth of meaning that can be
conveyed. This limitation raises the question of what harm is done by using shorthand? For all
intents and purposes, having a universalized means of expression comes across as a noble goal.
But what has developed is a system of shorthand notations concerning generics and reduced
symbols that truly can only be applied in certain fields. This question could in itself be the topic
of an entire dissertation, but it does have relevance to the discussion of this chapter. To put the
question another way, what is it that fully contextualized representation provides that shorthand
cannot? Or even the reverse: what is it that shorthand provides that fully contextualized
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representation does not? The first answer is of course brevity. Characteristica universalis,
developed by Leibniz in De Arte Combinatoria (1666) and the subsequent systems like it, work
when the assumption is made that depth of meaning is not always necessary, that quickness of
conveyance is a greater priority. This assumption grants authority to the system at hand in
determining what forms of meaning are necessary. Those modes of meaning (visual affect, tone,
specificity, time, etc.) that cannot be conveyed in the shorthand are thus marginalized. In short
originality, specificity, and reference are not immediately granted to the reader. Those things
must be pursued by secondary means if desired. In the subsections that follow we will see how
the next incarnations of universalized expression attempt to negotiate the need for reference and
specificity. The exclusion of qualitative and/or subjective concepts is not a necessary feature of
universal language concepts, however. But it wasn’t until 1879 that such inclusions were even
considered.

Gottlob Frege
The advent of Analytic philosophy of course has bearing on this discussion. In the
interest of brevity I will keep the philosophers mentioned here germane to the concept of
mathesis universalis and modes of universal expression. Historically speaking the schism
between Continental and Analytic philosophy is not easily pinpointed in any singular event or
publication, but there is a distinct period of the early twentieth century involving a limited circle
of philosophers on either side of the debate. Husserl, Heidegger, Claude Levi-Strauss, and
Jacques Derrida are among the most well-known Continental philosophers focusing their efforts
on topics such as structuralism, existentialism, and critical theory. In the grand scheme of
aesthetic discourse, Continental philosophy tends to view the arts as agents of change. When the
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arts provide knowledge it is of the structures of power at play, the consequences of social norms,
or the nuanced facets of life that are marginalized due to systems of universalization. The most
well-known Analytic philosophers are Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege, Ludwig Wittgenstein,
and Rudolf Carnap. The analytic tradition can be best understood as a function of “sorting”.
These scholars work to sift through, organize, and isolate fundamental principles—some in
search of absolute laws, others in search for common threads. Lists and bullet points are de rigor.
In terms of aesthetics, the analytic philosophers maintain a rather taxonomial view of the arts.
The common threads of form and content are used to create different “isms” of art when paired
with specific historical events or periods. But beyond that, the analytic camp finds little objective
knowledge to be gained, nor agency to be had from the arts. In fact, there is a distinct silence on
the subject of the arts beyond their historical significance.
Gottlob Frege plants the seeds of Analytic philosophy, a second tradition of
universalization beyond that of Descartes and Leibniz. James Luchte elucidates the
continental/analytic divide in his treatment of the topic in his Martin Heidegger and Rudolf
Carnap: Radical Phenomenology, Logical Positivism and the Roots of the Continental/Analytic
Divide. Frege, Carnap, and others “set forth an epistemological interpretation of Kant which set
out from the ‘fact of science’ as the primary datum, and saw the task of philosophy to trace the
foundations of this ‘fact’. In this way, philosophy becomes a mere adjunct to the natural
sciences. Moreover, this school had a more ambitious political agenda, contending that the
natural sciences, as a ‘universal cultural knowledge’, intimated a striving for a global cultural
and political ideal” (Luchte). By contrast, those working from the perspective of Continental
philosophy understood Kant’s work to be a gateway for “re-integrating the concerns of science
into the lifeworld of human existence. In this way, the political and cultural implications of this
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perspective were that of a respect for the plurality of individuated communities in terms of their
own historical specificities.” While the political concerns for the analytic/continental divide are
not necessarily relevant to the discussion at hand, Luchte’s point illuminates the nature of each
party’s locus of concern.
Frege determined that logic and language were essentially entwined with reality, placing
linguistic analysis on the philosophical map for the first time.50 Although he intended the work to
be about quantifiers and qualifiers, his work on language begat an entirely new frame of
reference to consider in terms of reality (prior to this metaphysics was bound to physics or
religion). “Frege was the first person in history of Western thought who produced a sustained
and rigorous analysis of the way that meaning works in language” (Priest, 30:10)
Frege develops the Begriffsschrift (translated roughly as “Concept-Script) in a book with
the same title published in 1879. The idiosyncratic language is difficult to master, but once
understood is a facile notation system that offers complex expressions in few variables.
Begriffsschrift is still in use today, having been built upon by Frege’s successors, in what is now
referred to as second-order logic. A few simple examples of this system of notation, taken from
E.N. Zalta’s exposition simply titled, Frege, are as follows:
∀xRxa Every x is such that x stands in the relation R to a.
∀x∀y(Px → Qy)

For all x, for all y, if Px then Qy

∀F Fa Every F is such that a falls under F
∀F(Fx → Fy) For all F, if Fx then Fy
After Frege developed this system of notation that included sets, quantifiers, and
qualifiers as discussed above (see Begriffsschrift for more detail), questions about “sense” began
to arise in the philosophical community. This does not refer to subjective meaning, as Frege
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believed the image in one’s head has nothing to do whatsoever with the meaning of that word. It
means the sense in which one is discussing the object. In a later paper, On Sense and Reference
(1892) Frege determined the need for notations of what sense a statement was being made. To
use Priest’s example, there are two senses in which one can use the object “the Morning Star.”
The Morning Star = The Morning Star
The Morning Star= The Evening Star
Both of these statements are true, which means that there must be clarity as to the sense
of an objects reference so that contradiction can be avoided. Dissecting the functions of language
in reality even further, Frege made an enormous leap in is next paper On Concept and Object
(1892). When dissecting phrases into objects and predicates, Frege determined that concepts
(concepts can be verb phrases, conditions, or adjectives) are possessed of imperfect meaning—
they are understood but with objective “gaps” of sorts. For example the phrase “is excited” has
no meaning because it isn’t paired with an object to fill the objective gap. Frege notes that
another concept does not fill this gap as the phrases “is excited, is excited” or “is excited, is red”
are meaningless until they are paired with an object. The phrases “Jane is excited” and “The Bird
is excited and is red” show how the objective gap is filled. To put this system simply:
Reference

Sense

Noun Phrases

Object

Mode of Presentation of an Object

Verb Phrases

Concept

Mode of Presentation of a Concept

While this system may seem incredibly obvious, it in fact represents a prototypical
paradigm for metaphysical reality. He has stated that there are at least two different kinds of
things in reality and they both entail a referent and a sense. Frege’s system of semantics is no
longer in use aside from one aspect—putting the theory of meaning center stage in terms of
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reality. Edmund Husserl would later pursue similar avenues of thought but took his own
conception to originally include subjective mental images (psychologism). A critique from Frege
would cause Husserl to dedicate the remainder of his career to developing a non-psychologstic
analysis of the objective structure of thought, but dependent upon the nature of logic and thought
rather than linguistic meaning. This historical “fork in the road” marks what can be viewed as a
first division point between Continental and Analytic philosophy.
Frege’s overall justification for a reform to the standardized notation was a completion of
the Aristotelian logical syntax that could not include generalized statements. He begins the
preface of Begriffsschrift by stating precisely this, “If the task of philosophy is to break the
domination of words over the human mind ..., then my concept notation, being developed for
these purposes, can be a useful instrument for philosophers ... I believe the cause of logic has
been advanced already by the invention of this concept notation” (Begriffsschrift 6). In essence,
Frege worked to expand Leibniz’ system to have reductive symbols for modes of logic and
inferences, not just numbers and objects—thus allowing for the laying down of generalized
statements that could not otherwise have been made. This increase in available complexity is the
basis for modern predicate calculus, which in turn, is the basis for generations of programming
language. What is different in Frege’s approach is the emphasis on actions and relationships
between objects, rather than an emphasis on the fixed-ness of the objects at hand. The static
symbols of objects that would have been utilized by Descartes and Leibniz underscore their
objective worldviews. These two philosophers’ approaches began with what could be understood
as clear and distinct, thus placing an “object first” characteristic on their respective philosophies.
Frege viewed the interaction between human beings and the objective world as more central to
generating a system of universality. For him, logic and relationships were the universal glue
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holding the human world together, rather than the universally observable objects be found in it.
Predicate calculus worked to universalize the actions taken, the relationships upheld, or the
meaning instilled into those objects that can be found in a particular context.

Ludwig Wittgenstein
Ludwig Wittgenstein continues on the path Frege lays out by developing a universal
system of propositions that would encompass all logic- but he does so with a sharp critique of
philosophy. Tractatus Philosophicus (Tractatus) hold seven basic propositions from which all
situations can be examined. Rather than employing a reductive way of approaching
universalizations, Wittgenstein worked to universalize communication about a specific closed
context he referred to as “the picture.” A picture, rather than being a literal image, is the case of
facts at hand. Facts, as he sees them, are not objects but combinations of objects that are either
actual or possible.
Tractatus is a methodology for generating propositions about cognition and the natural
world that adheres to a strict sense of formal logic. Beyond Tractatus, however, Wittgenstein
does not uphold philosophy as a legitimate field in and of itself, but instead treats it as a field of
therapeutics to be applied to any other mode of inquiry. It is the way one “shows the fly the way
out of the fly bottle” (PI 309 p 103) For Wittgenstein, the methodology is logic aimed at the
propositional knowledge of the natural world. This includes no philosophical discourse properly
speaking. “The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing
except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science … and then whenever someone else
wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a
meaning to certain signs in his propositions” (TLP 6.53, p187) The second, more far- reaching,
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“discovery” in the Investigations “is the one that enables me to break off philosophizing when I
want to” (PI 133, p51). On paper Wittgenstein’s methodology is strict form of propositional
logic. Taken in context, his work can be seen as a radical dismissal of the self-indulgent nature of
philosophy. By these standards, in depth investigations into metaphysics, the nature of cognition,
and the meanings of large underscoring concepts such as being, time, etc. are not acknowledged
as necessary to the epistemological “game.”
Wittgenstein’s most influential works seem to push for a stricter adherence to logic when
generating knowledge of the natural world—this fits with the general arc of the Vienna Circle’s
rejection of moralism and existentialism— Wittgenstein’s later work, specifically On Certainty,
reveals a deep conversation with the Cartesian methodology of doubt that sheds light on the
overall game of Wittgenstein’s strict logical method. It is clear from this posthumously published
collection of aphorisms that the general aim of his work was to simply “get on with it” without
allowing the mind to become mired in seemingly-unanswerable questions of metaphysics and
morality.
In Wittgenstein we find a truncation of the Cartesian tree of knowledge—he effectively
skips over the roots and ignores the sky above. Descartes posited metaphysics as the root of
epistemology, and posited that morality would naturally follow after the establishment of
specialized scientific knowledge (like the sky above the branches). Wittgenstein finds no purpose
in trying to apply the language games of science (logic and mathematics) to those areas beyond
the bounds of said language games. He is in effect closing the epistemological circle by means of
subjective dismissal. He enables the subject to reject those questions that cannot be readily
answered. In a sense this is very much like Descartes in that both men only wish to proceed in
clear and distinct directions. Unlike Descartes, however, for Wittgenstein that direction need not
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be supported by metaphysics or morality, as those fields are not possessed of the rules that allow
for the pursuit of logic and mathematics. To put this in terms of universalization, Wittgenstein is
the first to declare ingressum (refusal to allow) to those questions that philosophy (philosophy in
the contemporary, specialized sense that it is today) pursues in terms of his system of universal
expression. It must be understood that Wittgenstein effectively answers the Cartesian call to
generate universal language, universal logic, and universal methodology with a simple non
possum (not possible).
Wittgenstein rejects and thus effectively ends the Cartesian ambition to close the “circle.”
He states that you cannot encompass the whole the natural world under one universalized
system. He determines philosophy to be an activity of personal therapy rather than any type of
doctrine, and most interestingly, determines the activity to be nonsensical as the picture at hand
in itself is not the concern. He determines philosophy to be the act of clarifying logic and
elucidating on problems of language and therefore it is not related to “sense,” and is indeed,
“nonsense.”
The Tractatus’ dependence upon the idea of pictures and what “cannot be said, only
seen” has made it one of the few works of the analytic tradition that appears to make space for
the visual arts, though that space is of questionable value. As stated above, pictures for
Wittgenstein are not generally of the visual sense of that term, and are more lists of facts at hand.
Philosophy and related revelatory means of exploration (like the arts) cannot have the same rules
of formalized logic introduced (nor can the formalized rules of logic be introduced to the arts), as
their inherent “game” is not the same. Towards the end of Wittgenstein’s life he became more
interested in aesthetics, and began to posit what the rules of aesthetics might be. First and
foremost Wittgenstein understood the language game of aesthetics as changing over time.
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Secondly, and most importantly for our discussion, he understood aesthetics—by and large he
means the acts of sensing by this term—as an influential force in the grand inquiry into the
human world. What exactly aesthetics means to Wittgenstein is difficult to define in words, as he
feels the concept becomes bogged down by the limitations of language, and as the Tractatus
firmly states, should be kept at a far remove from objective inquiry.
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CHAPTER 5

Wright of Derby as a Moment in the Development of Universalization
In this chapter I will argue that the Science Paintings of English painter Joseph Wright of
Derby hold a deep philosophical discourse with the Cartesian paradigm by questioning the
paradigm’s consistent privileging of universalization and centralization of the hard sciences
through its placing of scientific research within a social sphere.
I will begin with a brief biographical sketch of Wright himself, and follow with small
sections on the arts during the industrial revolution, the contemporary aesthetic comportment,
and art theory of Wright’s time. With these historical contexts in place, I then proceed to a
discussion of Wright’s social milieu, aesthetic mindset, and economic status—all of which bear
upon treating him as a thinker, as well as an artist through consideration of a specific series of six
paintings (I will group them by pairs) done by Wright between 1768 and 1790. In this chapter I
will demonstrate the inclusive nature of Wright’s philosophical discourse, and foreground the
moral questions posed by these works.
Born the third son of attorney John Wright in Irongate, Derby-in-the-Midlands, Wright
was free to pursue a career beyond the family business of law. His eldest brother John followed
in their father’s choice of profession, and his brother, Richard, chose the noble trade of medicine.
As a young man, Joseph displayed a knack for capturing likeness in drawings of friends and
neighbors, so his father supported the choice of an arts career.51 He arranged for Wright to have
an apprenticeship with portraitist Thomas Hudson52 (1701-1779) in London from 1751-53. After
returning home to Derby, with brief a professional excursion to Liverpool (1768-1771), Wright
became a respected portraitist to many of the rising Industrial moguls of the area, all the while
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painting many works with peculiar and striking subjects. These works were nearly always
painted on speculation- a strong indication that the subjects chosen are ostensibly of personal
interest. The works universally emphasize illumination by artificial means, an unusual topos for
a provincial English painter.
The distinct lack of consistency of the nicknames given to Wright across the relatively
few texts dedicated to his works speak more of his lack of recognition than to his comparative
lack of sales, or lack of acceptance by higher social orders. “The Painter of Light” by Benedict
Nicholson, “The Philosophers’ Painter” by Eric Robinson, and more descriptively “A Painter and
A Gentleman” by Andrew Graciano all warmly invite the reader to look upon Wright with a
pitiful shake of the head and a regretful shrug. But it is unclear as to what it is these authors feel
Wright should be recognized for as he is consistently viewed through a lens of assumed
mediocrity. Wright’s work is portrayed as what I can only describe by the following critical
quips: “good, but not great,” “well executed, but not original technique,” and “a big fish in a
small pond.” Most of the texts speak of his provincial nature, his very British folksiness, and the
prevalent influence of the Industrial Revolution on his work. “That the fire of genius is absent
from the finished work of Wright we will not deny” (Kaines-Smith and Bemrose 33), while
conveying the very tautological point that Wright is not famous because he is not well known.53
Portrayed as a person peripheral to the Royal Society and other high status milieu, he is treated
as one whose work is considered archetypal to the Industrial Revolution, a classic example of a
provincial (read less successful) artist who painted more genre-esque works, and one who failed
to achieve celebrity status.
Certainly the historical records indicate that he did not reach the levels of fame that he
might have sought after, and it is well documented in his personal correspondence that he was
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often unsuccessful in securing higher profile commissions. But average or middling does not
necessarily point to mediocrity. In Wright’s case, it is more indicative of an engaged but nonradical stance on many aspects. Moderation was his nature and his asset. As a landowner, Wright
was wealthy by comparison to his neighbors in Derby, but not so compared to those in London
society. As an artist his skill was remarkable for his provincial background, but not so compared
to artists trained on the Continent. Bemrose describes him as “a painter by instinct not by
environment,” indicating that a career in the arts was an unusual move for someone of his
locality and lineage.54 In all the texts dedicated to Wright, I have yet to see real discussion given
to Wright’s own philosophical contributions or any acknowledgement of him as a thinker.
With this case study of Wright’s Science Paintings, I intend to bring to light the discourse
an “average” artist maintained with the hard sciences during such a pivotal time in Western
history. I will use the moment of Wright’s works (1768-1791) to provide a historical example of
how the privileging of universal expression, a concept directly tied to the Cartesian paradigm,
marginalized the concepts of content and original expression. The Science Paintings directly
address the sciences, and do so with enthusiasm and awe. This is not to say however that Wright
offers no criticism or wariness of science and industry. The lone exception to the paucity of
aesthetic discourse given to Wright is a chapter Andrew Graciano’s Joseph Wright, Esq: Painter
and Gentleman. Chapter 4 of this text connects Wright to certain philosophical circles, but not as
a contributor, only as a social bystander or soliciting businessman. In the below section titled
“Wright as Self-Funded Artist” I offer an in-depth critique of Graciano’s views on Wright as an
artist who did not need to paint for money. As prologue to this discussion, I offer a look at
Wright’s particular moment in history.
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Wright as Self-Funded Painter
The title to Graciano’s 2012 text is titled Joseph Wright, Esq.: Painter and Gentleman,
abandoning the typical reference to the artist as Wright of Derby. The text follows suit by
delving deeply into the economic atmosphere of Wright’s personal finances, as well as those of
his circle of friends and clientele. One the key premises he argues for is that Wright chose to stay
in Derby, rather than staying due to any professional failure. “Wright was not ‘stuck’ in
Derbyshire unable to make it as an artist in London. Rather… that he was a man of independent
means who did not need to paint for money” (53). This matters to our broader discussion of
Wright’s speculative works. If one understands that Wright was not aiming to sell these works as
a means of financial support the tone of their expression hits different notes. Works painted to
suit a patron or aimed at a particular buyer carry a tone, hopeful or otherwise, of beseeching or
even supplication. The Science paintings, though likely painted in hopes of someday selling
them, cannot be understood as typically speculative. It is entirely possible Wright was painting
these works as advertisements for himself, hoping to impress viewers in order to secure portrait
commissions. But even so, the circle that Wright moved in would by and large be more
impressed with an artist who could engage not just their visual interest, but their own
philosophical interests as well.
Let us assume that Graciano is correct that Wright did “choose to stay” in Derby. This
does not mean that the secondary interests of philosophy, science, and industry were purely
pursued by Wright as an artist/businessman. The scholarly and philosophical nature of the
pictorial content however would not necessarily have been palatable to the nouveau riche that
made up the bulk of Wright’s patrons. To illustrate my point, Graciano discusses the importance
of the newly rich industrialists in such a way that does not account for Wright’s personal
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interests of philosophy or Science, but instead only discusses how an interest in geology or mapmaking would have been relevant for his pictorial descriptions of objects painted in some of the
various portraits commissioned by industrialists.
In a letter from Wright to his brother (dated Nov 11, 1774), Wright describes missing his
geologist friend, John Whitehurst, while witnessing a volcanic eruption in Italy: “When you see
Whitehurst, tell him I wished for his company when on Mount Vesuvius, his thoughts would
have center’d in the bowels of the mountain, mine skimmed the surface only.”55 Graciano argues
that this statement is testament to Wright’s general, not in-depth, interest into geology (and thus
all of the hard sciences) by inferring that the “surface only” portion of this quote has more
meaning than Wright’s own visual appreciation for what can only be a surreal event to witness.
In fact the title of Graciano’s chapter is “Surface and Depth,” in which he describes the industrial
motivations for the Derby locals to be keen on geology (knowing which types of clay produce
the best pottery for the Wedgewood factories, for example). As these people would be Wright’s
patron’s Graciano views any interest Wright would have had in geology as pandering to the
interests of the wealthy. He uses the above quote from Wright’s letter as proof. But Graciano’s
position is a disservice to Wright as a thinker and potential contributor to greater philosophical
discussions.
Adding to my doubts about this position, Graciano notes only a portrait by Wright that
contains a mineral specimen (Portrait of Charles Hurt), and the few landscapes that contain
geological formations (this is tautological: they are landscapes, of course they have geological
formations) as evidence of Wright’s superficial interest in geology. I find the argument that a
visual artist being mostly interested in the surface appearances of phenomenon as indication of
his lack of in-depth interest in the visual subject matter to be fallacious and tautological. As a
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visual artist, of course he was interested in the appearance of objects. The surface appearance of
phenomenon (particularly light in Wright’s case) would be his area of expertise. But to discredit
a person’s interest in a subject matter as novice or secondary to their profession, and that a
“hobby-like” quality to one’s interest somehow makes one less able to contribute to discourse on
the subject matter at hand is certainly an academic fantasy. I say academic because only
academics believe in the proprietary voice of expertise. This argument of a novice interest in the
sciences is flawed, but recalls a key aspect of the larger question at hand: how does Wright’s
work hold discourse with the Cartesian paradigm? The deeper meaning to be gleaned is that
Wright shuns the need for expertise or credentials as he contributes to the world around him.
That is to say, he casts off the pre-requisite of expertise and “properness” of voice that is inherent
to the Cartesian paradigm.
Recalling that Descartes tells us what is the proper subject for inquiry, that which is clear
and distinct; that he delineates the proper order of inquiry (the metaphysical to the physical, and
so on); that his paradigm requires us to understand knowledge as that which is discovered; and
that our worldview must require the mind to be separate from the body inhabiting a mechanistic
universe, it is simple to understand that Descartes was possessed of many notions of “propriety.”
As discussed in depth in the previous chapter, he felt a strong need for a proper means of
methodology and expression. For Descartes, morality is the natural result of the full possession
of knowledge of the natural world. But because his work contained no reference to the arts,
aesthetics, or moral philosophies, these fields are not deemed the proper arenas for the pursuit of
knowledge, nor the expression or conveyance of knowledge. Wright will challenge this Cartesian
paradigm on many levels, all the while engaging the aesthetic discourse of his time by a
strategically inclusive stance on the sublime, the picturesque, and the beautiful.
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Wright’s Sociocultural Milieu
There is historical evidence of Wright’s participation in philosophical discourse as he was
part of a circle of people in Derby known as the Lunar Society. So named because they convened
monthly on the Monday nearest the full moon (arguably for the use of the full lighting a large
moon would offer), the group was comprised of industrialists, scholars, clergy, and intellectuals.
Largely informal, the group was maintained for over fifty years and included many prominent
figures of the Midlands. This short list of associated members (there are over 200 people
historically involved in the Society) reveals the true diversity of interest the group provided:
Matthew Boulton (industrialist), Erasmus Darwin (physician and poet), Thomas Day(author),
Richard Lovell Edgeworth (politician and inventor), Samuel Galton (arms manufacturer), Joseph
Priestley (theologian), William Small (professor), Jonathan Stokes (botanist), James
Watt(engineer and chemist), Josiah Wedgwood (industrial ceramicist), and John Whitehurst
(clockmaker).Wright was never a consistent member of the group, but this circle of people
included so many of his patrons and prospective commissioners that occasional meeting
attendance was not just of importance to his scholarly interests, but as a networking event.
Wright’s patrons’ enthusiasm pushed Wright to read the latest in all manner of scientific
and philosophical writings. He spoke of reading Emile by Rousseau, attended lectures given by
Scottish astronomer James Ferguson, and discussed the works of Isaac Newton with his close
friend John Whitehurst. Peter Perez Burdett, cartographer and mathematician, is described as
Wright’s closest friend in several texts (Egerton, Elliot, et al), and indeed he is the only exact
likeness that can be identified, appearing in two of the six science paintings. Burdett is the center
figure represented in Three Persons viewing the Gladiator and is the man taking notes in The
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Orrery. Wright accompanied Burdett on survey outings of the Derby area, and was instrumental
in introducing Burdett to Josiah Wedgewood—a meeting that proved fortuitous for the latter two
in terms of the newly developed aquatint technology that Burdett presented to Wedgewood for
purposes of reproducing images on pottery. This technique is now a hallmark of Wedgewood
Pottery.
When reading the litany of influential people in Wright’s immediate social reach it might
appear that the painter was a gregarious socialite. Nothing is further from the truth. Wright is
noted by several biographers to be of a “home-ish” nature and preferred to keep his social life to
a limited circle. What allows us to consider this wide range of industrial and scientific leaders as
influential to Wright was the developing trend of “societies” that was in full stride during
Wright’s lifetime. The above-mentioned Lunar Society was one of at least a dozen scientifically
slanted social groups that met in Derby and the surrounding Midlands in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Special interest groups ranging from the scientific to the sinful (a number of
drinking, gambling, and sex societies are also of note during this time frame) showed the rising
middle class answer to the Royal Society and other courtly circles in London. The social
consumption of science is the topic of Paul Elliot’s book The Derby Philosopher’s: Science and
Culture in British Urban Society 1700-1850. A key claim Elliot makes in this text is that the
growth of these societies due to the advent of Newtonian natural philosophy. This distinct way of
describing Newton’s influence on the Industrial revolution is key to our discussion of Wright’s
works as they relate to the Cartesian paradigm.
Newtonian natural philosophy56 offers critique to Cartesian natural philosophy only by
means of expansion. Newton felt that the radical rationalism of Descartes relied too heavily upon
theoretical foundations. Andrew Janiak, in his essay on Newtonian philosophy, states that
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“Newton respected Descartes' rejection of Aristotelian ideas, but argued that Cartesians did not
employ enough of the mathematical techniques of Galileo, or of the experimental methods of
Boyle, in trying to understand nature” (Janiak, 1.3) Newton’s Philosophae Naturalis Principia
Mathematica can be understood as a direct response to Descartes’ Principia Philosophiae. The
response therein is hardly a rejection of Cartesian methodology57, though historians often posit it
in such a light. The criticism is not that what Descartes’ has done is unsound but incomplete in
terms of the practice of study. Newton finds the dearth of methodological standards and guidance
on the topics of mathematical data and experimental science to be problematic. Newton
encouraged rigorous criteria for experimentation and demanded that mathematical modeling be
an essential part of the pursuit of knowledge.
The push for experimentation and the importance for mathematics made scientific
research more accessible to the growing classes of scholars. Those classes of scholars eventually
disseminated their ideas to the rising, newly-educated, middle classes. Holding educational, if
not necessarily research driven, “experiments” for public witness has direct ties to the ease of
legitimacy that Newtonian natural philosophy extended to all participants—that is, anyone can
conduct experimentation so long as the three tenets of hypothesis/conclusion rationale,
mathematical modeling, and detailed consideration to experimental factors were upheld. On
these grounds it is not illegitimate to conclude that the discourse at hand in Wright’s paintings
resonates with Newtonian natural philosophy. It is however an incomplete conclusion. As
Newton never contributed to philosophy any such works devoted into the topics of world-view,
the character of the mind, or metaphysical philosophy it would be an unsubstantiated credit to
say that his philosophical discourse was at the heart of Wright’s visual discourse. Wright’s works
touch on the harmonious order of the universe, the nature of the practical work of science, the
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conceptions of those things proper to science, and the pleasure to be found from the scientific
pursuit of knowledge. None of those topics are central to Newtonian discourse, therefore for the
intents and purposes of this discussion, we shall understand Newtonian natural philosophy as the
contemporary incarnation of the Cartesian paradigm—an incarnation that expands upon, but does
not alter, the character of Descartes’ original scientific method.

The Zeitgeist of Mid- to Late-Eighteenth Century England
It is a large undertaking to accurately capture the full picture of the Industrial Revolution,
even if one tries to limit the view to its origins in Great Britain. Francis D. Klingender narrows
the aperture even more with his historical treatment of the Arts during the mid-eighteenth
century. Critiqued by some (See Robinson and Barea Reviews) as overly linear and for making
“forced” explanations, Klingender’s text on the Industrial Revolution is certainly broad-reaching
with few points of in-depth scholarship or keen acumen. However it is one of the few dedicated
texts on the subject of the Arts during this pivotal time in history, and its breadth (shallow as it
may be) provides an adequate backdrop to our discussion of Joseph Wright’s works. The overall
thesis of Art and the Industrial Revolution holds a reverence for the self-driven gumption those
artisans and tradespeople working in eighteenth-century England maintained. “To become a
great maritime and trading power, England had to develop her own industrial resources. […]
Enriched by the dissolution of the monasteries and by colonial profits, aided by the grant of
monopolies, a new class of adventurer emerged to direct the industrial expansion of the sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries” (3). Use of the term “adventurer” is quite telling. Klingender
works through the various arts describing each artisan as having self-possessed tenacity, and
warm embraces for the developing industrial mind-set. In the works discussed, there is no
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nostalgia for any era gone-by, and a distinct patriotic sense of accomplishment and wonder at
England’s own resources and resourcefulness.
There are few criticisms of the consequences of the industrial revolution (no comments
about environmental devastation or remarks about the greed of industry royals) and a distinct
sense of praise for the cultural re-valuing of human labor. Whereas a more contemporary text on
this topic might paint the time period with colors of greed, Klingender focuses on the industrious
nature of mankind rather than industry itself—calling the big names of the era “adventurers”
rather than “tycoons” or even the more neutral “inventors” is noteworthy. Perhaps it is because
the real topic of the text is the art and artists working during this time that he chooses to eschew
such common denigrations. Klingender’s own Marxist tendencies are referenced more than once
in the different introductions to the book, so it would stand to reason that he would carry grudges
against those that exploited common labor. And yet nothing of the kind is said. He chose to
embrace the awe and enthusiasm of industry that these artists portray as a noble moment when
humankind awoke to the values of their toil.
Simon Schama, in his History of Britain vol. 1, also acknowledges this sudden rise of
interest in the value not only of one’s own labor, but the beauty that resided in one’s own
country. Wright’s portrait of Sir Brooke Boothby features in Schama’s opening chapter. Schama
interprets Boothby’s portrait as depicting a citizen whose attentions have returned to the Ancient
British heritage.
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Fig. 1. Sir Brooke Boothby, Joseph Wright of Derby, 1781, Oil paint on
canvas 148cm x 208cm
http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/wright-sir-brooke-boothby-n04132

Posed graciously nestled in the English woods, reading a book by Rousseau (no doubt
Reveries of a Solitary Walker), Boothby is depicted as a tourist of the quaint countryside, an
activity that rose in popularity during the fall of the British Empire. This concept connects with a
newfound appreciation for the aesthetic pleasures of the picturesque described in detail below.
The un- manicured scene of nature, not overwhelming or vastly foreign as with the sublime, but
still rugged and untouched is a mode of aesthetic expression that received great attention during
this time.
Klingender and Schama’s somewhat optimistic viewpoints about this time frame are well
suited to open our discussion about Joseph Wright of Derby. Wright certainly upheld a kind of
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visual reverence and optimism for the reaches of science and industry. Weary of the light of the
sun, Wright paints man-made light as compelling, and truly the focus of contemporary attentions.
Judy Egerton begins a chapter on Wright and The Lunar Society as follows: “Joseph Wright’s
two major paintings of the 18th century scientific activity, ‘A Philosopher lecturing on the
Orrery’, 1766, and ‘An Experiment on a Bird in the Air Pump’, 1768, represent a complex
synthesis of art, science, and philosophy” (15) The pity is she is only referring to the content of
these works. A deeper synthesis is at hand with all of the Science Paintings. The moderate
negotiation Wright exhibits between Cartesian rationalism, industrial practicalities, and artistic
expression is remarkable, and as yet undiscussed by scholars of this period.

The Aesthetic Discourse of the Late Eighteenth Century
The state of aesthetic discourse during Wright’s lifetime was one of inquiry and
categorization. Aesthetics as a concept, as well as a philosophical branch, was in a natal state.
Baumgarten’s Aesthetica was published in 1750, marking the first time that the word “aesthetics”
had been used to refer to a sense of beauty rather than just simple “sensation.” After Baumgarten,
philosophers took an interest in the compelling and pleasurable aspects of the arts. Treatments of
aesthetics that serve to rationalize the experience of pleasure from the arts began to appear,
though these works were generally always written by philosophers, not artists. If we are to
understand Wright as a thinker—that is, as one contributing the philosophical discourse of his
era—we must consider his visual record and the aesthetic sensibilities and philosophical texts
prevalent during his time. Descartes, as we have discussed in the previous chapters, had stressed
that maintaining proper decorum in an inquiry, as well as employing the four foundational pillars
of his paradigm, was necessary to support rational philosophical discourse. Aesthetics in
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Baumgarten’s sense was made prominent for English-speaking readers by Edmund Burke.
Wright’s near contemporary, who sought to theorize the then uncharted topic of “good taste” by
rational means. Burke’s concepts of the beautiful and the sublime can be directly tied to Wright’s
visual discourse, as well as some ideas that reflect the “new” idea of the picturesque—a concept
introduced by William Gilpin in the late-eighteenth century. Wright implicitly places these new
aesthetic conceptions in dialogue with the Cartesian paradigms in his paintings depicting the
social reception of scientific ideas.
It might seem unlikely that the taxonomy of visual expression developed by Edmund
Burke could have any significant connection to Descartes’ pillar of mathesis universalis. In the
introduction to A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the
Beautiful (Enquiry), Burke describes the difficulty of the laying out of new knowledge about
complex matters in such a way that it cannot help but recall Descartes’ preference for simplicity
and clarity: “We must not attempt to fly, when we can scarcely pretend to creep. In considering
any complex matter, we ought to examine every distinct ingredient in the composition, one by
one; and reduce everything to the most simplicity; since the condition of our nature binds us to a
strict law and very narrow limits” (8).
In Descartes’ and Burke’s separate, yet similar, calls for careful consideration58 there is a
preference for what is clear and distinct. In the above, Burke is essentially beginning a rational
exploration of the two concepts that pervade the arts while having little in the way of prior
similar investigations to draw from. Burke composed Enquiry largely wishing to inform a rising
middle class of participants in civic government and higher society as to the benefits of
considered and informed taste. Though knowledge per se is not what he intends the essay to
convey, he is in fact generating knowledge that will inform the course of aesthetic history by
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both direct and indirect means. Other philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant (though by means of
critique59), will draw upon Burke’s aesthetics to generate their own treatments of the topic—
giving aesthetic philosophy a decidedly rationalist pedigree. In Enquiry, Burke describes the
need for developing good taste as such:
If we can direct the lights we derive from such exalted speculations, upon the
humbler field of the imagination, whilst we investigate the springs, and trace the
courses of our passions, we may not only communicate to the taste a sort of
philosophical solidity, but we may reflect back on the severer sciences some of
the graces and elegancies of taste, without which the greatest proficiency in those
sciences will always have the appearance of something illiberal. (11)
Burke, with the above, is stating that the sciences are in some ways impoverished by the
lack of attention to the pleasure gained from well-crafted, complete knowledge—in particular
well-crafted knowledge about the seemingly-subjective concept of pleasure. From this quote we
see that Burke has qualitative concerns about the generation of knowledge.
What is more important to glean from Enquiry is that Burke opened a channel between
cognition and the arts by means of addressing how a work of art might affect cognition, rather
than just by the visual content of the piece. While other European schools of art scholarship
contemporary to Burke were developing the somewhat standardized hierarchies of genres 60,
Burke’s concepts of the sublime and the beautiful are not all categories of visual content. They
are categories of cognitive response to visual content. What Burke had done is remove the
content as central to the means of taxonomy, and considered the intended expression of the work
as more important. As a means of organizing the possible cognitive reactions one may have to a
painting, Burke uses scale and scope in relation to the individual human being as incremental. To
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clarify, Burke asks the questions of a painting: is the meaning intricate? Singular and complete?
Or larger than the human scope of understanding? If one understands these categories as smaller
than, on the scale of, or larger than a human being—as Burke developed these concepts to be,
and as Kant would later maintain them in the third critique—one can see an instinctual
measuring of what is universally available to all viewers of a work of art: the scale of the
expression in terms of their own human existence.
Wright in his science paintings negotiates these scales of expression in singular
viewpoints. He does not choose any one scale in particular to be the main focus of the scene. In
each of the six paintings, there are important references to the beautiful (the intricate scientific
equipment), the sublime (the reverence for the larger universe or the harmony of nature), and the
picturesque (the quaint scenarios on display). Ever the inclusive thinker, he visually comments
on each of these concepts as they relate to the actual scenario. The continued inclusion of all
“scales” across these paintings shows persistence in Wright’s sense of what ought to be
expressed in terms of science—Inclusion of the whole of the case at hand, not just what is clear,
distinct, and measurable. By doing so with the aid of generic representations, Wright has found a
way to bring the focus to the mood at hand, to the figures as they interact around the work of
science, and to the scene of science as a complete and inclusive visual moment.
By favoring what is being expressed (what is being said) and by declining to shoehorn
that statement into a single scale of expression, Wright has found a tangible way to favor the
content of an expression, even if that content does not readily fit into a clear category of subject
matter. In understanding the science painting in this way, we understand Wright’s moderate
stance as a means of engaging in philosophical discourse by means of inclusion. By the inclusion
of all three “types” or means of visual expression, and the use of generic, non-specific tropes and
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un-identified figures engaged in indiscernible activity, Wright has stated that the work of science
is socially un-isolated, that there can be pleasure found in the work of science, and that the reach
of science (and therefore industry and technology) has at once both dubious and glorious facets.
As discussed in a previous section of this dissertation, Descartes’ conception of mathesis
universalis, when taken into consideration as an object or “thing,” is comprised of three aspects:
a means of expression for fundamental knowledge, a mode of inquiry and experimentation to
determine fundamental knowledge, and the body of fundamental knowledge itself. What we have
seen to be missing from Descartes’ paradigm of mathesis universalis is the means of laying down
conclusions—a means of making knowledge. That means is poiesis, which has thus far only been
considered viz a viz the arts. Yet the step of making knowledge for the purposes of moving the
world forward is applicable to the hard sciences as well. Wright, by contributing his science
paintings to the philosophical discourse surrounding science, technology, and industry, succeeds
in adding visual knowledge to the sciences. If one is doubtful as to the veracity of this claim, one
only need to place the phrase “discovery of phosphorus” into a search engine and on every page
related to the topic, an image of Wright’s Alchemist is to be found.

The Shift from the Harmonious Renaissance to the Sublime and the Picturesque
What is meant by the shift away from the Renaissance must be made clear if we are to
fully understand Wright as a thinker engaged with the Cartesian paradigm, rather than just an
artist. Klingender clarifies this shift for us, by choosing an excellent pair of paintings to show the
marked shift in style that occurred in the arts during Wright’s lifetime. A side by side viewing of
paintings by the le Nain brothers underscores how two works exemplify the move towards
picturesque realism:
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At about the same time the brothers le Nain similarly resolved the conflict
between classical convention and realism. ‘Venus at the Forge of Vulcan’ at
Rheims, attributed to Mathieu le Nain (1607-77), is close in composition to ‘The
Forge’ by his brother, Louis (1588-1648), at the Louvre. But in the latter Vulcan
has been reduced to the role of onlooker, and Venus and Cupid replaced by the
blacksmith’s wife and child. It seems probable that the former picture [left] is the
original composition and the Louvre [right] picture a brilliant variation. (53)

Fig 2. Venus at the Forge of Vulcan, Mathieu le Nain, 1641, Oil on Canvas,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Venus_at_the_Forge_of_Vulcan,_Le_Nai
n.jpg (left); The Forge, Louis le Nain. 1641, Oil on Canvas, http://www.safranarts.com/42day/art/art4may/art0523.html (right)

In the absence of an in-depth analysis from Klingender (he says no more about these two
paintings than the above quote), we may expand upon the aesthetic values at play in this stylistic
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shift. In Venus at the Forge, we find clear homage to ancient Greek anatomical style and
posturing (the venus pudica pose of the Venus figure, for example), as well as the classically
idealized draped garb—clothes that are absolutely impractical to be worn at a forge. The objects
present are crafted and delicate in appearance, unlike any actual tools a smith would wield. The
anvil, for example, is rendered small and smooth, echoing the feel of a writing desk rather than a
work surface. The conventions of Venus and Vulcan are maintained with the odd presence of a
child-Cupid and an impossibly-oversized hammer. Through this we see the clear reverence for
classical idealization that is typical of Renaissance paintings. The aesthetic values at play appeal
to a Platonic mindset, with beauty having strict rules, proportions, and orderly appearance.
The step away from idealized forms in the second of these two works shows
disenchantment from the idealizations of the ancients towards a more anthropocentric lens on the
various subjects of painting. In these two works the subject of labor is most central, a theme that
is recurrent through the works of the industrial revolution. By the eighteenth century, painting
and sculpture had begun to capture labor by the light of hearth fires and steam furnaces—but in
the former Le Nain painting those manning the forge are still concepts of visual and cultural
perfection. The conceptualization of labor, before portrayed as that carried out by gods, is in the
latter work conducted by human beings as one would have encountered in everyday life. As the
need for manual labor to maintain industrial means swelled in the eighteenth century the sweat of
human labor morphed in its perceived value from a lowbrow means to the awestruck realism of
glowing coal fires, futuristic machinery, and other mechanisms of industry. While Klingender
does not delve deeply into any one of the artists or poets he mentions in this text, the book is a
strong survey of a time frame where the meaning of “work” was drastically changing. For his
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chapter on painting, he uses the title “Joseph Wright of Derby,” although Wright’s work is taken
as merely representative of general tendencies of his time.
For the purposes of this dissertation, Klingender’s chapter titled “The Sublime and the
Picturesque” offers the most in terms of illuminations of the aesthetic character of this time in
history. The three main guiding texts on the subjects of beauty during this era would be: Edmund
Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful
(1757), Sir Uvedale Price’s An Essay on the Picturesque, and William Gilpin’s An Essay on
Prints61 (1768). As aesthetic discourse of the time was pre-Kantian, there had yet to be a
complete dismissal of Aristotelean metaphysics and the Cartesian paradigm was embedded
within philosophic discourse. A veritable war raged between empiricists and rationalists, and the
problems of mind/body dualism had yet to be addressed.
In terms of aesthetic discourse of the eighteenth century, Edmund Burke’s conceptions of
the sublime, beauty, and curiosity were de rigor. Briefly, Burke associated feelings of
overwhelming darkness or despair with the sublime. The vast tempestuous ocean, or imposing
mountain scapes—the moments when a person encounters vacuity, silence, extreme darkness or
light (as from the sun)—are all to be associated with the sublime. It refers to those moments
when a person recognizes their fundamental “smallness” in relation to the world and its many
forces. Conversely, the beautiful is when a person encounters the perfectly small and satisfying.
Smooth worked surfaces, clearly intended lines, applied colors (opposed to those lines and colors
necessarily found in nature), and delicate moving parts are all associated with the beautiful for
Burke. Beauty is associated with tenderness and parental love. It is the moment when a person
encounter’s his or her own “largeness” in relation to the world. A third and more simple aesthetic
concept is that of curiosity. Curiosity is, according to Burke, “is the most superficial of all the
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affections; it changes its object perpetually; it has an appetite which is very sharp, but very easily
satisfied, and it has always an appearance of giddiness, restlessness and anxiety.”
The picturesque occupies a medial space between the sublime and the beautiful. It is the
scope of life as can be grasped by the human body both visually and physically—one can
accessibly walk the lengths depicted in a picturesque landscape, for example, as opposed to the
monumental distances that are often depicted in images described as sublime. Coined by William
Gilpin as the type of beauty that would be best captured in a picture—hence the “picturesque”—
there is in the concept an inherent nod towards the production of images beyond idealized or
rationalized states like the sublime or the beautiful. What is more, there is a nod towards a
burgeoning middle class of people as producers and consumers of this middle distance of
aesthetics. Often described as rustic or rugged, “accidental irregularity” was constitutive of the
picturesque. With minimal means of unity, and an emphasis on approachable wildness, the
picturesque became a driving force for Europeans.62 The connections between the picturesque
and the growing middle class of travelers has been explored by scholars such as the
aforementioned Simon Schama, as well as Christopher Hussey and Malcom Andrews. In the
interest of brevity it is sufficient to say that the idea of the picturesque cannot philosophically be
disassociated with the concept of the middle class. As I will discuss in the next sections, the
science paintings of Wright maintain a direct relationship with the picturesque as well as the
developing middle class of Industrial Revolution England.
Klingender taps into an important precursory attitude toward the eventual uproar against
the Industrial Revolution that arose just after the turn of the nineteenth century (shortly after
Wright’s death). This attitude has implications in the aesthetic discourse of the picturesque and is
apparent in Wright’s visual discourse. First it should be established that the sanctity of science,
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in terms of scientific knowledge and experimentation in pursuit of metaphysical law, can be seen
as the fuel upon which certain human corruptions feed. Greed, mass-production, materialism, et
al are buoyed by the development of scientific knowledge. In no other period of history do we
find such a surge in technology and industry than the eighteenth century and that growth can be
credited by and large to the development of scientific knowledge, and the dissemination of that
knowledge via the tenets of the Cartesian paradigm and the inception of the scientific method. It
should be understood that in the context of the Industrial Revolution science, industry, and
technology are cousins that influence one another to such a degree that no one individual of these
fields can rightfully be isolated from the others. Those living in the midst of this revolution were
keenly aware of this triad and assumed a number of different attitudes towards it. Some (the
rising middle class, for example) embraced the practical fruits of theoretical science with open
arms. Others, such as the Luddites, disparaged the advances of technology and industry (and by
implication the sciences) as greed incarnate. And then there were those who chose more
moderate stances, if not so morally defined.
Klingender equates the picturesque with a sort of looking away from the swift and
massive changes that characterized the epoch. The rocky and decrepit character of the
picturesque is not isolated to the subject of nature and is often applied to the larger scale material
evidence of industry. Describing works admired by Sir Uvedale Price, Klingender generalizes
about the typical results of the picturesque applied to the works of man: “The extreme intricacy
of the wheels and woodwork of the watermill [for example], combined with moss, weather
stains, and plants growing out of joints in the walls, together give such buildings great charm for
a painter, provided only that it be old and battered” (74) The paragraph that follows this reveals a
motivation for this mode of composure: “Theories such as these allowed the artist and his
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patrons to escape the more baleful aspects of industry by pretending it was already worn out. The
rules of the picturesque allowed the intrusion of steam engines or mills or mines only if they
were given an air of decrepitude or made to appear ancient and ruinous, and so harmless” (74).

Fig. 3. Freestone Quarries, (1798), John Hassell,
Woodcut Print on Paper,
https://www.victoriagal.org.uk/galleries/jane-austensbath-image-gallery

A typical example of this scene is given above with a painting by John Hassell (17641825). Freestone Quarries (1798) shows the precisely cut stone blacks gouged from the earth as
a non-disruption to the idyllic nature of the scene to the right of the quarry. In this image industry
and material revolution are a congenial part of the English landscape. Though they are
thoroughly removed from the genre of landscape, we shall see that Wright executes his science
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paintings with a combination of both of the attitudes. There are glimpses of Uvedale’s optimism
and shadows of the coming disdain for the developments of industry and science. Whether his
portrayal of the sciences in social settings are indeed a cheery denial of the effects of the growing
reach of the industrial revolution or if Wright’s optimism carries deeper implications of critique
is discussed in more depth in the next sections. For now we must bear in mind that the
picturesque can carry with it an underlying sense of denial. To be clear, science, technology, and
industry compose the underlying forces of the Industrial Revolution. The originally noble pursuit
of scientific knowledge (what many philosophers would call “pure science”) quickly became
exploited for the purposes of production and the creation of more affordable material means.
Wright’s paintings clearly work within the realm of pure science, as there is little productivity or
material gain at stake with the scenes portrayed. But Wright and his milieu were acutely aware of
the turn of science towards industry. The fact is that within Wright’s immediate social sphere
industrial wealth was the source of the leisure time and resources for education that would allow
scenes such as he portrayed to be a reality for the growing middle class.
Art in the Industrial Revolution offers us one final point for consideration before
discussing the science paintings. In a very brief section of his chapter titled “The Age of
Despair,” Klingender discusses William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s Lyrical
Ballads (1798) in a brushing reference to the relationship between poetry and science. The
book’s poems (particularly “The Wanderer” by Wordsworth) are the larger subject of this
chapter, with Wordsworth’s critique of human corruption and greed at the heart of the matter.
Child labor, environmental concerns, and the general disruption that industry placed upon the
traditional rural life are touched on, but all with a full acknowledgement of the advantages and
glories that scientific knowledge can provide for humanity. Quoting Wordsworth’s preface,
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Klingender discusses his own perceptions on the following statement: “Poetry is the breath and
finer spirit of all knowledge; it is the impassioned expression which is in the countenance of all
Science” (91) Klingender finds Wordsworth to hold equal parts optimism and pessimism in
terms of a reunion between the arts and sciences, but then quickly moves away from the topic of
knowledge, art, and science. He chooses instead to focus the bulk of the chapter on all of the
upheaval groups such as the Machine-Breakers and Luddites wrought upon the Industrial
Revolution. The present chapter of this dissertation will argue that the notion of equal parts
enthusiasm and mistrust can be found in Wright’s science paintings. The painter’s contemporary
moniker of “Moderate Wright” indicates recognition that his work represents a middle grounds
between these two poles of optimism and pessimism about science’s social and material effects.

The Philosopher Painting: Analysis of Wright’s “Science Paintings”
The Science paintings by Joseph Wright can be organized into pairs by subject matter for
the ease of discussion. It is unknown if he consciously created these works in pairings, but for
the purposes of this dissertation I will break this chapter on the Science Paintings into sections
discussing the pairs of works as follows: the philosopher paintings, the science and society
paintings, and the artistic anatomy paintings. As I proceed in the analysis of these works, I will
first discuss the visual elements at hand. This will include the objects represented, the figures, the
settings, and the typical symbolic readings thereof. Next I will discuss the aesthetic visual
discourse in terms of the beautiful, the sublime, and the picturesque. These would have been the
key terms of aesthetic philosophy during Wright’s time so in order to avoid anachronism, I
endeavor to keep this part of the discussion germane to these concepts (for fuller definitions of
these terms see the section on Edmund Burke). I will next explore the historical significances of
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the works in terms of broader Art History. Finally, I aim to elaborate on the aesthetic philosophy
at play as regards the history of ideas, in particular the Cartesian paradigm and conceptual
universalism (for more on these concepts see the chapter on Mathesis Universalis). As I move
through these analyses, I will show how placing Wright within the context of the history of
scientific ideas, rather than limiting the discussion to historical circumstances, enriches our
understanding of visual philosophic discourse.
Beginning with the philosopher paintings, the pair consists of The Alchymist, in Search of
the Philosopher’s Stone, Discovers Phosphorous, and prays for the successful Conclusion of his
operation, as was the custom of the Ancient Chymical Astrologers (The Alchemist) painted in
1770 and exhibited in 1771 at the Society of Artists, London; and A Philosopher by Lamp Light
(A Philosopher) painted in 1769 and exhibited that same year at the Society of Artists in London.
As both works contain a single central figure of a scientist at work, a pair of wary young
onlookers, and the presence of manmade light as well as moonlight, the pairing is quite natural.
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Fig. 5. A Philosopher by Lamp Light, 1769, Oil on Canvas, 50 ½ cm x 40 ½
cm, Hayward Gallery, London,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Philosopher_by_Lamplight
Where the two paintings diverge is in the vocation represented, the setting of the subject
matter, and the underlying mood of the two pieces. While both are possessed of a certain
mystique (the cautious demeanors of the onlookers, as well as the uncanny moonlight) the
Alchemist maintains more reverence, as opposed to A Philosopher, which conveys a certain
melancholy. Whether that melancholy is coincidental to a prototype (a dramatically mournful
Democritus by Salvator Rosa was abuzz during this time frame) is inessential to this discussion
beyond mentioning that sadness is not typically associated with classical representations of
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Democritus, who is canonically represented as the “Laughing Philosopher” and as such is
typically depicted mid-guffaw.

Fig. 6. Democritus in Meditation, Salvator Rosa, 1650, Oil on
Canvas, 344 × 214 cm (135.4 × 84.3 in),
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Demokrit,_hensunke
n_i_betragtninger.jpg
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The sadness in Wright’s painting is only conveyed by the posture of the figure. The facial
expression is somewhat bemused, only the slouch of head to hand indicating ennui. Wright’s
Democritus, while certainly not jubilant or reverential, is more possessed of his wits and holds
more interest in his task at hand and immediate surroundings. Beyond the central figure, there is
more optimism in the setting of cave in nature than in the flotsam and jetsam strewn cemetery of
Rosa’s painting. While still not neat and orderly, the unified substance of stone provides a visual
tidiness that, if not overly welcoming, does invoke a sense of the naturally ordered. The universe
of this painting is bare, but not bleak. A trickling stream, a work table, and a sturdy lantern are
provided in view so that one may understand this philosopher to have what is needed. They
communicate a gentility about this exile—the philosopher could be there by his own wishes, or
could choose to leave if desired.
With this in mind it is difficult to understand the central figure as Democritus beyond the
tentative mention of that Philosopher’s name in a letter of Wright’s. But the inconsistency in the
title of this work in itself opens up philosophical discourse. The painting is titled “A Philosopher
by Lamplight” in the Egerton catalogue raisonne63 of Wright’s work but that same catalogue
identifies the Philosopher as Democritus: “Wright had exhibited his picture as ‘A Philosopher by
Lamplight’ but he soon began to refer to it as ‘Democritus’ or ‘A Hermit Studying Anatomy,’
perhaps because he found that his source was readily recognized as Rosa’s ‘Democritus’ and
Pether’s engraving of it was published in 1770, presumably with Wright’s full authorization, as
The Hermit” (91-2).
The un-settled-upon title gives one pause for consideration of Wright’s valuation of the
specific vs. the universal. The flitting from one title to another by Wright’s own hand indicates a
change in Wright’s views of the viability of the work as a specific allegory. The more generic
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title of ‘A Philosopher by Lamplight’ indicates a resistance towards specificity of content. This
could be because Wright painted the piece on speculation,64 and as such granting a specific name
to the central figure might impede the interest of a potential buyer. But in consideration of the
other five works in his series of Science Paintings (no other of these works is christened with
specific names), the generic title indicates a leaning preference for form rather than content. It is
not any specific philosopher, it is rather just a philosopher.
This is very telling of the shift in philosophical (read scientific and philosophical as the
two had not yet been fully separated as disciplines) preference for universal expressions. “A
Philosopher” is no specific philosopher, and could be any philosopher known to the viewer. This
indicates that Wright was aware of the value of universal expressions. It tells us that at the
moment of 1769, the concept of universal variables (like X, Y, and Z in algebraic expressions)
had begun to infiltrate disciplines beyond the hard sciences. I argue this is due to the advent of
Cartesian discourse on universality. As Egerton, Benedict, and Graciano all indicate the
chronology Wright first exhibits the work as “A Philosopher by Lamplight,” unofficially refers
to it in two letters as “Democritus,” and then settles finally on the title of “The Hermit” when the
work is reproduced by printed means. This means that Wright himself begat the work with no
titular specificities in mind, later considered a specific and Classical baptism for the central
figure, and in the end chose an even less specific title for the piece—the word “philosopher”
offers more descriptive power than does “hermit” as the former indicates a vocation and the
latter indicates only a social choice. In the other Science paintings, Wright also declines to give
specific names to the figures at hand, instead choosing to place the emphasis on the materials at
hand. “The Alchemist in search of the Philosopher’s Stone, Discovers Phosphorous, and prays
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for the Successful Conclusion of his Operation as was the custom of Ancient Chemical
Astrologers” is the proper title of the other work in this pairing.
The other Science Paintings are similarly centralized around the material at hand. An
Academy by Lamp Light, and Three Persons viewing the Gladiator by Candle-light, (the artistic
anatomy paintings) have at their loci the statues being studied. The Orrery and The Air Pump
(the science and society paintings), too, have the material means of science at their locus. The
centers of each of these works is discussed in greater detail in the sections devoted to those pairs,
but it is sufficient to say that the human response to the material at hand is key to understanding
the artistic statements made by Wright.
The visual effect of the central figure’s hermitage in A Philosopher of course recalls
Plato’s allegory of the cave. This is more a nod toward the aesthetic concept of the picturesque
than a direct reference to Plato. As mentioned above in the discussion of Burke and Klingender,
the picturesque is an aesthetic mode that is rugged, unorganized and unarranged, yet
approachable by the human psyche. Wright’s representation of the philosopher removed from the
more sterile grounds of an academy or laboratory nods directly to the conception of the
picturesque, and thus secondarily nods to a growing accessibility of the middle class to
philosophical discourse. The philosopher is placed within a slightly haphazard arrangement of
rocky terrain in which the actual depths and heights of the stone landscape is hard to grasp, yet
not frightening in nature. The young pilgrims65 are less than sure footed as they hesitantly
approach their interlocutor, and yet they have reached their intended terminus. Even the
traditional arrangement of the skeleton has been forgone in favor of a partial skeleton laid
loosely upon the table. The knee join being tinkered with is held in an unorthodox position near
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the skull, indicating a lackadaisical mode of study—not necessarily disinterested but certainly
not studious or professional.
What Wright puts on offer is a philosopher removed from the pristine and privileged
Academies populated by privileged clergy or the entitled elite. He has placed science and
philosophy in the picturesque. That is to say, he has placed science and philosophy within the
reach of the middle class. This is in fact the only of the Science Paintings that does not include
sophisticated equipment or priceless models of study. Here the average pilgrim approaches
science and philosophy in an arena accessible by the means of one’s own two feet.
The study of anatomy portrayed in A Philosopher differs from the artistic anatomy
paintings. The aim of the figures in the artistic anatomy paintings is superficial—studying the
outside of the figure for proportion and sharpening one’s skill at capturing likeness. The old man
in his cave is tinkering with the kinetics of the knee joint, a pursuit of knowledge rather than an
exercise in visual skill. The work at hand is clearly aimed at science, while the work of the
artistic anatomy paintings is aimed at art. By this distinction, Wright alludes to the idea of what
properly belongs to science and what properly belongs to the arts: knowledge belongs to science,
and skill belongs to the arts.
As with A Philosopher, The Alchymist is enigmatic as to what time period is being
portrayed and what the exact nature of the mood is meant to be. Either of these works could be
historical allegory, subject paintings, or conversation pieces. However, the overall generic nature
of the settings, clothing, and titles does not afford the viewer any specific recognition of the
scene at hand. While this could be cause to critique Wright for ineffectual expression, I argue
that he was working to privilege the form of expression rather than the specificity of meaning, a
concept (form) that has deep roots in the Cartesian paradigm.
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Fig. 4. The Alchymist, in Search of the Philosopher's Stone, Discovers Phosphorus,
and prays for the successful Conclusion of his operation, as was the custom of the
Ancient Chymical Astrologers, 1771, Oil on Canvas, 127 cm × 101.6 cm (50 in × 40.0
in), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Alchemist_Discovering_Phosphorus

To open this discussion, it would have been a known fact to Wright that the inventor of
the method for creating phosphorus was Hennig Brand (or even the often mis-credited Gottfried
Leibniz who purchased the method from Brand). As a participant in the Lunar Society, the
history of chemistry was certainly available. If the facts was not in his own personal
epistemological repertoire, resources on the subject matter would certainly have been available
to him. The figure in The Alchemist is neither Leibniz nor Brand, nor any other recognizable
figure in the coterie of Wright’s friends and associates.66 The old man recalls Renaissance

176
figures of St Jerome or St Francis that Wright may have encountered during his pilgrimage to
Italy (Egerton 20). The generic nature of the central figures in both The Philosopher and The
Alchemist offers us insight into Wright as a thinker. By choosing to portray a figure that has no
specific identity for the viewer, and by placing said figure in a non-specific chronological space,
Wright has privileged the overall expression of the painting, rather than the pictorial content.
What is more, is that Wright has chosen for both of these works to offer a universalized visual
expression of what he understand scientific work to be.
The men in the philosopher paintings are working in non-dedicated environments to the
study of science. Neither man is a specific figure by rights of the titles granted by the artist nor
by likeness to any figure that we know to have been an associate of Wright’s. The work at hand
is the only specificity granted in the paintings. The Philosopher is studying kinetic anatomy and
the Alchemist has discovered phosphorous. All other aspects of the piece are generic structures
added to the specific theme of the work of science. They are universalized ideas of settings,
people, and time. As such they are in dialogue with Descartes’ conception of mathesis
universalis. Wright has employed reductive means to express certain “variable” visual elements
that surround a single specific concept, much like the many modes of universalization discussed
in the previous chapter. As in algebraic expressions, a variable stands in place for unknown
numbers or objects. It curbs the attention of the mathematician towards the tasks at hand rather
than the as yet unknown. Wright’s visual variables (chrono-tope, names of people, exact origins,
locations, etc.) direct the viewer’s attention to the work being done. But there is a clear
secondary visual message: the work being witnessed and un-isolated. It occurs beyond the
theater of the mind and has direct and indirect participants.
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The primary witnesses of events in the philosopher paintings are the pairs of young male
figures that feature in each work. The nature of the two boys present in each painting is that of
interlocutor—they are not directly engaged in the work and appear to happen upon it. Indeed the
focus of each central figure could carry on without their presence. This begs the question as to
why Wright included them at all. Why paint in figures that are irrelevant to the locus of the
visual expression? A consideration of the light source in the works is most revealing. In the
Philosopher the oil lamp hangs slightly behind the philosopher. The boys appear to be
approaching the philosopher from the right and must peer around some rock formations to see
into the philosopher’s cave. Their view of the source of light is obstructed by the wall-like rock
formation. They would see the shadow cast by the philosopher, perhaps his backlit figure. The
philosopher himself does not look at the light source, but could do so unshielded should he
choose to do so. A similar vantage is granted to the alchemist. The boys are off to the left and
behind a wall—they would be unable to see the light source, but would have certainly wondered
about the glowing light source and seen the dance of shadows across the stone walls of this
space. We, as the viewers can see both the light sources, the central figures, and the witnesses in
toto. It must be made clear here that while there is certainly some reference to Plato’s Allegory of
the Cave, I do not feel that any particular comment on Platonic dialogue is in play with Wright’s
paintings. Wright instead makes use of the operational discourse that is at play within Plato’s
Cave. That discourse with Descartes can be understood in terms of what I refer to as the
epistemological gaze.
What I refer to with this term is more than just a “knowing glance” or “privileged
position,” although both of those concepts relate to the idea. The epistemological gaze refers to
the focus of rational attention within a work of visual art. It can be possessed by one or more of
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the figures in a work of art, and/or by the viewer observing the piece. It is a vantage point that
allows clear and distinct understanding of the subject matter at hand. In the philosopher
paintings, the central male figures have full knowledge of what is light, what is mere shadow,
and what forms casts those shadows. The scientific nature of the work at hand, truly the locus of
these paintings, is in full illumination and those who can see both the work and the light source
are granted clear possession of the epistemological gaze. What is so striking about these works,
however, is that the viewer has the most omniscient vantage point. As such, Wright intentionally
supplies us, the viewers, with an understanding that there exists an epistemological class system
at play within the work of science. There are clearly those possessed of clear and distinct
knowledge, and there are those who can only see the shadows cast by forms surrounding the
proper work of science. As Descartes demands clear and distinct hypotheses for scientific
pursuit, Wright makes it clear that there are only a select few who are possessed of clear, distinct,
and fully illuminated circumstances.
These paintings are a step towards a “formal system for expression.” As with all of
Wright’s Science Paintings the central figure is unnamed, even if it is logically clear whom the
figure would reference. Wright fails to specify the identity of the figure at hand, indicating a
privilege of form over content. The Philosopher and The Alchemist share a second non-descript
point of time period at hand. Time and identity are unimportant it seems. The focus is on the
reverence human beings hold for the miraculous nature of the ordered universe God has created.
Beyond the move towards formal and universalized systems of expression, Wright
provides another layer of discourse by describing the sublime, the picturesque, and the beautiful
in a cohesive image the realm of science, without the specificity of names, places, or dates. He
has found a way to express those concepts within the context of the scientific community.
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What’s more is that by the inclusion of all three elements of pictorial scale, he has found an
avenue for expressing the all-encompassing reaching of universalized expression. The fine,
smooth jars and vessels that surround the alchemist, as well as the intricate structures of the
partial skeleton in The Philosopher recall the conception of beauty. The mysterious glowing
substance and the upturned, awestruck expression of the old man invokes the sublime. The
smallness of the figures in The Philosopher compared to the rocky landscape conveys the same
sense of the smallness of humanity. Science is portrayed as the realm of the picturesque. For
Wright, Science is the arena where the beautifully small and perfect objects like tools, glass
beakers, and timepieces are manipulated to reveal the sublime power of the ordered universe. As
none of Wright’s personal correspondence indicates a strong religious leaning, it is difficult to
speculate as to whether he felt compelled to express a reverence for God or in fact it was a
reverence for the unfolding order of the universe, whether that be due to God or nature.

The Science and Society Paintings
The two paintings in this pairing are Experiment with a Bird in an Air Pump (The Air
Pump)(1768) and A Philosopher giving a Lecture at the Orerry (The Orerry)(1766). The two
works involve figures seated along a round table at various degrees of face towards the viewer,
and feature elaborate and strange scientific equipment being demonstrated for group of men,
women, and children. They differ in timbre greatly.
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Fig. 7. A Philosopher giving a lecture on the Orrery in which a lamp is put in pace of the
Sun (1766), Oil on Canvas, 47 cm × 203 cm,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Philosopher_Lecturing_on_the_Orrery

The Orerry, completed first has a certain optimistic cheeriness folded into its visual texture. The
Air Pump has a dark, nearly intrusive tone for the viewer: Though this pair of painting
chronologically precede Kant’s Critiques by at least a decade, a brief jump ahead to his first
Critique sets the tone for our discussion of these two paintings: “The light dove, in free flight
cutting through the air the resistance of which it feels, could get the idea that it could do even
better in airless space. Likewise, Plato abandoned the world of the senses because it posed so
many hindrances for the understanding, and dared to go beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in
the empty space of pure understanding” (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 129).
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Fig. 8. An Experiment on a Bird with in the Air Pump, 1768, Joseph Wright of Derby,
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/22/An_Experiment_on_a_Bird_
in_an_Air_Pump_by_Joseph_Wright_of_Derby,_1768.jpg

With this elegant allegory, Kant rebukes Plato for his unwise reach beyond that which
can be rationally understood or empirically experienced. For Kant, the theater of the mind must
ground itself in the world as it can be clearly and distinctly understood less it become crippled by
its own desire to effortlessly possess things as they are. The bird which readily flies with ease
wants even still more ease of movement. For Kant, Plato’s Ideal world (or Descartes’ purely
rational mental theater) seems a superfluous, even greedy addition to the real one.
The metaphor of the bird’s flight into a vacuum is eerily foreshadowed in Wright’s The
Experiment on a Bird in the Air Pump, 1768. Painted thirteen years prior to the publication of
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Kant’s first critique (1781), the piece also speaks volumes on the uneasy march of scientific
progress; a march set in place over one hundred years prior, by Rene Descartes’ radical
rationalism and objective world-view. His idea that knowledge of this world is “what we can
perceive thus it is rightly what we should pursue” runs counter to that of Plato recalling Kant’s
above mentioned critical view of the Platonic Ideal. Descartes, convinced that unaccountability
ran rampant in the science of his time, went so far as to “triage” knowledge into various strata of
fundamental importance. Each of the layers of knowledge (beginning with metaphysics, leading
through the various hard sciences, terminating at morality) are to be discovered by the
demystified self as she expands her knowledge of a clockwork universe. Each layer informs her
knowledge of the next. Knowledge is only classified as such when it can be abstractly
demonstrated and verified through reproducible means. What is lacking is an inward gaze on the
circumstances of the self—a void that all of Western philosophy since Descartes has been trying
to fill. The fleshing out of social concepts (language, hermeneutics, gender, class, history,
aesthetics, and psychology) has led to the certain understanding that for the self to be truly
demystified (and thus able to account for the universe around it), the epistemological gaze must
be turned inward as well as out. The very things that Descartes removed in his hyperbolic doubt,
things that appear to him as biased or doubtful, are informative to truths that elude the
expressions of mathesis universalis. Yet without these cast-off social and subjective truths,
knowledge cannot exist. Knowledge cannot be created in an objective vacuum. As a poignant
example of this counter to the Cartesian epistemological paradigm, I argue that Joseph Wright of
Derby in his Science paintings visually demonstrates that there is knowledge of a sort that can
only be expressed via the poiesis of painting, thus rebuking the Cartesian epistemological
schema.
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Fig. 9. An Experiment on a Bird with in the Air Pump, altered by author for
purposes of this dissertation.

Of all the science paintings by Wright, The Air Pump makes the strongest first
impression. The world shown has a complex visual vocabulary and other scholars, Benedict
Nicholson and Judy Egerton in particular, have done a marvelous job of translating that visual
language into written prose. But both have missed a very significant passage in this painting. It
must be understood that the approach I will presently explain does utilize historical and
philosophical speculation, but it is my intention to use said speculation in order to reveal a clear
dialogue between the aesthetic imagination of the eighteenth century and the Cartesian paradigm.
I endeavor to ground my speculation in as much factual evidence as I am able.
If one were to use a subtractive method on The Air Pump the nature of the discourse of
Wright’s work is radically changed. If one removes the women and children from this painting,

184
an underlying message is revealed in this work. We find a representation of the scientific world
as perhaps Descartes idealized it to be. You would find the learned philosopher speaking to the
young man across the table. The two other gentleman, not as young and naïve of the implications
of this experiment, are engaged in conversation about the workings of this fantastic machine. The
atmosphere of just the male figures is one of studiousness, of industry, of academic prowess. It
thus precisely imagines the scientific paradigm in its proper context, as Descartes would not have
considered women and children to be party to discourse.67 These four figures are an echo of this
paradigm. Careful scrutiny of the image reveals that the addition of the women and children is
contextually superfluous. The men, that is to say those in the picture who are properly suited for
science by the standards of the day, still converse with only themselves. The true tone of the
work at hand is revealed with the removal of those to who science would only be a novelty. So it
begs the question as to why Wright chose to include the others. What is being said with the
inclusion of these figures that appear to be removed from the scene’s discourse? I offer three
possible answers for consideration:
1.) Wright was proving his skill as a painter for the purposes of securing future

commissions.
2.) He was illustrating some facsimile of scientific events as they might have occurred

during his lifetime and the milieu of the Industrial Revolution.
3.) He was in fact engaged with Cartesian philosophical discourse about the propriety of

scientific means. It should be understood that no one of these three avenues precludes
any other.
Pursuing the first line of thought, the complex visual nature of The Air Pump does raise
the possibility that this piece was created as a showcase of the Wright’s skill as a painter. The
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candle-lit ambiance delicately illuminating the round table of figures (each a demonstration of
the artist’s skill at capturing profile, ¾, and portrait views of the face) is a remarkable feat of
composition. The varying ages of the figures shows Wright’s facility capturing a likeness of a
person of either sex at any age. So too with the range of emotions displayed at this gathering. But
the unheimlich nature of the subject matter is so dramatic that it is unlikely that Wright
composed this picture to be pure advertisement. The fact that it is clearly someone’s pet in the
bell jar (it is a cockatoo, an exotic bird, and the cage above the group indicates this is not
livestock), for example, is a strange choice indeed if one were inviting commissions.
The second line of thought views The Air Pump as illustrative of scenes that might have
occurred during Wright’s time. It is true that James Ferguson, the Scottish inventor, traveled
through Great Britain giving lectures and demonstrations of the effects and utilities of vacuous
space. It is unlikely, however that women and children would have been present for such things,
or that they would have been held in someone’s home. Ferguson’s forays into the Midlands
spanned several years (most accounts state 1739-1743) and gave lectures a public speaking
venues on a range of topics such as astronomy and the use of an Orrery, pneumatics and the
effects of vacuum pumps, and mathematics (algebra and geometry specifically). By all accounts
these lectures were largely attended by men only, though a few women are on record as being
admitted in the company of their husbands.68
The third avenue to pursue offers the most philosophical depth. Wright’s work shows us
a continual dialogue with scientific philosophy. For Descartes, the demystified consciousness
must pursue hypotheses without bias, emotion, or attachment. In effect, Descartes’ imagined
science to occur in a vacuum of sorts. While the vacuum may contain air, human beings, and the
observable universe, he very much intended the humanities and mundane realities to be ignored
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as those aspects are subjective and emotional in nature. They cannot provide reliable,
mathematical truths. This is not to oppose Descartes’ refinement of focus. Clarity is easier to
achieve when unfettered by life. But the cost of the clarity could only be afforded by a very few.
Economically speaking, one must have the means to pursue research.
Industrial concerns are to be considered with the sciences as well. Needs typically inform
experimentation. Needs are typically industrial in nature, and particularly from the
Enlightenment on. Can the bias of human need be truly removed, even in cases of “pure”
experimentation? Is theoretical knowledge truly to be upheld in such a “holy” manner? Of course
these questions have been put to the Cartesian paradigm by more experienced philosophers than
myself, but a distinct moment of discourse with these questions can be found in the Science
paintings of Joseph Wright.
What is said by the inclusion of these additional figures? The inclusion of the other
figures in this scene is what provides the critique of the Cartesian paradigm, particularly the
concepts of the objective universe and epistemological proof. The two young girls and the older
man to the right’s downcast gaze break the visual passage of a conversation between two men of
science. Instead, two other passages are to be seen and neither involve the learned patriarchy
engaging only in itself. There is now the fatherly figure trying to impart the objective knowledge
to the disturbed children, and there is contemplative old man staring at a carious skull near the
candle on the table. The concepts of sacrifice and inevitable death are conveyed through the
addition of the social reality of children.
The Orrery is not possessed of the same degree of uncanniness as The Air Pump. The
tone of this setting doesn’t include a singular moment of tension. The figures are peaceful in
their contemplations of the mechanical wonder before them. Painted two years prior to The Air
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Pump, this piece conveys a great sense of scientific optimism. The cheerful gaze of the children,
the deep interest of the audience, and the naturalness of the transaction between the philosopher
and the man who appears to be his assistant all express a serene comportment that is completely
absent from The Air Pump. Similarly to The Air Pump, the male figures converse with one
another unfettered by the presence of the women and children.
It is interesting that the eye isn’t drawn immediately to the clearly authoritative figure of
the philosopher. Instead the viewer’s gaze is directed to the glowing faces of the children beneath
the philosopher. Wright clearly intends the philosopher to be prominent. His height above the
other figures, his advanced age, as well as his imposing posture indicate that he is the one
speaking. But oddly he is not the clear center of attention. One can nearly hear him speak in a
background noise kind of drone, as he rattles off readings of degrees and notes on position of the
planet. All the while our first glances are directed to the two children with beaming faces. The
age of these children indicates that they would likely not be able to grasp the concepts on display
at the Orrery, but their delight in the tiny mechanism is clear.
We the viewer have no direct view of the light source in either of the science and society
paintings. In both cases the light source is obscured in such a way that we can know from where
the light comes, but cannot actually take measure of it. In The Orrery, the lamp’s reflection is
depicted, but Wright only grants the viewer this facsimile of light. The Air Pump gives little clue
as to whether the light source is a candle or a lamp, but it is in either case clearly man made.

The Artistic Anatomy Paintings
Between A Philosopher and the two artistic anatomy paintings there exists a discourse
that reveals much about what is to be properly allocated to the fields of art and science in terms
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of the common ground of the study of anatomy. Three Persons viewing the Gladiator was the
first of Wright’s science paintings, though it is not known whether he, at the time, he intended
the work to be properly of the “science works” or if it was a first foray into exploring scenes lit
by candle or lamplight.

Fig. 10. Three persons viewing the Gladiator by candlelight, 1765, Oil on Canvas,
121.9 x 101.6 cm, http://www.artic.edu/aic/collections/artwork/137059

As Wright does again include the subject matter of anatomy-study (both artistic and scientific)
four years later with The Academy by Lamplight and the aforementioned Philosopher painted
that same year, it is sufficient to say that these works are rightly grouped into the science
paintings as the treatment, lighting, and subject matter all correlate to those of the works that
more overtly handle what we would today consider the hard sciences.
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Fig. 11. An Academy by Lamplight, 1769, Oil on Canvas, 101.2 x 127 cm
http://fineartamerica.com/featured/academy-by-lamplight-joseph-wrightof-derby.html

As an artist, the study of anatomy would be the most facile of the sciences for Wright to
comment upon so it is no surprise that the topic arises in three of the six science paintings. Those
of the strictly rationalist camps of contemporary philosophy would perhaps be scandalized to
find artistic anatomy included within the ranks of chemistry, astronomy, and physics. Yet this in
part why Wright’s science paintings are such a unique moment in the timeline of art theory. His
mindset as painter and a contributor to philosophical discourse do not include the linguistic (let
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alone the specialized professions) separation of philosopher and scientist. It is not that he is
trying to unite the arts and sciences after they have been split, as many twentieth century artists
and philosophers have done. It is that he views them as natural equivalents, bound by the
common noun of philosopher and the identical practice of intense study. Andrew Janiak points
out for us in his discussion of Newtonian natural philosophy, the trend of linguistically
specializing the fields of science did not happen in Wright’s lifetime. Specifically, at a meeting
of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in June of 1833, the Cambridge
philosopher William Whewell coined the word “scientist.” At the meeting, Whewell said that
just as the practitioners of art are called “artists,” the practitioners of science ought to be called
“scientists,” indicating that they should no longer be called philosophers. Indeed, before the early
nineteenth century, people like Newton were called “philosophers,” or more specifically,
“natural philosophers.” This might appear to be mere semantics, but it is not. During the
seventeenth century, and well into the eighteenth (at least until 1750, if not later), figures like
Newton worked within the centuries-old tradition of natural philosophy.
Wright chooses to include the study of artistic anatomy in his series of candlelit paintings
in order to give a tacit nod to the fact that the studious and industrial of human knowledge need
not only include what are now known as the hard sciences. To finalize this point, recall that the
light source in all of these works is man-made. The man made light evokes in the viewer a sense
of the power of the human will and the luminous capability of the rational mind at work. Wright
clearly stood in awe of the tenacity of the quest for knowledge and the harmony that organized
knowledge provided to man’s reason. As such, the drive to possess the qualitative, that is to say
aesthetic, knowledge of human anatomy should be viewed in no less a light. A palpable sense of
passion and dedication pervades these six pieces. There is a tacit tone of dedication to both of
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these works (indeed, to all of the science paintings) as they are all set at night. In Wright’s time,
to conduct work into the night meant an extra expenditure of candles or lamp oil—a not
inconsiderable expense considering that for drawing in particular one would almost certainly
need more light than for other activities (Recall that the Lunar Society met on the Monday
nearest the full moon to make the most of the available light). The dedication represented in
these works is aimed at the pursuit of knowledge, which during Wright’s time was still nonspecialized, and more importantly supported by a network of reproducible experiments and
rational axioms. Though the specialized profession of artist had long ago been established in
contrast to that of a philosopher (reference Plato and Aristotle sections in Chapter 1 of this
dissertation), Wright inhabited an historical milieu wherein such singular professions were
unnecessary and even passé. The rising middle class of industrialists were free to occupy more
than one profession—something that prior to the Industrial Revolution, was a rarity. His friend
and fellow Lunar Society member, Erasmus Darwin for example was a physician, a poet, and a
botanist. Peter Perez Burdett, Wright’s best friend, was a geologist, cartographer, and
mathematician. It would fit the character of his time that Wright would have felt free to consider
himself able to contribute to philosophy as that term enfolded so much in his day, and the social
circles he frequented encouraged pursuits beyond one’s profession.
Recalling the discussion of types of revelatory knowledge (that which can reveal a slant
or bias, and that which can reveal things as they are), Wright succeeds in the latter of the two
types. If taken as a group, the six science paintings reveal how the work of science “is” for
Wright’s lifetime. As the character of science is not represented as entirely glorious, nor entirely
grim, it is unfair to say he positions the subject towards any one particular point of view. Wright
reveals certain truths about the work of science and research that give contextual and social
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meaning to the work of science and research. On a deeper, more operational level, Wright
reveals to us the participatory nature of the artist in philosophical discourse concerning science
and epistemology.
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CHAPTER 6
Introduction
In the concluding chapter of this dissertation I aim to widen the scope of the conversation
to matters more important to our times. The Cartesian paradigm is immensely important to the
course of Western philosophy, but its value today is somewhat obscured by the centuries of
criticism that has amassed around it since its advent. German philosopher Hans Blumenberg
provides modern thinkers with renewed interest in the Cartesian paradigm. Blumenberg makes
an argument similar to Heidegger’s: the Cartesian paradigm is the source of modernity in the
West. For Blumenberg, however, this modernity need not be shunned or “corrected” as
Heidegger would have argued. He nonetheless acknowledges that, as a side effect of the
Cartesian epistemological shift, certain areas of the humanities were marginalized, excluded, or
made obsolete via the hard focus on objective knowledge that is characteristic of thinking of
knowledge in terms of mathesis universalis. Blumenberg considers myth and myth making to be
a prime example of epistemological technology (a pre-rational means of generating knowledge)
that the paradigm made obsolete for a time. He maintains, however, that the fervent “fact
finding” of the Enlightenment, and the technological developments of the Industrial revolution,
pushed he human drive to “make knowledge” in the sense this dissertation articulates. The effect
of this “pause” was to renew the impulse and enlarge its effects through redefining its goals and
resituating its activity.
Blumenberg asserts that the Cartesian paradigm set philosophy on a course of
epistemological rationality that eventually led it to be unable to find “unknown territory” to
explore, categorize, and catalogue. This dearth of unfamiliar material to discover and order
spurred humanity to begin inventing the unknown—a process that created a new role for myth
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and myth making. Blumenberg delves into the myth-related concept of onomathesy (naming) in
a manner that I will argue is similar to how we can understand poiesis as an important aspect of
knowledge making (discussed in Chapter 4). In a brief recap of what I mean by “knowledge
making,” three premises are in place:
1. Knowledge in the literal reading of the Cartesian paradigm is typically understood as

discoverable—in other words “found.” There are other types of knowledge, however, that
are still valid within the operational reading of the paradigm, which is referred to as
revelatory knowledge.
2. Knowledge of both types can be objective and “found” but are only knowable through

methods that are “made,” not “found.”
3. Both types of knowledge, as we consume them in life, are the product of different types

of “making” (ordering, naming, prioritizing, and politicizing of knowledge, etc.).
Though mathesis universalis was originally implemented as a means of setting down
objective, propositional knowledge (as opposed to picking up, see discussion in chapter 4 for
more detail), Blumenberg’s discussion of myth reveals that such a narrow epistemological
modality can reach (and perhaps has reached) an impasse if not expanded to include other types
of knowledge and knowledge making. Myth, aesthetic discourse, and the epistemological
perspectives of interest groups outside of the traditionally privileged patriarchy are examples of
the kinds of revelatory knowledge that must now be considered with the same “seriousness” (to
use Blumenberg’s word) as the West has long granted the knowledge of the hard sciences. This
is because we have reached an epistemic age wherein the “unknown” of the natural world is
considerably smaller than in previous historical eras. Blumenberg theorizes that we have entered
a time when human reason now has the drive to willfully direct investigations and inquiry
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towards circumstantial, subjective facts that influence worldviews—more simply, towards
“inward things.” Rather than being directed toward the necessity of survival as it may have once
been, mathesis universalis can and should be expanded to include subjective and revelatory
knowledge.
In this chapter I will connect four different groups that have been traditionally and
unnecessarily marginalized from philosophic discourse by the Cartesian paradigm: feminism,
fiction, myth, and aesthetic discourse. These groups share the common thread of “nonuniversality” and perceived epistemological inadequacy. As I will demonstrate in the later
sections of this chapter, there has been an active “comparing of notes” between the various
groups excluded by the Cartesian paradigm. These comparisons review the means of their
exclusion, the power structures at play that perpetuate their marginalization, and the means they
engage actively in “course correction.” While the focus of this dissertation is the Cartesian
Paradigm and its theoretical and epistemological implications, a broadening of this study’s scope
makes it more about the philosophy of science.
In the twenty-first century, there are perhaps no greater philosophers of science than
those working in the genre of science fiction. Science fiction authors most consistently point out
the pitfalls of scientific optimism and the incompatibility of the innately corrupt human character
(as some understand it to be) with the tremendous power of technology. Authors such as Phillip
K. Dick and Ray Bradbury look at philosophical problems such as sentience or commercially
driven technology in ways that remind us that, armed with science or not, we are imprecise and
unpredictable creatures. But the authors most relevant to our discussion deal less with dystopia
and apocalyptic scenarios, and more with the perceived schism between science and “notscience.” American novelist Ursula K. Le Guin (1929-2018) approaches topics such as this in
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efforts to challenge not the correctness of objectivity, but the authority and finality of objectivity.
In this concluding chapter, I will compare the marginalization of aesthetic discourse in the
Cartesian paradigm with the marginalization of women in philosophic discourse, revealing their
similar treatments at different points in philosophical history. I will then tie our broader
theoretical conversation to the writings of Le Guin, as well as to the work of British author Neil
Gaiman. I will then use the connections between Descartes and these two authors as a lens to
examine a painting by Diego Velasquez— An Old Woman Cooking Eggs (c. 1618),
contemporary to Descartes.

Working on the Cartesian Paradigm
“The history of philosophy in the century of science is in essence a history of
philosophical reactions to what was happening in connection with science in a changed culture.”
-- Herbert Schnadelbach, Philosophy in Germany, 1831-1933 (1984)
It can be said that we are in a “post-Cartesian” era. The prefix of “post” indicates that the
affixed event is insurmountable or irrevocable. Heidegger in The Age of the World Picture
idealizes a time before the Cartesian paradigm—a time before the philosophical split between
mind and body, between subject and object, became indoctrinated in the West. It is, however, not
worth considering how one could possibly “go back” to a pre-Cartesian philosophical climate.
Instead, there are philosophers who take into consideration how to “work on” the Cartesian
paradigm in a manner of speaking. They find ways to expand upon the paradigm without
dismissing it. In my own work with this dissertation, I too seek to work on the Cartesian
paradigm by showing how the disconnect between the paradigm and aesthetic philosophy is an
unnecessary construct, one based on traditional and literal understandings of Descartes’ texts. As
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a reaction to this traditional understanding, many aesthetic philosophers have positioned
themselves squarely in opposition to the paradigm via open critique of its structure or via a
general dismissal of its integral nature to modern thinking. There are other scholars, though, who
seek to acknowledge the Cartesian nature of current philosophical and scientific discourse. Hans
Blumenberg is one such philosopher. Blumenberg is not calling for an end to Cartesian
rationality, nor does he object to the way that rationality has traditionally been viewed as
opposed to aesthetic concepts such as expression and the arts. He instead lays out Descartes’
transformative role in philosophy, but in so doing, he calls attention to how the paradigm need
not mandate the exclusion of aesthetics, the feminist perspective, and most especially, fiction. In
this section, I will give an overview of Blumenberg’s operational (rather than literal) reading of
the Cartesian paradigm, then discuss how he connects myth to the revolution caused by the
paradigm’s advent in the West. In so doing I argue that Blumenberg has provided one of the
most significant avenues for the expansion of mathesis universalis to date.
A key first concept that underlies Blumenberg’s philosophy is that the Modern Age is not
a drastic or tragic swing away from a “natural course” of history, but a very natural product of
the progress of history. Many historians and philosophers (such as Heidegger) view the
Enlightenment and its trappings as an event that has severely altered the course of human history.
In contrast to Heidegger, Blumenberg does not view the Cartesian paradigm (easily understood
as a catalyst to the Enlightenment) as tragic to the state of human existence. On the contrary, he
finds rationalism and the philosophy that followed in its wake to be a natural evolution,
stemming from a marked turn towards epistemological “seriousness” that occurred during the
Enlightenment. He essentially argues in The Genesis of the Copernican World (GPW) (1975)
that owing to the Aristotelean Scholasticism prevalent throughout the medieval eras, the West

198
had essentially “over-objectified” knowledge to the point that formal knowledge was drastically
removed from knowledge of humanity. Simply, knowledge became a matter of rote applications
of ossified technical philosophical terms and ideas, and therefore neither were searchingly
engaged with. As a reaction to this “remove” of epistemology from human existence, the
Enlightenment and its emphasis on proof and investigation were a natural evolutionary step in
Western philosophy. This being the case, Blumenberg clearly is neither for nor against
Enlightenment philosophy or judgmental about the effects the scientific revolution has had on its
course. He instead treats it simply as a historical progression that has resulted in significant
changes in human existence, most particularly in relation to myth and religion. His later book,
Work on Myth (WOM) (1979) works with the Cartesian paradigm and investigates what the new
roles of myth and myth-making might entail in a post-Cartesian era.
For the second key concept of Blumenberg’s approach to the Cartesian paradigm, we
must understand that he maintains a conception of the human being as inherently “frail and
finite,” but nonetheless evolving. A creature of deficiencies, lacking in environmental
specialization, human beings are compelled to use their highly adaptive powers of reason to
survive the anxiety inherent in self-conscious existence, a concept Blumenberg calls the
absolutism of reality69. Briefly, reality is absolute in the sense that without codified meaning, any
phenomenon could potentially signify anything: a boulder could indicate a memorial, a warning,
a spiritual presence, etc. Myth limits the anxiety by limiting the potential meanings one may
derive from encountered phenomenon. Descartes makes similar allusions to a kind of inherent
state of anxiety in Meditations, referring to the immediate sensations (those both corporeal and
biological in nature) as confusing and misleading, thus painting the backdrop of existence as
mire-like—opaque, directionless, and befuddling. Such a setting can surely be understood in
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terms of anxiety over the uncertainty of the world around us. Explicitly, Descartes describes
anxiety as deriving from the discordant relationship between mind and body, yet this is but a
characteristic “meta-moment” of the anxiety caused by the absolutism of reality.
Descartes and Blumenberg share a sense that the urge to limit the anxiety a lack of
knowledge generates is innate to the human consciousness, but a key difference in the
conceptualization of theoretical knowledge separates the two stances slightly. Descartes has
isolated the discordance between what we are biologically compelled to do, and what reason
dictates as appropriate. However, he has done so in a Pre-Darwinian manner—that is to say,
without the understanding of human beings as evolving organisms. Descartes writes his theory
with crystalline moments of “absolute beginnings” in mind owing to the influences of the
Christian cosmogony70. Angus Nichols refers to Blumenberg’s stance on this difference as “antiCartesian,” though his view that the two interpretations of this matter need be so starkly opposed
strikes me as unnecessary. To clarify this stance, we must remember that Descartes understood
the universe to be clockwork in nature. Such a paradigm does not give space to concepts of
evolutionary change—a clock’s gears and cogs do not adapt or get better at being gears and cogs
over time. By contrast, Blumenberg understands the human being, as well as all life on this earth,
to be a product of evolution. It is ironic that without Descartes’ scientific method (developed
upon the clockwork model), Blumenberg’s evolutionary model would never have emerged.
Without the underlying knowledge of biological evolution, Descartes has no way of anticipating
the moments of epistemological development as an evolving concept. While this in some ways
misshapes his understanding of the machinations of the universe, his model of knowledge
making as a method for staving off the anxiety caused by non-knowledge is still sound. As such I
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argue that Blumenberg’s position as not anti-Cartesian, but post-Cartesian—not antagonistic to
the Cartesian paradigm, but rather a complimentary addition or modification.
While their respective stances on the human condition as fixed or somewhat fluid differ,
both Blumenberg and Descartes place distinct emphasis on reason as essential to the human
species, but the nuances of their respective opinions are not completely parallel, nor are they
mutually exclusive. Both understand reason to be central to “successful” human activity.
Descartes understands res cogitans as that which must pursue knowledge separately from the
passions. Blumenberg postulates reason as the same, with the addition that he understands the
passions and will-to-express as a once necessary prologue to reason. Both hold human beings to
be imperfect, either by lack of biological adaptations or by possession of (seemingly71) biological
urges. It is via a sort of pre-reason that Blumenberg believes fundamental myths are produced.
Fundamental myth as a term is a bit misleading, as it refers not to myth in itself, but to
the prototypical concept that is built upon more specific iterations of myths; for example, there
are different versions of the myth of Prometheus. However, the fundamental myth at hand is that
of the creation of fire. Humanity has bio-social concepts that are universally present and
mythologized upon across cultures and religions. The reason for using this term instead of some
other is two-fold. First, the term “fundamental” implies an innate “building upon” or “expansion
of” a reducible concept, which is key to understanding Blumenberg’s concept of myth. He makes
full use of the developed, diverse, and even anecdotal iterations of myth as important evidence
supporting its pre-rational nature. Second, a fundamental myth has little “corrective” recourse—
that is, to remove the presence of a myth from a culture, or more specifically from a culture’s
epistemology, is an impossibility.
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Myths arrive in the face of crisis, according to Blumenberg. However, the concept of
crisis is also subject to evolution over time. But prior to our exploration of the evolution of this
“situation of crisis,” a last point must be made about Blumenberg’s concept of myth. Most
essential to our understanding of Blumenberg as a philosopher working on the Cartesian
paradigm is the fact that Blumenberg holds the concept of myth to be pre-rational, but at the
same time influential to the trajectory of reason after the setting down of myth. We can
understand myth as an initial, pre-rational response to crisis—a crisis that is unique to humanity
as a species of non-specialized rational organisms (for Blumenberg, our frailness stems from a
lack of biological or physiological specializations). He posits that myth-making is a way for
cognition to demarcate the unknown as unapproachable or at least unapproachable for now. He
refers to this as the setting down of “limit concepts.” He conceives of myth as a means of setting
limit concepts around that which is obscure so that one need not invest one’s cognitive energy
into the exploration of what is not clear and distinct. Essentially, the obscure was made even
more obscure as a semi-rational means of coping with the angst that “the great unknown” might
generate.
The function of myth is to keep what is obscure, within the bounds of reason, safely in
obscurity, as further pursuit of such things would be futile. In effect, Blumenberg proposes that
myth functions as a precursor to identifying what is both not clear and not readily available. It
functions as a prelude to reason’s building of knowledge but also as an indicator of areas of nonknowledge—a practice Descartes would have been in support of as he consistently stated that we
must pursue only that which is clear and distinct. This second function of myth helps us to
understand its creation and cultural permeation as precursory to reason, rather than opposed to
reason. Blumenberg finds that as myth wanes in the face of modernity, its function becomes less
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procedural to knowledge (procedural meaning “leading us to knowledge”), and more about the
expansion of our knowledge (meaning it enhances are understanding about our knowledge). As
we move the discussion towards the similarities between the acts of poiesis and myth-making,
this point is key. Blumenberg finds modern day reason to be more interested in subjective,
internal truths as he believes objective knowledge of the natural world has largely been set down
epistemologically. This has led to the idea that myth and myth-making are obsolete
epistemological technologies. Obsolescence is a peculiar problem and one unique to humanity. It
is even more peculiar to possess an epistemological technology that is obsolete. This strangeness
has led to a variety of attitudes about myth.
The obsolete practice of myth requires reconciliation to modern discourse by some
means. The “problem” of myth in philosophical discourse is at once apologetic, defensive, and
distinctly a salvage mission for what Blumenberg calls preliminary reason. There are
philosophers (Bertrand Russell72, for example) who understand myth as regrettably feeble first
efforts to explain natural phenomena and are quick to encourage rationalism in all aspects of
life—as if to apologize for an outburst of juvenile behavior. There are others, like Blumenberg,
who understand myth to be a necessary step in the evolution of modern reason, and work to
defend the position of myth as pre-rational (more aptly, Pre-Cartesian). At either end of this
spectrum of opinion is the fact that myth (in the secularized West) is no longer as it was, due
largely in part to the machinations set to work by the Enlightenment and Descartes’ philosophy.
For Blumenberg, to address myth as an idiosyncratic “bump in the road to reason” is to do
disservice to the human mind. He maintains that if myth ever existed, there must be some
valuable function to it beyond a misguided explanatory means of coping with nature.
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Blumenberg finds the value to both modern and pre-modern thinkers to be in the practice of
naming objects.

Poiesis and Onomathesy as Related Practices
Blumenberg also finds the power to name objects unique to the human capabilities.
Citing Walter Benjamin, he establishes (as he does with eschatology in his book The Legitimacy
of the Modern Age) a connection between Christian cosmogony and Western epistemology.
Blumenberg quotes the following passage from Benjamin’s On Language and On the Language
of Men in his discussion of this connection:
With the creative omnipotence of language it [naming] begins, and in the end
language as it were assimilates the created, names it. Language is therefore both
creative and the finished creation, it is word and name. In God’s name it is
creative because it is word, and God’s word is cognizant because it is name. ‘And
he saw that it was good’; that is: He had cognized it through name…That means:
God made things knowable in their names. Man, however, names them according
to knowledge. (323)
This connection between epistemology and Christianity allows for our connection of ancient and
medieval lore to the modern era of science. Modernity, for Blumenberg, comes from history, not
in opposition to or rebellion against it. “The modern age has become the epoch that finally found
a name for everything,” writes Blumenberg, “What science repeats has already been suggested in
myth: the success, achieved once and for all, of acquaintance with everything on all sides. Myth
itself tells the story of the origin of the first names from night, from the earth, from chaos”
(WOM, 38-9).
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Onomathesy, or the setting down of names, is key for the modern understanding of
mathesis universalis, and arguable to any epistemological system. Simply put, to name
something is to know something. The ability to identify objects, whether through ideals or the a
priori, is to have a primal knowledge of such objects. That primal knowledge leads to
exploration and expansion via expression. Once again Blumenberg establishes a direct
epistemological connection to myth via onomathesy. He argues that those names and stories
established by inculcated myths set a trajectory for the sciences that have since explained away
those myths. A very simple example is the Greek myth of Arachne, and the more modernly
developed term of arachnid. But his argument seems to assume the practice of onomathesy has
ceased in modern times. To clarify, Blumenberg argues is that our modern understanding of
myth seems to come pre-packaged with a determinism towards the overcoming of myth. Simply
put, myth is a way of putting a pin in the unknown to mark it for later exploration. It was, in the
past, a way of knowing the unknown “for now” simply by naming it or giving it a story.
Blumenberg argues that this “pre-packaging” is a modern understanding of the concept of myth,
and one that no longer exists: “Assumptions about the origins of myth are not without
consequences for supposed triumphs over it. Neither are they without consequences for the
assessment of the potential for its (wished for or feared) return, as well as for discerning its ways
of functioning and modes of reception” (WOM, 46). Blumenberg critiques this assumption of
“progress” that he claims is romanticized historicism—a way of portraying history as an eventual
rise above a stultified past. As the Enlightenment supposed reason to be the antithesis of myth,
the historical view of that era portrays reason as the rejection of or an overcoming of myth.
Blumenberg finds this portrayal to be spurious: “In this connection they must be clear that the
antithesis between myth and reason is a late and a poor invention, because it forgoes seeing the
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function of myth, in the overcoming of that archaic unfamiliarity of the world, as itself a rational
function, however due for expiration its means may seem after the event” (WOM, 48). The
difference between the reason of science and the reason of myth is that the former is presumed to
become obsolete, and the latter “cannot be made obsolete, however much, in each of its steps
forward, it itself makes the preceding steps obsolete” (WOM, 50).
Blumenberg’s ideas about onomathesy are helpful in connecting myth and epistemology,
and his work reflects upon a somewhat bigger picture of knowledge as human made. As
discussed in Chapter 4, I posit poiesis as a means of setting down knowledge beyond the
traditional propositional or mathematical means that is typically associated with the Cartesian
paradigm. Onomathesy and poiesis share the characteristic of the human mind drawing out its
own maps of its existence. Understanding onomathesy and poiesis as related concepts allows for
a more accurate view of knowledge as an evolving human-made process. The study and mapping
(the meta-mathesis, if you will) of what is involved in the epistemological practices that codify
knowledge, we can better expand the grand bank of mathesis universalis.
The naming of objects can be understood as an act of poiesis. It is a setting down of
knowledge. As an avenue for future discourse, I would examine the roles that paintings play in
the onomathesy of objective knowledge, and by so doing possibly expand our understanding of
what onomathesy might entail as a knowledge-making concept. The naming of objects is not,
and should not be, limited to the linguistic concept of naming. Myth, the arts, mathematics,
language, and perspective are all means to the setting down of knowledge. That is, they are the
means of making knowledge knowable. For example, history books and websites nearly always
pair texts about Hennig Brand discovering how to make phosphorous with Joseph Wright of
Derby’s painting The Alchemist Discovers Phosphorous. This is the case despite the fact that the
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painting was not intended to be Hennig Brand, nor is the equipment depicted an accurate
representation of the process by which he discovered it. But as the frequency of the pairing of the
text about phosphorous and Wright’s painting increases, and an increasing number of individuals
see this pairing, the painting then becomes a part of that piece of knowledge in the grand human
consciousness, just as the Mona Lisa has somehow become ubiquitous with the general
conception of art history or the term ‘art.’ Likewise, through work on onomathesy, paired with
my Chapter 4 discussion of poiesis, mathesis universalis moves beyond both the need to define
the unknown and the need to map the visible world.
As for what Blumenberg understands the modern role of myth to be, he illustrates to us
the shift from an outward-exploration characterization of onomathesy towards a reading of
“naming” that has moved to introspective explorations. Blumenberg uses Joyce’s Ulysses as his
case study, titling the book as the first truly modern novel. Though other scholars credit
Cervantes’ Don Quixote or Richardson’s Pamela with the title of first modern novel, we must
recall that for Blumenberg the concept of modernity is tied to an inward gaze and the creation of
works that require deep reflection and personal interpretation. Blumenberg is in fact stating that
Joyce was providing the mind with a lens unto itself as an individual entity, with the full
expectation that different minds will interpret the book differently. If this is the case, then we
find a kind of full reversal of the “universal” nature of mathesis universalis. Whereas prior to
Ulysses, novels were aimed at communicating general themes, morals, emotions, etc. that would
more or less need little interpretation; for this book, however, there is no expectation that there
will be a “universal” response. He states that Joyce understood the significance of the modern
need for literature that puzzled cognition with no certain conclusions. Thus, such literature filled
the cognitive void opened by modern epistemological and technological advances.
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Ulysses as a text is not about story telling per se. It is a book that requires much more
than simple comprehension of a narrative or even reflection upon general themes. Blumenberg
directly ties Joyce’s choice of writing style to modernity:
Ulysses has to be read in a way that responds to expectations of integration and
exhaustiveness, and can be read in this way only by born hermeneuts. But in a
world in which people are relieved of work by machines, that is such a large
group that it is increasingly worthwhile to write only for them and according to
the rules of their guild. With Joyce, a literature begins in which even those
weaknesses in the classical skills of composing, inventing, constructing, and
storytelling have been converted into eminent skill in writing for initiates: an
industry of production for and industry of ‘reception.’ This professional public is
prepared for something that, in the history of mankind, has only been accepted
under the conditions of cults: for boredom. (WOM, 82)
The leisure (or boredom) provided by the perceived completion of the mapping of the visible
world results in the obsolescence of the purposive obscurity that myth and myth-making
generate. As such, the epistemological urge to “figure out” the world must be sated. As a result,
modern fiction has become a means of occupying this urge. I expand Blumenberg’s argument to
say that rather than constituting a simple occupation of a cognitive means, modern fiction has
come to be an epistemic and philosophical force that allows interest groups beyond those
traditionally given epistemic or philosophic authority, a means to expand upon mathesis
universalis.
Blumenberg’s work spells out three important characteristics of knowledge-making
practices:
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1. They do not need to be and have not always been, rational in nature (as it is not with

myth) but that does not mean its non-rational means of knowledge are completely
irrational or opposed to reason.
2. They are no longer, due to the evolution of humanity, the same as they once were.
3. They are now inclusive of the mapping of the subjective, interpretive world of the

individual.
No longer is myth-making needed as the prelude to reason’s exploration of the natural world, so
it is now taking on the role of an exercise program for introspection. That introspection has the
means to expand mathesis universalis by providing a means of mapping subjective and
individual responses to the world as it is. Blumenberg credits the greater leisure time provided by
the industrial revolution and the Cartesian paradigm as the primary causes of a newer, more
internalized and self-made “problem solving” function emerging in humanity. Instead of
devoting the majority of epistemic practice to the setting down of knowledge about the natural
world, we have focused epistemic efforts towards the understanding of how we as human beings
fit and shape our own views of the natural world. The shift from the work of myth to the work on
myth is directly tied to the scientific and subsequent industrial revolutions that are, in
Blumenberg’s thinking, now permanent fixtures of humanity.
This is not to say that we should detach our interest from the historical build up to the
present state of modernity, nor should we dismiss the past lives of myth. “Only an assessment of
the risk involved in the human mode of existence makes it possible to discuss and to evaluate
functionally the behavior that was serviceable in mastering it, and to take seriously the tentative
inclination to be able to avail ourselves of such serviceability again” (WOM, 111). Blumenberg’s
conception of modernity as a progression from antiquity rather than a drastic change, all the

209
while embracing modern philosophical developments gives validity to our project of developing
a Cartesian aesthetic. If we can learn from Blumenberg how to avoid working only “with or
against” modernity, it would allow for an understanding of more modern subjects such as
aesthetics as a natural step in the development of western epistemology which may in turn help
us in any future shifts that might lay ahead. This type of expansion acknowledges that the
evolution of humanity (and of the humanities) will necessitate the inclusion of those interest
groups that have prior been excluded from epistemological models indebted to the traditional,
literal readings of Descartes’ pillars. In the next sections, I will connect the interest groups of
aesthetic philosophy, feminism, and fiction (specifically science fiction) as groups all
marginalized by traditional views on mathesis universalis. These groups are able to enlighten,
and in some cases disrupt, the traditional reading of knowledge via their marginalized nature.

Aesthetics, feminism, and science fiction as traditionally marginalized groups
There are a great many interest groups that are able to enlighten and in some cases disrupt
the traditional reading of knowledge via their marginalized nature. While each group should be
given its due consideration and is frankly owed dissertations of its own, for the purpose of our
conversation in this study I will focus on three groups that have a distinctly interconnected
discourse with mathesis universalis—a discourse that is very much in the public eye today. The
interest groups of aesthetic philosophy, feminism, and fiction share a common core in the
rationale of their traditional exclusion from the concept of mathesis universalis—specifically the
concerns and values of these groups were viewed as divorced from the pursuit of objective
knowledge. One might even bristle at the idea of calling the facets of intellectual life that they
represent as those of “interest groups,” as that term is typically applied to groups of people
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actively being oppressed by authorities. Yet that is precisely what happens to groups that do not
hold the epistemological clout of other intellectual groups.
There are unique power structures at play in epistemology, and as a result, certain
directions of inquiry came to be understood in the West as merely secondary or even purely
whimsical. But as Blumenberg informs us above, we have reached a period of cognitive
development and epistemological breadth that gives us the leisure and incentives to examine
what was formerly considered merely secondary and whimsical. The following pages are to act
as a brief introduction to the broader claims of feminism, fiction, and aesthetics, as they critique
the “status quo” of mathesis universalis. These claims do not intend to negate or reject the
Cartesian pillar, though some in the camps discussed would take such a radical stance.
Let us first establish in what ways these three groups are “interest groups.” Through the
previous chapters of this dissertation I have shown that aesthetic discourse has been continually
understood as distinctly outside the bounds of objective knowledge, but such an understanding is
an unnecessary limitation. In Chapter 2 I specifically evaluate works by philosophers working on
reconsidering this exclusion. In particular, they aspire to validate aesthetic discourse in face of
the grander scientific revolution. This validation is necessary because, since the advent of the
Cartesian paradigm and more aptly since the erroneous reading that the pillars are or should be
being disconnected from subjective or qualitative concerns, certain types of knowledge have
been deemed “more valuable” or more “noble” by the academic and commercial than others.
While an entire dissertation could be written on the disparity between types of knowledge, it is
sufficient for our needs here to say that the knowledge produced by the “hard sciences” (as they
are generally conceived) has a higher value in academia, education, industry, and thus the
general cultural consciousness of the West. These three groups are working to establish a voice
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and a sense of value for intellectual arenas marginalized by being commonly labeled as “not
objective.” The previous five chapters of this text have been dedicated to dissolving the
assumption that the Cartesian paradigm (a driving force, perhaps the backbone of the hard
sciences as we know them) cannot and does not include aesthetic discourse. Therefore, the focus
will be on the two remaining groups of feminism and fiction.

The Feminist Perspective
As feminism is such a far-reaching concept encompassing political movements and
ideologies with many different avenues of thought, I will isolate the conversation to the two
specific arenas of feminism that are most relevant to the larger discussion of the dissertation:
feminist epistemology and the feminist critique of science. Before delving into these arenas, it
must be clear that what is at stake with both is the representation, validation, and normalization
of the “feminine perspective.” What is meant by this term is not necessarily the feminist
perspective, although the two overlap a great deal. Missing from the history books and from
philosophic discourse (epistemology specifically) generally are views that can readily be
understood as coming from outside the demographic of privileged-white-male. Acknowledging
this fact has been a source of expanding academic interests, the professional world, political
activity, etc. since the mid-twentieth century. It is my aim with this discussion to specifically
expand our ideas of what the Cartesian paradigm means in our current time. As such, it is
important to recognize where it has fallen short of its own goals (of universal knowledge) and
expand our understanding of epistemology to allow for less rigid views of what does or does not
constitute knowledge.
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Feminist epistemology can be generally understood as a critique of Western
epistemology by three different perspectives: feminism standpoint theory, feminist
postmodernism, and feminist empiricism. Each of these perspectives can provide us with a point
of departure from which we can examine the pillar of mathesis universalis. In the last sections of
this chapter I will apply these points to the analysis of two works of literature and a painting that
directly address epistemology and the feminine perspective. In brief, standpoint theory maintains
that Western epistemology privileges certain social perspectives over others. Despite the
disparity, however, there is the view that those in marginalized groups are afforded a less skewed
perspective on objective truth because they are not invested in maintaining an existing privileged
status quo.73 It should be clear that the “standpoint” of standpoint theory is not necessarily about
someone’s biases or subjective views, but is more about the power structures at play for a
specific social group. This particular perspective on feminist epistemology reveals the
problematic notion of what we can refer to as “motivation bias.” The basic argument stands that
those not working towards the specific goal of maintaining a political status quo are less
vulnerable to certain biases that would shape their conclusions. Simply put, these groups (namely
women) had little concern as to the consequences of truth upon the status quo, because the status
quo did not privilege their cause. Ergo, they are able to more clearly perceive the truth. While I
agree that the motivation bias is certainly a factor to consider of any group, to state that a less
privileged group is free or less prone towards motivational bias is not a completely logical
proposition, as motivation bias is not necessarily restricted towards the maintenance of the status
quo. In fact, with certain radicalized groups, there is a distinct motivational bias to disrupt the
status quo, which in turn could shape one’s epistemic views. What this theory does offer us,
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however, is the idea that seeking and creating knowledge are not purely “noble” pursuits—that
is, they are not free from political or social motivations and consequences.
Feminist postmodernism views epistemology as purely constructed and denies the
existence of truly “objective” knowledge. What is more is that those in this camp rally for a kind
of perspectival relativism, citing that the perspectives of all social groups have epistemic validity
and that no one specific social group should possess total epistemic authority. A complete
rejection of objective knowledge is a radical stance that is difficult to accept when the pursuits of
science, a field dependent upon the idea of objective knowledge, have been so fruitful. However,
what we can take from feminist postmodernism is the idea that the label of “objective” is much
more difficult to legitimately affix to knowledge than is often acknowledged.
Perspectival pluralism seems a more fitting term than perspectival relativism. The term
pluralism implies a coexistence of truths, whereas the term relativism implies that there are no
absolutes, granting no party finality or authority. The term pluralism by its definition implies a
coexistence of truths. The two are not mutually contradictory, but in the case of epistemology a
dismissal of finality runs the risk of epistemic entropy. The depths to which one could follow
these nuances would require entire dissertations dedicated to do them justice. For now, it is
sufficient to say we should understand mathesis universalis as a concept in which authority and
finality are circumstantially connected. Operationally, this is what the Cartesian paradigm was
after—a setting down of knowledge until it otherwise needed moving.
Feminist empiricism is less a critique of knowledge than a movement towards the
expansion of knowledge to include feminist theory. It focuses on combining the main ideas of
feminism and observational studies to prove feminist theories through evidence. While this
perspective is most in line with my own in this dissertation, there are several rhetorical problems
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that can hinder feminist empiricism as an epistemological practice. Two in particular are worth
mentioning in this discussion: the paradox of bias and of social construction. The paradox of bias
can be understood as the tendency to instill one bias while working to remove another,
particularly in the case of power struggles. In the case of feminism, while working to expose and
remove androcentric or sexist ideologies from epistemology, one could easily adopt certain
feminine biases about gender and science. The paradox of social construction works in a similar
fashion. While criticizing science and epistemology for their inherent tendencies, the political
and social constructs of feminism might be instilled, thus still leading to biased epistemology. To
avoid these paradoxes those working in feminist epistemology are not generally out to establish
their own conception of knowledge or science. Rather, they work to balance the proverbial
scales.
Feminist empiricism focuses on reforming two major types of epistemic inequity:
testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. Testimonial injustice is the idea that a speaker’s
credibility can be deflated by class, status, gender, etc. Hermeneutical injustice is the idea that a
speaker’s knowledge or understanding of a matter is conceivably lacking owing to a
disadvantaged education or access to resources. As an example, marital rape may not be
understood as such by the victim, or also the victimizer, if neither understands that such a
specific concept of rape exists, or that such an assault is socially unacceptable. Feminist
empiricism is largely criticized for the assumption that one’s perspective might ever transcend
social or historical determinations—meaning that in many ways the cultural dye has been cast
and course corrections are difficult and already subject to their own pre-established trajectories.
Despite these criticisms, feminist empiricism aims to keep one’s skepticism, credulity, and
interpretations (of testimony and experiences) free, or as free as possible, from gendered bias.
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Throughout all three perspectives, a common critical point can be made related to the
concept of positivism. Positivism can have many nuanced meanings, but generally conceived, it
is the combined idea that scientific methodologies will provide clear and distinct knowledge, and
that science maintains a kind of authority over all knowledge. Since the inception of this idea
with Plato, positivism has been viewed as a kind of battle between science and the humanities.74
His argument was that science allows for the verification of knowledge, and that all “authentic”
knowledge assumes the authority of the sciences. In the Enlightenment era however, the idea of
positivism has been expanded by Auguste Comte (1798-1857) to include the social sciences and
humanities as secondary branches of the sciences. Very briefly, Comte conceived the hard
sciences as foundational to, rather than opposed to, the social sciences and humanities75—an idea
not unrelated to Descartes’ tree of knowledge referenced in Chapter 1. However, many interest
groups, such as feminists, find Comte’s (as well as Descartes’) reductionist methodologies to
only boil all human activity down to physical, biological, or chemical happenstances, leaving
knowledge impoverished by a lack of meaning or significance to human events.
While entire books have been dedicated to the exploration of how positivism can be seen
as an oppressive force to many groups beyond women, a quick summary of the basic points of
feminist criticism of science enlightens this conversation by clarifying the five major feminist
points of critique aimed directly at positivistic science, and thus at the major epistemological
force in the West today:
1. The marginalization of women scientists impairs scientific progress
2. The accepted social applications of science and technology disadvantage women

and other vulnerable groups and treat their interests as less important

216
3. Science has ignored women and gender to such a state that revisions of accepted

theories may be warranted
4. The limiting, partial, or incomplete perspectives of men can lead to errors of

omission or unjustified conclusions owing to their solely masculine nature
5. Research into sex differences that reinforces sex stereotypes and sexist practices

fail to live up to standards of good science. 76
The second, third, and fourth of these criticisms are most important to the last sections of this
chapter, but for now it is sufficient to establish that there are distinct pitfalls in an
epistemological reliance on positivism. Though the original conceptions of mathesis universalis
have relied heavily on positivism, there must be room for the expansion of other views on
knowledge in mathesis universalis. Feminism has produced some of the well-developed
arguments against a traditional understanding of knowledge—arguments that have clear
connections with the realms of aesthetics and the arts.
The overall goal pursued in our previous chapters—enlarging the conceptual boundaries
of the Cartesian paradigm to include aesthetic discourse—is consonant with that pursued by
those working with feminist themes and ideologies. The two interest groups of aesthetics and
feminism should be seen as parallel forces working to solve a similar problem. Aesthetics and
feminism both work via different means to “correct the course” of traditional epistemology that
has been upheld by literal understandings of the Cartesian paradigm. However, if we are to look
beyond knowledge itself, we must look to those who make and use knowledge, and most
importantly, those who have the authority to determine knowledge as such. Though the
responses to traditional Cartesian epistemology may vary across different eras, fields of study, or
even schools of thought on a particular matter like feminism, one unifying inequity exists: that
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epistemic authority has been solely represented by and for the perspective of the privileged white
male. Post-colonialism, Marxism, Feminism and others have taken umbrage with the lack of
non-white, non-wealthy, and non-male representation in the sciences. This inequity might at first
glance appear to be a problem of statistical representation. If one were to look into most history
books it is standard to surmise that women philosophers, particularly prior to the twentieth
century, were few and far between. Female artists, historically, suffer the same paucity of
representation. However, the representation of women scholars is indeed a large piece of this
inequity. The logical conclusion feminists make about this lack of representation is that the
epistemological powers that be either purposefully left out women scholars from history, or
determined that their works were less noteworthy than their male counterparts.
Aside from the gender disparity, the feminine perspective (the fourth of the above listed
criticisms of science), in most feminists’ view, is distinctly absent from the scholarly fields. 77 In
discussing this disparity, it is worth mentioning that Descartes was one of the few philosophers
to actively work with women as philosophers—a rare professional practice for his time. This is
not to say that Descartes should be seen, necessarily, as a hero of the feminist cause by his
inclusion of women as his colleagues. The women were in fact royalty (Princess Elisabeth of
Bohemia and, for a brief time, Queen Christina of Sweden), and their own works have, until
recently, been largely swept aside by the academic community as “novice” dabbling into
philosophy. But in taking the operational approach to his work, Descartes’ actual practices, his
epistolary records, etc. into his overall philosophy, show that Descartes held no overt aversions
to the idea of women as thinkers.78
Hilde Hein and Carolyn Korsmeyer’s essay “Pleasure: Reflections on Aesthetics and
Feminism” (1993) provides many examples of how the two separate philosophical groups of
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aesthetics and feminism are connected by their need to assert their views in the face of
rationality, objectivity, and “universal knowledge.” The first obstacle that both groups face is the
stigma that emotion traditionally evokes amid philosophical discourse. As far back as Socrates,
emotion was a force to be curtailed. Most notably, artistic expression was a threat to be avoided
as it made people emotional and “womanish.” However, in more recent years there has been a
rising interest in emotion, which Hein and Korsmeyer find to be favorable to both the feminist
and aesthetic causes:
This new attention to emotion can be found in moral theory, epistemology,
philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science, as well as aesthetics. Moreover
many of these analyses are devoted to refuting the bad reputation emotions have
had since antiquity and to arguing for their cognitive, moral, and aesthetic value.
In this aspect of their work, the vindicators of emotion are in stride with feminist
critiques of the way the concept of reason operates in traditional philosophical
discourse. (200)
Hein and Korsmeyer characterize rationality as a perceptibly masculine by way of its opposition
to typically feminized emotion.
Classically (and medievally and modernly) the powers of the rational mind are
conceived as the highest achievement of man. There is some generic connotation
to this claim (for rationality distinguishes men from beasts), but also a good dose
of the specific, for rationality fully achieved is usually cast as a preeminently
masculine accomplishment. ((P 200)
To build upon Hein and Korsmeyer’s comparison of aesthetics and feminism as two
philosophical branches similarly pitted against rationalism, we can make more specific
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references to the Cartesian paradigm. The claim of epistemological “universalism” that Descartes
makes the pillar of mathesis universalis is suspect when one considers the lack of attention to
aesthetics and feminist perspectives. As the overall goal of this dissertation was to show means
by which the Cartesian paradigm readily connects with aesthetic discourse, and thus proving the
unnecessary exclusion of aesthetic knowledge from mathesis universalis, we hope to open
windows of discourse for other traditionally excluded disciplines. Many feminist critiques of the
sciences attack aspects of the Cartesian paradigm that are non-representative of the “operational”
spirit that can be surmised in the previous chapters. But one can critique the Cartesian paradigm
while still preserving its overall goals and functions. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 4, we find
that the four pillars of the Cartesian paradigm do not necessarily preclude aesthetic discourse.
Chapter 4 in particular shows how the “human-making” of knowledge allows for aesthetics and
the arts to maintain a copacetic relationship with Descartes’ original vision for mathesis
universalis. The cause of feminism might also be “introduced” to the Cartesian paradigm in such
a way. If one understands certain types of knowledge as the result of the subjective act of
“setting down” (poiesis), then considerations of the nature of who is setting the knowledge down
easily dovetails into the conversation.
This dissertation holds a special interest in the traditional exclusion of aesthetics from the
Cartesian paradigm. The related topic of pleasure has yet to be discussed in detail and is a
relevant concept to both aesthetics and feminism. A comparison of the commonalities
concerning pleasure between the two disciplines is warranted, though for the purposes of this
dissertation the outline must remain cursory. Hein and Korsmeyer’s essay generally addresses
the concept of pleasure more than epistemology, but their argument that the two disciplines have
been similarly suppressed in favor of rationalism brushes the edges of epistemological concerns
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as well. Their argument, situated in psychoanalytic thought, is that the modern contextualist
stance on knowledge and philosophy requires broader pluralism—meaning that if we are to take
into account the specific contexts of knowledge as it is made (set down), then we need to
broaden what “context” refers to. If this broadening of context is accomplished, then a reconsideration of what “good taste” embodies would also be necessary. As the concept of good
taste is a central concern of aesthetic philosophy, Hein and Korsmeyer find that “Feminism is in
stride with the recent contextualist orientation of philosophy of art, for example, in which
cultural facility in apprehending art is emphasized a part of learning to discover artistic
properties [that would inform as good taste]” (202).

Velasquez’s Feminist Critique of the Nobility of Knowledge
My overview on the topic of feminist epistemology, feminist criticisms of science, and of
the confluence of interest that aesthetics and feminism share, all serve to contextualize the casestudy I present in these next sections. First, I will work through an analysis of a painting by
Diego Velasquez that reveals some awareness, if not direct understanding of, the inherent
imbalances of gendered epistemological practices. Second, I will discuss the works of two
modern authors and their perspectives concerning the feminist views on gendered motivations
underlying Cartesian epistemological practices. The phrase gendered epistemological practice
refers to the idea that the ways in which knowledge is established, codified, exchanged, etc., are
steeped in gender specific characteristics that are upheld by cultural norms. We are again
reminded by Hein and Korsmeyer that our purpose for inquiring into gendered perspectives is to
work on an expansion of, rather than a rejection of, mathesis universalis and the various
structures at play in that pillar: “To assume a female perspective—to look at the world from a
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woman-centered position—is not necessarily to declare allegiance to essentialism or to
separatism, but rather to describe the world as it is encountered: gendered and patriarchal” (204).
The three thinkers I will discuss in this section have all broached inquiries about
gendered epistemology. They have called into question (by various means) the effects of gender
roles and the associations of gender with certain behaviors and activities in ways that directly tie
to epistemology. Two of the three, the authors Ursula K. Le Guin and Neil Gaiman, have more
directly investigated this question of gendered epistemic practice via critique of science— the
most prevalent epistemological practice of our time. The painter Diego Velasquez makes an
intuitive commentary on the gendering of knowledge. I use the term intuitive to indicate that as
he was not presented directly with the ideas of feminism, gender, or epistemic practice as those
terms were not yet developed as philosophical ideas during his lifetime. I will argue that
Velasquez, as an artist-thinker, took notice of a particular phenomenon attached to the gendering
of knowledge and portrayed it as such, though the work in question has been largely described
by arts historians and hermeneuts alike as a simple genre scene. More broadly, Velasquez takes
note of the seemingly ungendered idea of mathesis universalis as a distinctly gendered
epistemological practice. Velasquez, and the later discussed Le Guin and Gaiman, all take note
of the roles gender can play in epistemic practices. What these three creative thinkers hold in
common with their respective works is attention given (by visual observation, literary thought
experiment, or poetic speculation on social development) to the idea that privileged white males
have had the rights to determine what the “proper arenas” for knowledge are and likewise what
constitutes the proper motivations for the making of knowledge. All three thinkers acknowledge
by some means that people of marginalized groups (women, in this case study) might have a
perspective on the making of knowledge that differs from what has been traditionally established
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and maintained. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Descartes sought to establish decorum for scientific
inquiry. What he likely did not consider while doing so is that his race, class, and gender would
have such a significant impact as a normative function on that which constitutes what is proper to
mathesis universalis.
Diego Rodriguez de Silva y Velasquez (1599-1660) was a painter known for his
philosophic use of gaze lines and placement of figures. Painting during the Spanish Baroque
period, Velasquez’s interests were consonant with that of the times. He painted with a highly
individualistic style, incorporating the themes common to the Baroque period, though they found
unique representation by his hand. Michel Foucault’s analysis of Velasquez’s masterpiece Las
Meninas in The Order of Things (1966) provides evidence that the artist was a thinker. Foucault
understands Velasquez to be representing visually the classic episteme—in short, Velasquez
shows how representation was the ordering (epistemic) force of that time. His use of many
figures in the painting reveal the artist to have an epistemic power, as he orchestrates and sorts
through the chaos of the scene at hand.79 The viability of Foucault’s claims about the painting
have been debated and expanded upon since his commentary’s original publication. Foucault’s
deep analysis reveals that Velasquez was possessed of philosophical interest in epistemological
practices and, more importantly, interest in the roles of those outside normative power structures
in epistemological practices. In painting the scene as he did (including so many of the
“background” figures of life in the works, and representing the power structures via the metaphor
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An Old Woman Cooking Eggs
Diego Velasquez
C. 1618
Oil on Canvas
100.5cm x 119.5cm
National Gallery of Scotland, Edinburgh
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Old_Woman_Frying_Eggs

of gaze, etc.), Velasquez made it clear that during the Classic episteme, the role of ordering was
essential and this role, more often than not then, fell to those skilled in representation (visual
artists).
Bearing Foucault’s work on Las Meninas in mind, we now turn our attention to a much
earlier pair of paintings by Velaquez: An Old Woman Cooking Eggs (Cooking Eggs) and Christ
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in the House of Martha and Mary (Martha and Mary) While Las Meninas, or at least Foucault’s
reading of it, has epistemic importance as a visual representation of power structures as they
relate to knowledge, these earlier paintings by Velasquez shed light on the gendered
epistemological practices of his time—practices that in our modern era have become an area of

Christ in the House of Martha and Mary
Diego Velasquez
1618
Oil on canvas
63cm x 103.5cm
National Gallery, London
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christ_in_the_House_of_Martha_and_Mary_(Vel%C3%A1zquez)

great interest.

The most notable visual aspect of both works is the absence of a precise fixation point for either
figure’s gaze. It is unclear upon first impressions if the figures are gazing out at the viewer, at
each other, or at objects in the room. The lack of focused gaze has a deliberately unsettling
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effect—it disorients the viewer as to the nature of the scene at hand. As an artist, Velasquez is
known for deliberately directing his subject’s gaze to impart meaning to the viewer, so it is not
without reason that one can assume that the ambiguous gaze has significance as well. The
woman in Cooking Eggs looks beyond the boy to her right, but unto what is not discernable. Her
stare is vacant and untethered to any visible object or interlocutor. The boy also has no clear
object of interest. He could be looking at the food being cooked, or at the objects on the table. He
is clearly, however, not entirely or solely engaged with the woman as his comportment is
uncomfortable, perhaps slightly embarrassed as if he had recently been rebuked. The young maid
of Martha and Mary also seems unsettled or upset by the old woman’s presence.
These works are referred to as a bodegons—a kind of blend of still life and genre
painting. Velasquez, early in his career, explored the potential of these types of works, likely in
response to the recently developed Baroque affection (in Spain in particular) for the picaresque
novel. The Baroque era held a distinctly pessimistic flavor in response to the perceived failure of
Renaissance ideals—stoicism, escapism, satire, and a distinct sense of futility against the passage
of time were the common themes of the arts. This led to the emergence of the picaresque novel—
one of the birth places of the anti-hero. These novels feature realism, an esteem for lower-class
characters who make it by their wits, and a distinct un-vanitizing of morality. Miguel de
Cervantes’ masterpiece, Don Quixote crystalizes the aesthetic mood of the Baroque, and the
anonymously published Lazarillo de Tormes is the archetypal picaresque novel. Both authors
found ways of creating troubled heroes, although the source of those troubles differ greatly in
their symbolic meanings80. The bodegon paintings of Velasquez embody some of these same
tropes. Though simply dubbed as “pantry scenes” that demonstrate his interest in the everyday,
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Velasquez appears to have used the symbolism or significance of the figures at hand to bolster
his visual discourse.
Women, the elderly, children, and people of color (The Kitchen Maid, formerly known as
The Mulatto, shows a black maid at work in the kitchen) all feature in Velasquez’s bodegons.
The “everyday” aspect of the pair of paintings is readily apparent as there are no opulent or
decadent objects present. While Martha and Mary has the more obvious allusions to morality
with the inclusion of the figure of Christ (it is unclear if the scene is a painting within the
painting or a hatch window through which we see the scene in the next room), Cooking Eggs has
little high moral posturing of the figures at hand nor of an obvious notable metaphor.
The ambiguity of the scene in Cooking Eggs is of particular interest to our discussion of
gendered epistemological practices. A part of epistemological practice is the determination of
what types of knowledge are more desirable than others. As such there is typically an
authoritative group or principle that one aligns one’s inquiries to. Historically, the authoritative
group has been privileged white males, but since Descartes’ paradigm was introduced in the
West, it has been displaced by the guiding principle of objectivity or that which is clear and
distinct. Velasquez’s paintings can be understood as windows into what has been marginalized,
not just on a social scale, but on an epistemological scale also. To clarify this point, while
conducting my research about Cooking Eggs, a most poignant piece of trivia that appears in the
search results is a notation about how the official name has had a suggested change from An Old
Woman Frying Eggs, to an Old Woman Cooking Eggs. The change came about because there
were objections as to whether the woman depicted is indeed frying or if she is boiling or
poaching the eggs. This seems unimportant at first. However, I find it most noteworthy. The
process of cooking eggs, a pedestrian enough undertaking, portrayed in a manner mysterious
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enough to be unclear to the artist or unclearly read by the viewer—enough so to re-catalogue an
art piece’s title— reveals a very telling void of knowledge. To clarify the significance of this, if
we assume that the method used for cooking the eggs, for example, is unclearly described by the
artist for the modern viewer, this indicates one of two things: the image given is vague or
misrepresented by the artist’s rendering of the scene or the technique at hand is one lost to
modernity, and therefore is not readily identifiable. In either case, we find a lack of
comprehension and therefore a lack of attention is given to pedestrian domestic knowledge—a
type of knowledge that has historically been gendered as female.
If the first case is true, the strangeness of the scene is the sort of naïve representation of
the objects at hand. Perhaps Velasquez did not understand the processes, objects, etc. of a
working kitchen well enough to accurately render the scene. The painting is an awkward visual
description of tools and practices of cooking—a representation done by someone who apparently
does not cook, nor spends time watching someone cook. As Velasquez has been reputed to be
very clever with his portrayal of order vs. chaos in later paintings, it is even possible to imagine
that he purposefully left the cooking process vague for the sake of the feeling of unsureness and
curiosity of the viewer—a reminder to privileged viewers that they are an outsider looking in on
practices and everyday occurrences that are foreign to their knowledge. If so, Velasquez has
shown that there are realms of knowledge that are outside the interest of an educated man. If the
second assumption is true, then it can be understood that the process shown in Cooking Eggs was
never properly documented or “categorized” by men of science for the annals of history. Simply
put, domestic work was deemed unworthy for an educated and inquiring man’s attention as
“proper knowledge” and therefore omitted from mathesis universalis. This might seem an
exaggerated stance but the theme of what has traditionally been understood as “women’s work”
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has arisen in several works of our modern era (the themes of domesticity, motherhood,
caretaking, etc. abound in feminist art works), making it most noteworthy when a thinker so
early on as Velasquez also takes interest.
The scene Cooking Eggs, similar to Foucault’s reading of Las Meninas, has significant
visual discourse in terms of epistemological practice and gender. If Foucault is correct about his
reading of Las Meninas then it can be assumed that Velasquez was aware and interested in the
epistemological practices of his time, even if that awareness was intuitive in nature. It would also
follow that other paintings by Velasquez might also address epistemology by other means. The
visual development of Cooking Eggs is above and beyond that of Velasquez’s other bodegons,
and as such, viewers must inquire as to what about this scene warranted his extra time and
attention. Velasquez developed this painting as a visual commentary about those groups outside
the epistemological “norm” of the privileged male. His painting has stumbled upon the
“laboratory” of those marginalized by science, and has made subtle indications that you as the
viewer are witnessing “others” to the privileged white male. The respective ages of the figures
are the first and most apparent layer of marginalization. The boy is young enough to not be a
man, and is therefore somewhat feminized by his age. The woman’s elderly age would indicate a
frailness that also recalls to mind the frailness so often associated with femininity. That the pair
are engaged in practical, domestic activity further separates them from the men of means who
would have been practitioners of science (and therefore epistemology) during this era.
What is more, Velasquez shows an alternative type of knowledge to that of the hard
sciences. It is a knowledge of practical matters, related to survival and the necessity of domestic
practice. This marks the knowledge at hand as feminine in nature, as the gendered practices of
life have typically been feminized in the West. The hard sciences and epistemological practices,
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as they are generally conceived, are aimed at knowledge beyond what is necessary for survival.
Mathesis universalis holds the purpose of establishing knowledge for the purpose of codifying
that knowledge. It serves to map the world. Such mapping is not an immediate necessity, and
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was the practice of men wealthy enough to afford
the out-sourcing of their domestic needs. As such, practical and domestic knowledge was outside
the scope of their interest. Velasquez has spotted the novelty of the scene at hand, and
understood that the novelty was only specific to the privileged male gaze. The effect of this
scene is a small acknowledgement that there are others beyond the world of scholarly pursuits,
and those others are possessed of epistemological practices that may be called extra-Cartesian in
nature.
Diego Velasquez, with his bodegon paintings, provided visual allusions to the
epistemological practices of others outside the demographic of educated, wealthy men—in this
case, the others are women specifically, which ties the visual discourse of Cooking Eggs and
Martha and Mary directly to our above conversation about feminist epistemology. The paintings
provide the viewer with at least an instinctual, if not fully conscious, awareness of those realms
of knowledge that have until recently been outside the academic or scholarly norm. Feminists
argue that, epistemically, feminine perspectives have been excluded from grander scientific
epistemic practices. Velasquez’s paintings confront the modern viewer about this exclusion with
scenes of epistemic others, though these others are “hidden” in genre scenes.
As Velasquez’s bodegons predate Descartes’ philosophical works by several years, we
would have to understand this reading of the paintings as a prescient nod by the artist (similar to
Foucault’s readings of Las Meninas) as to the “way of things.” If we set the specific chronology
aside, we have a general statement about the way of society that certainly carried on well after
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Descartes’ lifetime—indeed well after Wright’s. What the general statement indicates is that
either Descartes, or more likely, those with the authority to establish Descartes’ idea of mathesis
universalis as a means of creating objective truths, would have had some conscious awareness
that they were excluding the epistemic practices of others by codifying their own. If that is the
case, the exclusion could be seen as an attempt to maintain a status quo of their own epistemic
practices.
Those who pursued science in their daily lives (nearly all people that have been installed
into traditional scientific/epistemic history were of the singular demographic of privileged white
male) found in Descartes a codified means of avoiding misleading assumptions, biases, etc. His
methodologies allowed for a setting aside of certain subjective differences so that the work of
science might carry on unhindered by unnecessary disputes that such differences may cause.
However, the Cartesian “release” of objective knowledge from bias has limitations in its original
form. The limitations of his initial vision for mathesis universalis end at the biases of sensation,
religion, language, and nationality. The mathematicalized nature of his methodology circumvents
these biases, but does little to aid the biases set forth by gender, race, class, or age. Simply put,
his methods were aimed at uniting different groups of wealthy white males only. It is entirely
believable that these shortcomings are due to the circumstance of his lifetime, however, as we
have discussed above, we in our modern era have reached the moment when we must expand the
boundaries of the traditional understanding of knowledge. Velasquez’s Cooking Eggs serves, if
nothing else, as a moment, prior to our modern time, when that boundary line was crossed—a
peek over the edge of an educated male’s purview. Cooking Eggs shows the work of
nourishment, sustenance, and survival as the work of the feminized other from the gaze of an
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educated seventeenth century male. In the next sections we encounter two authors who approach
these same types of work from the vantage point of the post-Cartesian feminist.

Fiction as a Marginalized Epistemological Practice
The paintings by Diego Velasquez have value in revealing these sources of knowledge
that have been traditionally excluded as “extra-Cartesian.” While the discussion of Velasquez
offers insight into the philosophical stances on knowledge contemporary to Descartes, the
question arises as to how those stances are reflected (and perpetuated) in matters
contemporaneous with our own times. Today, the major source of Epistemology in the West is
scientific research, a system of rules, methods, and laws that can be directly traced to the
Cartesian paradigm (see Chapter 1). Science as a source of knowledge is so enfolded into
Western philosophy that it has developed a corollary genre of fiction. It is standard practice to
end one’s dissertation with ideas for further research. As we have discussed in this last chapter
how mathesis universalis may be expanded by including epistemological practices that are
inclusive of aesthetic and feminist philosophy, a possible avenue to further expand mathesis
universalis lies in the genre of science fiction. Science fiction, while traditionally understood as a
literary category, has branched out to encompass film and television, crossing the bounds of pure
literature into the visual and theatrical arts. As a genre, it is explicitly in dialogue with the moral,
ethical, and political concerns that are connected to science as an epistemic and technological
force. In these last sections, I examine the works of two contemporary authors – Ursula K. Le
Guin and Neil Gaiman – both of whom are working with feminist themes that reveal more layers
of “extra-Cartesian” epistemological practice: foundational assumptions about the people that
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make and use science. This discussion may indeed warrant larger texts of their own someday, but
for the purposes of concluding this dissertation I will keep these closing ideas brief.
When discussing marginalized groups, typically one’s mind goes to those socially or
politically marginalized—the specifics of race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, etc. are terms
that inevitably arise. It might seem odd, then, to consider authors who write fiction to be a
marginalized group. But when discussing epistemology, particularly in relationship to the
sciences, that is precisely the case. The particular art form of fiction is by its definition a story or
narrative that has been completely, and often theatrically, fabricated. As such, it is an intellectual
pursuit that, while few would dispute has cultural value, is a dubious source of knowledge.
Science fiction is a valuable epistemological practice that reveals via thought experiments the
possible shortcomings of scientific optimism. Blumenberg showed us in the first sections of this
chapter that fictional literature is a valuable epistemic tool as it allows for more internal and
subjective truths to be made clear. Two factors, however, denote science fiction as a valuable
resource for revelatory knowledge:
1. Blumenberg’s aforementioned ideas of modern fiction being a source of

introspective knowledge (see above discussion of Blumenberg’s reading of
Ulysses).
2. The advent of the genre of science fiction in the mid-twentieth century has created

a unique philosophical footprint in Western epistemology as it deals primarily
with moral and ethical matters that pertain to aspects of science (our greatest
contemporary source of knowledge).
As such, science fiction has traversed the bounds of cultural significance to epistemological
importance.
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It is difficult to support claims that a completely fabricated tale is epistemologically
valuable. But recalling James M. Thompson’s work discussed in Chapter 4 on the knowledge to
be gained from paintings, similar views to fiction can be applied, as fiction has the potential to
generate revelatory knowledge. It is an art form that often reveals more plainly what is at stake in
the real world, precisely because it is removed from the real world. Fiction reveals
presuppositions of the norm or of reality as we the reader expect it to be when they are disrupted
by some means. It is counterfactual, as J.O. Urmson says in his essay “Fiction.” Urmson
summarizes the bias of presupposition that we nearly always enter the reading of fiction with:
If the story begins with the words "Tom was a middle-aged man from Columbus,
Ohio," we may assume that he is visible to other men, needs food and drink,
speaks English, and so on, unless we are explicitly warned to the contrary.
Without some such presuppositions as these the story will be unintelligible. Even
in the most fanciful fairy stories and science-fiction we, in general, presuppose
things to be as they really are except where it is clearly shown or stated to be
otherwise. Thus the presupposed is in general the truth, though in certain genres
the truth is partially replaced or supplemented by conventional falsehoods; in
Wodehouse's novels, for example, it is presupposed that all rich young aristocrats
are moronic unless we are explicitly warned of an exception. (153-4)
As a specific genre of fiction, science fiction so very often disrupts the very common
presupposition that science is inherently good or typically leads to good things—known as
scientific optimism. In Isaac Asimov’s Foundation Series, for example, the presupposition of
technology (robotics in particular) as good or for the good of humanity is disrupted when
technology surpasses human control. Author Phillip K. Dick disrupts the presupposition of what
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sentience entails with his many novels that describe human creatures that are entirely fabricated
by technology. Science fiction writers (both of literature and of film) practice philosophy in ways
that, today, matter most in the larger consciousness. It is one of the most significant means by
which the West currently engages in philosophical discourse. Most typically in science fiction
the discourse is speculative—one finds a certain piece of technology or ideology to be purified
and then radicalized to reveal a flaw in scientific optimism. Two particular science fiction
authors have made “experiments” that reveal two “extra-Cartesian” aspects to epistemology that
are relevant to feminist epistemology. While other types of science fiction are also
philosophically oriented, I will keep our discussion germane to science fiction writing about
feminist themes that are less speculative and more directly engaged with the Cartesian
paradigm.81

Ursula K. Le Guin
Author Ursula K. Le Guin, in an interview with Vice Magazine, gave a definition of
science fiction that provides our first insights into how the genre directly addresses concerns of
the Cartesian paradigm in the real world. Le Guin reveals that we, today, are actively expanding
mathesis universalis through the counterfactual experiments of science fiction and that what
follows these experiments allows the highlighting of salient features of our experience that are
normatively occluded or marginalized.
Science fiction—and the correct shortcut is “sf”—uses actual scientific facts or
theories for the source ideas or framework of the story. It has some scientific
content, however speculative. If it breaks a law of physics, it knows it’s doing so
and follows up the consequences. If it invents a society of aliens, it does so with

235
some respect for and knowledge of the social sciences and what you might call
social probabilities. And some of it is literarily self-aware enough to treat its
metaphors as metaphors.
Le Guin’s statement reveals two extra-Cartesian epistemological practices:
1. Thought experiments geared towards the bypassing of the natural world—a concern

never broached in Descartes’ writings.
2. Thought experiments that bypass societal foundations that may or may not have

repercussions on the decorum of science.
As our discussion will primarily focus on the second type of “extra-Cartesian” concept, I will
eschew a deep discussion of the first type save to mention that its concerns are squarely outside
the scope of Descartes’ original vision for mathesis universalis.82 The second type of thought
experiment that Le Guin mentions, wherein the author bypasses a perceived foundation of
society, introduces to us a much deeper connection between science fiction and the above
discussion of feminist epistemology as a means of expanding mathesis universalis. In particular,
Le Guin’s The Left Hand of Darkness shows us that mannerisms, decorum, and customs
surrounding gender and sexuality are not necessarily natural or “scientific” facts. To what degree
such imaginings might be used is difficult to say, but her idea that gender and sexuality need not
be as they are for a human like society to thrive is a formidable comment upon foundations of
“science” that might otherwise have been unexamined.
There exists “extra-Cartesian” characteristics to mathesis universalis that Descartes
himself did not recognize. We in our modern era are able to develop and are actively developing
these characteristics despite a perceived “dismissal” of the Cartesian paradigm since the advent
of postmodernism. We have discussed feminism as one such “extra-Cartesian” interest group and
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have briefly sketched the three major stances taken on feminist epistemology. All three challenge
one or more of the underlying assumptions about knowledge and knowledge-making, making
subtle criticisms about how the world of science thus far has been governed by gendered
epistemic practices.
It must be made clear that as modern authors, Le Guin and Gaiman both live in the postCartesian West, and as such are deeply entrenched in an “episteme”—to use Foucault’s word—
that has been building a grand bank of knowledge for four centuries since Descartes’ inception of
mathesis universalis. They inhabit moments of history when the bounds of mathesis universalis
(and other philosophical foundations) were being expanded beyond their traditional or original
meanings. Both Le Guin and Gaiman are inclined to comment on science as an epistemic
practice, rather than to extrapolate upon the effects and consequences of any singular aspect or
innovation of science (such as artificial intelligence or space exploration). Le Guin’s thought
experiments about the foundational aspects of gender and sexuality as socially-upheld reveal
“extra-Cartesian” assumptions about the thinking human being.
Le Guin (1929-2018) is heralded as one the foremost feminist science fiction authors of
the last century. Her writing approached the genre atypically, without hyperbolized speculation
upon technology, but instead with what she referred to as “thought experiments” about the nature
of human societies. Her most well-known works, The Hainish Cycle—comprised of three novels
The Left Hand of Darkness (1969), The Dispossessed (1974), and The Telling (2000)—is a series
that explores possibilities for different foundational facts to social structures. These foundational
facts are aspects of human existence that have been largely understood as biologically or
psychologically necessary to the composition of a human being. More simply, they are essential
aspects of a human being such as breathing oxygen, needing water and nutrients, and so on. The
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Left Hand of Darkness (Left Hand) is the most widely read of the three books, and as the
foundational fact at hand in this novel is gender and sex, it is the best to bring into our discussion
of feminist epistemology.
To give a brief synopsis, Left Hand is a novel following an Earth human, Genly Ai, on an
exploratory mission on Gethen—a planet inhabited by two kingdoms of human-like beings that
are largely at a détente. The Gethenians are androgynous, displaying gendered sexual
characteristics only during their monthly 3-day sexual cycle called kemmering. They have few
social rules or expectations around kemmering, and the role of child-rearing is shared by all in
the society. As such the social interactions between adults differ greatly from our own. Sexual
prowess, gendered power, and segregation of the sexes is non-existent, creating difficulties for
the earthling protagonist. His difficulties are made apparent by his own up-bringing in deeply
gendered and sexualized customs. Left Hand may be read as a thought experiment upon what
human life might be like when the supposed foundations of sexuality and gender—two concepts
that are considered by many to be “of nature” rather than of social construction—are disrupted as
on-going social schemas and are reduced to genderless, purely-biological construct. Le Guin,
twenty-one years prior to Judith Butler’s groundbreaking text Gender Trouble (1990), created a
counterfactual trope wherein one might process the significance of gender and sexuality to our
epistemological practices. As with Wright of Derby’s Science Paintings, Le Guin also freely
engages, as an artist and not a scientist, with the Cartesian paradigm prior to any deeper, more
academic treatment of similar matters.
Left Hand is a lengthy and nuanced book, but one particular quote in its beginning pages
underscores the importance of Le Guin’s thought experiment:
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The Truth is a matter of the imagination. The soundest fact may fail or prevail in
the style of its telling: like that singular organic jewel of our seas, which grows
brighter as one woman wears it and, worn by another, dulls and goes to dust.
Facts are no more solid, coherent, round, and real than pearls are. But both are
sensitive. (Left Hand, 5).
With this, Le Guin artfully ties together concepts of truth, beauty, knowledge, subjectivity, and
feminist epistemology. The overall statement is about how those possessed of knowledge shape,
color, value, or de-value truth. While the truth may be objective, the success or failure of that
truth is a matter of subjectivity. Though the pearls (metaphorical units of wisdom) are
objectively real and true, they are subjectively valuable assets—meaning they are not universally
beautiful or important, despite their objective existence. The “extra-Cartesian” revelation to be
gained is that those in power over the wisdom decide which pearls are dull and which are bright,
useful or trivial. Descartes’ paradigm made no mention of possible differences in the value of
knowledge based on who controlled the knowledge. His lack of attention to this issue of valuing
pieces of knowledge over others may be owed to his reluctance to assign significance to matters
that cannot be determined independently of tradition and social position. His interest was solely
directed towards the pearls (truths) and was uninterested in how different religions or social
arenas might value the pearls. What Le Guin reveals with her metaphor above is that there is an
inherent imbalance to the Cartesian paradigm’s heavy focus on seeking objective knowledge—
an imbalance that leaves groups like women epistemically impoverished.
This poverty is owed not to lack of truth, it is owed to lack of interest. A fact fails if it is
considered outside the scope of valuable knowledge, it prevails if it falls in line the with value
system of those in epistemic authority. A fact may be seen as true, but irrelevant to a greater
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cause. If the fact is deemed relevant to the interest of those in power, such a pearl of wisdom is
deemed priceless. Many in the feminist interest groups would argue that facts that are important
to women or the feminine perspective have been glossed over by the male dominated epistemic
practice of science. Left Hand allows a counterfactual musing upon this unnecessary
marginalization. Le Guin reveals that though the Cartesian paradigm was primarily aimed at factfinding, a greater consideration of the management of facts may be necessary.

Gaiman’s “The Mushroom Hunters”
It is fitting that as we discuss Blumenberg’s ideas of expanding upon the works of our
predecessors that in our final section we discuss a poem dedicated to Ursula K. Le Guin in the
year of her death by her fan and fellow author, Neil Gaiman. “The Mushroom Hunters” (2017)
(See Appendix A) expands upon Le Guin’s interests in extra-Cartesian concepts concerning
gendered epistemic practices. For Gaiman, the practices the modern era most readily associate
with science – observation, experimentation, and knowledge making—are originally feminine. In
the primitive tropes of his poem, he has identified a consonance between the objectives of
mathesis universalis and perceptively feminine epistemological approaches. In “The Mushroom
Hunters” Gaiman creates a scene of “before history” –a prehistoric (he mentions flint and cave
paintings) milieu of men, women, and children surviving in a small tribe. In traditionally
understood roles, the men go off to hunt and the women stay to forage and raise the children.
Men and women approach survival differently. They both survive, but the methodology is
different. The male seeks out and conquers to survive and provide.
Gaiman portrays “male knowledge” as resulting in a victory that must be repeated for
sustenance. The women survive by wit, innovation, and observation. They make tools for
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nurturing, pass down observations, and find varied means of sustenance, rather than singularly
hunt prey. Whereas Le Guin’s writings create an equality between the sexes by her trope of a
genderless society, Gaiman’s gendered views on knowledge-making reveal that traditionally
female roles and activities have strong parallels to those we associate with modern or traditional
science. In this way, Gaiman makes two arguments: that the modern stereotype of men being
scientific is unfounded by life-practices, and that women might indeed be superior scientists as
their domestic practices are founded on a science-like basis. Gaiman goes so far as to decisively
gender the brains of human beings by specifically mentioning that men’s brains are different
from women’s—a difference that is highly debated in neuroscience today83 and could be
considered counterfactual. One gender’s brain is meant for following, conquering, and killing for
sustenance; the other for observing, experimenting, and using resources beyond what is
immediately evident—for example, the women learn that if you cook the mushrooms in complex
ways you can eat them. An added imbalance in Gaiman’s world, one decidedly absent in Le
Guin’s, is the normative expectation that women raise the children. In Left Hand, the
androgynous Gethenians share child rearing responsibility, thus ensuring equal professional and
lifestyle opportunities for all—a utopic vision of social equality. The injustice of the real-life
gender inequality concerning child-rearing is a common theme in second-wave feminist works,
such as Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique (1963), and Le Guin has removed it from a
human-like society to show its unnecessary character as a feature of our worldview.
Using a slightly different tactic, Gaiman’s poem notes the inequality, but in a manner that
indicates admiration for a woman’s ability to be both scientist and caretaker, as the science is
geared towards the necessity of caretaking—a response perhaps more grounded in reality. As to
what end the facts discovered by science would be utilized, that is the motivating factor for
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finding them out and setting them down for posterity, is an “extra-Cartesian” concern—one not
fully developed by Descartes’ original writings on the paradigm. While Descartes was aware that
we are able to generate objective knowledge, he made no comment on to what greater purpose
the objective knowledge serves beyond that we should create a grand bank of knowledge. It is
arguable that the conquering of nature for human purposes may have been his own motivation
for establishing his paradigm, though no specific writing of his explicitly states such to be the
case. Gaiman, Le Guin, Velasquez, and Wright offer numerous “extra-Cartesian” considerations
but also show the incompleteness of the Cartesian paradigm. If one were so inclined, a book
detailing how such works bring to light “extra-Cartesian” concerns, rather than anti-Cartesian or
even post-Cartesian, might be valuable for the expansion and preservation of mathesis
universalis, an idea that is so engrained in Western thought that to discard it is impossible.
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APPENDIX A

“The Mushroom Hunters” by Neil Gaiman
Science, as you know, my little one, is the study
of the nature and behaviour [sic] of the universe.
It’s based on observation, on experiment, and measurement,
and the formulation of laws to describe the facts revealed.

In the old times, they say, the men came already fitted with brains
designed to follow flesh-beasts at a run,
to hurdle blindly into the unknown,
and then to find their way back home when lost
with a slain antelope to carry between them.
Or, on bad hunting days, nothing.

The women, who did not need to run down prey,
had brains that spotted landmarks and made paths between them
left at the thorn bush and across the scree
and look down in the bole of the half-fallen tree,
because sometimes there are mushrooms.

Before the flint club, or flint butcher’s tools,
The first tool of all was a sling for the baby
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to keep our hands free
and something to put the berries and the mushrooms in,
the roots and the good leaves, the seeds and the crawlers.
Then a flint pestle to smash, to crush, to grind or break.

And sometimes men chased the beasts
into the deep woods,
and never came back.

Some mushrooms will kill you,
while some will show you gods
and some will feed the hunger in our bellies. Identify.
Others will kill us if we eat them raw,
and kill us again if we cook them once,
but if we boil them up in spring water, and pour the water away,
and then boil them once more, and pour the water away,
only then can we eat them safely. Observe.

Observe childbirth, measure the swell of bellies and the shape of breasts,
and through experience discover how to bring babies safely into the world.

Observe everything.
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And the mushroom hunters walk the ways they walk
and watch the world, and see what they observe.
And some of them would thrive and lick their lips,
While others clutched their stomachs and expired.
So laws are made and handed down on what is safe. Formulate.

The tools we make to build our lives:
our clothes, our food, our path home…
all these things we base on observation,
on experiment, on measurement, on truth.

And science, you remember, is the study
of the nature and behaviour of the universe,
based on observation, experiment, and measurement,
and the formulation of laws to describe these facts.

The race continues. An early scientist
drew beasts upon the walls of caves
to show her children, now all fat on mushrooms
and on berries, what would be safe to hunt.

The men go running on after beasts.
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The scientists walk more slowly, over to the brow of the hill
and down to the water’s edge and past the place where the red clay runs.
They are carrying their babies in the slings they made,
freeing their hands to pick the mushrooms.
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ENDNOTES
1

Such inquiries are germane to the fundamental nature of reality, including the relationship
between mind and matter, between substance and attribute, and between possibility and actuality.
2
For more on the topic of Descartes’ ontology see Nolan, Abbruzzese, Alston, Beyssade, and
Chappell.
3
For more on the historical circumstances of Descartes’ lifetime see Nadler.
4
“Whenever men notice some similarity between two things, they are wont to ascribe to each,
even in those respects in which the two differ, what they have found to be true of the other. Thus they
erroneously compare the sciences, which entirely consists in the cognitive exercise of the mind, with the
arts, which depend upon an exercise and disposition of the body. They see that not all the arts can be
acquired by the same man, but that he who restricts himself to one, most readily becomes the best
executant, since it is not so easy for the same hand to adapt itself both to agricultural operations and to
harp-playing, or to the performance of several such tasks as to one alone” (Descartes, Rules 96).
5
“Some years ago I was struck by how many false things I had believed, and by how doubtful
was the structure of beliefs that I had based on them. I realized that if I wanted to establish anything in the
sciences that was stable and likely to last, I needed—just once in my life—to demolish everything
completely and start again from the foundations. It looked like an enormous task, and I decided to wait
until I was old enough to be sure that there was nothing to be gained from putting it off any longer”
(Descartes, Meditations 2).
6
“If a painter had chosen to set a human head On a horse’s neck, covered a melding of limbs,
Everywhere, with multi-coloured[sic] plumage, so That what was a lovely woman, at the top, Ended
repulsively in the tail of a black fish: Asked to a viewing, could you stifle laughter, my friends?” (Horace,
“On Unity and Harmony” 166).
7
“So lest we chance to assign you this part to age, or a boy’s to a man, Always adopt what suits
and belongs to a given age” (Horace, “On Characterization” 172).
8 The exact term Descartes uses in French is “désagréable” which is readily translated to English
as “of poor taste.”
9
For more on this topic see Roe.
10
For more on this topic see Pearl.
11
For more on Croce’s aesthetics, reference his The Essence of Aesthetic, translated by Ainslie.
12
Section 2 of Kemp’s Essay Croce’s Aesthetics offers further explanation of this complex idea.
13
Subjective studies refers to the social sciences, linguistics, gender studies, cultural studies,
psychology, etc.
14
Aristotle’s dichotomy of form vs. concept, for example, is comparable to Descartes’ mind/body
dualism. The two differ on their views of that which is “certain” however. Descartes feels that the self, the
world, and God are certain, while Aristotle felt only significant forms and potentiality were certain.
15
Michael R. Spicher provides a succinct account of Augustinian beauty drawing from Of True
Religion, De Muscia, and The City of God: “Unity, equality, number, proportion, and order are the main
elements in Augustine’s theory of beauty… Augustine does not systematically present these
characteristics of beauty, but they can be found, often in relation to one another, throughout his writings.
First, everything exists as a separate whole unit; therefore, each thing has unity. Simply put, something
cannot have the potential to be beautiful, unless it exists. And if it has existence, it will also be a unified
whole. Thus, unity is a necessary element of beauty.”
16
Further, the more unified something is the more beautiful it will be. Second, concerning
equality (or likeness): “The existence of individual things as units, the possibility of repeating them and
comparing groups of them with respect to equality or inequality, gives rise to proportion, measure, and
number.’ Third, ‘Number, the base of rhythm, begins from unity.’ Number, for Augustine, measures
rhythm. Since rhythm is based on number, which Augustine believes is immutable, then it follows that
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rhythm is likewise immutable. Fourth, ‘in all the arts it is symmetry [or proportion] that gives pleasure,
preserving unity and making the whole beautiful.’ Fifth, Augustine asserts, ‘everything is beautiful that is
in due order.’ Moreover, Augustine says, ‘Order is the distribution which allots things equal and unequal,
each to its own place.’ In other words, the degree to which things are in their proper place is the degree in
which they are beautiful” (Spicher).
17
The term objective is not germane to Plato, as the concept of object/subject had yet to be
articulated in Plato’s time. However the common threads of “fixed-ness” and “abstract-ness” run through
both Plato’s conception of the Ideal and Descartes’ conception of an object. Fixed-ness refers to the
constant nature of the object, and the abstract-ness refers to the corporeal remove that must accompany all
objects as they must be separate from the thinking subject in the Cartesian paradigm, and the Platonic
remove of the Ideal from the real world.
18
“The heart of Plato’s metaphysics is his famous ‘Theory of Forms.’ This theory holds that there
is a higher reality beyond the world of change which we come to know through sense experience. This
‘transcendent’ reality consists of Forms: that is eternal, unchanging entities which are grasped by the
intellect, not by the senses. Whatever reality our world of experience has it gets from these Forms. What
is “real” for Plato is not just what is permanent and unchanging, but, more importantly, what is
intelligible and knowable. It is chiefly because of the Forms’ perfect intelligibility that they are more real
than the things we grasp through sense experience” (Devereux, 165).
19
Rule III of Regulae states: “We must read the works of the ancients; for it is an extraordinary
advantage to have available the labours of so many menm both in order to recognise[sic] what true
discoveries have already long since been made and also to become aware of what scope is still left for
inventin in the various disciplines. There is, however, at the same time a great danger that perhaps some
contagion of error, contracted from too attentive reading of them, may stick to us against our wil, in spite
of all precautions. For authors are ordinarily so disposed that whenever their heedless credulity has led
them to a decision on some controverted opinion, they always try to bring us over to the same side with
the subtlest arguments; if on the other hand they have been fortunate enough to discover something
certain and evident, they never set it forth without wrapping it up in all sorts of complications. (I suppose
they are afraid that a simple account may lessen the importance they gain by the discovery; or perhaps the
begrudge us the plain truth” (Rules, 55)
20
Descartes lists the primitive passions as: wonder, love, joy, sadness, hatred, and desire.
21
Bruhn’s essay addresses this.
22
“But this ‘I’ that must exist—I still don’t properly understand what it is: So I am at risk of
confusing it with something else, thereby falling into error in the very item of knowledge that I maintain
is the most certain and obvious of all. To get straight about what this ‘I’ is, I shall go back and think some
more about what I believed myself to be before I started this meditation. I will eliminate from those
beliefs anything that could even be slightly called into question by the arguments I have been using,
which will leave me with only beliefs about myself that are certain and unshakable” (Descartes,
Meditations 4).
23
“I shall stubbornly persist in this train of thought; and even if I can’t learn any truth, I shall at least do
what I can do, which is to be on my guard against accepting falsehoods, so that the deceiver—however
powerful and cunning he may be—will be unable to affect me in the slightest. This will be hard work,
though, and a kind of laziness pulls me back into my old ways. Like a prisoner who dreams that he is free,
starts to suspect that it is merely a dream, and wants to go on dreaming rather than waking up, so I am
content to slide back into my old opinions; I fear being shaken out of them because I am afraid that my
peaceful sleep may be followed by hard labor when I wake, and that I shall have to struggle not in the
light but in the imprisoning darkness of the problems I have raised” (Descartes, Meditations 3).
Al-Ghazali’s most famous philosophical treatise, Incoherence of the Philosophers, is
considered the most influential texts in the rise of Avicennian School of Islamic philosophy.
25
“So it seems reasonable to conclude that physics, astronomy, medicine, and all other sciences
dealing with things that have complex structures are doubtful; while arithmetic, geometry and other
24
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studies of the simplest and most general things—whether they really exist in nature or not—contain
something certain and indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two plus three makes five, and a
square has only four sides. It seems impossible to suspect that such obvious truths might be false”
(Descartes, Meditations 2).
26
Descartes states: “I should consider the ideas of them in my thought, in order to see which of those
ideas are distinct and which confused. … I regarded the clearly apprehended propositions of pure
mathematics—including arithmetic and geometry—as the most certain of all” (Meditations, 24).
“Think a little,' I told him, 'and you will see that what has preceded will supply the answer; for
if simple unity could be adequately perceived by the sight or by any other sense, then, there would be
nothing to attract the mind towards reality any more than in the case of the finger we discussed. But when
it is combined with the perception of its opposite, and seems to involve the conception of plurality as
much as unity, then thought begins to be aroused within us, and the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive
at a decision asks "What is absolute unity?" This is the way in which the study of the one has a power of
drawing and converting the mind to the contemplation of reality.'
'And surely,' he said, 'this characteristic occurs in the case of one; for we see the same thing to be
both one and infinite in multitude?'
'Yes,' I said, 'and this being true of one, it must be equally true of all number?'
'Certainly.'
'And all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number?'
'Yes.'
'And they both appear to lead the mind towards truth?'
'Yes, in a very remarkable manner” (Plato, Republic 197).
28
The idea of God (that is, of a supremely perfect being) is certainly one that I find within me,
just as I find the ideas of shapes and numbers; and I understand from this idea that it belongs to God’s
nature that he always exists. This understanding is just as vivid and clear as what is involved in
mathematical proofs of the properties of shapes and numbers” (Meditations 25).
29
I will cite John Hawthorne’s description of these principles from his paper Cartesian Dualism,
as I find them the most succinct.
“Axiom 1, Completeness: Principal attributes are complete. Axiom 2, Essentiality: If a substance
has properties belonging to some principal attribute, then it is essential to that substance that it
has properties belonging to that attribute. Axiom 3, Uniqueness: If a thing x has properties
belonging to a principal attribute, then it has a part y which has that principal attribute as its only
principal attribute. Axiom 4, Comprehensiveness: For each fundamental property of a thing, there
is some principal attribute of the thing that it belongs to. Axiom 5, Exclusivity: No fundamental
property belongs to more than one principal attribute” (87).
30
In Passions (2), Descartes gives a helpful synopsis of how to determine a lie body from a dead
one demonstrating his parallelism:
“6. How a living body differs from a dead one: To avoid this error, let us note that death is never
due to the absence of the soul but only to the decay of some principal part of the body. And let us
recognize that the body of a living man differs from the body of a dead man in just the same way
that a watch or other automaton (i.e. self-moving machine) when it is wound up and contains
within itself the physical source of the movements for which it is designed, together with
everything else needed for its operation differs from the same watch or machine when it is broken
and the source of its movement has stopped working.”
31
“Their cause is this: variously agitated spirits come upon the traces of various impressions that
have preceded them in the brain, and there make their way by chance through certain pores rather than
others Their cause isn’t as conspicuous and determinate as that of the perceptions the soul receives by
means of the nerves; and they seem to be mere shadows and pictures of those ·other more normal·
perceptions. We should hold off from characterizing[sic] these imaginings, however, until we get further
in sorting out the other ones. The illusions of our dreams are cases of that, and so are the day-dreams we
27
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often have when we’re awake and our mind wanders idly without deliberately applying itself to anything.
All these imaginings are ‘passions’ of the soul if that word is understood in its general sense, ·i.e. they are
events in respect of which the soul is passive. But when ‘passion’ is taken in its more proper and exact
sense, some of them are passions and others are not” (Passions, 6-7).
32
“Spirits” refer to the animal spirits, the particles that move through the body and are
responsible for the passions of both the body and soul. Jonathan Bennett in his translation of Passions of
the Soul defines animal spirits:
“This stuff was supposed to be even more finely divided than air, able to move extremely fast,
seep into tiny crevices, and affect the environment within the nerves. Apparently some people
thought of spirits as so rarefied as to be almost mind-like, and thus suitable to mediate between
mind and body; but Descartes is innocent of this absurdity. Its most famous occurrence is in
Donne’s superb lines: ‘As our blood labours to beget / Spirits as like souls as it can, / Because
such fingers need to knit / The subtle knot that makes us man…’” (Descartes, Meditations 1).
33
“But it is even better to call them ‘commotions’ of the soul, not only because this term is
applicable to all the changes that occur in the soul—i.e. to all the various thoughts that come to it—but
more particularly because the passions agitate and disturb the soul more forcefully than any other kinds of
thought the soul may have” (Descartes 8).
34
Descartes belief in such properties of the Pineal gland is not original. Accounts by Galen (c.
130-210 AD) refuting such attributions to the Pineal Gland indicate that this belief was widely held in
Ancient Greece.
35
Aquinas and much of Catholicism hold the ecstasy of the afterlife as the greatest good.
36
“For just as faith teaches us that the supreme felicity of the other life consists only in this
contemplation of the Divine Majesty, so we continue to learn by experience that a similar meditation,
though incomparably less perfect, causes us to enjoy the greatest satisfaction of which we are capable in
this life” (Descartes, Meditations 89).
37
The first rule establishes the scope of the soul’s concern as itself and not the world around it, reflecting
the third rule of his first moral code. With the second, we find an assurance of the immortality of the soul
that allows for a freedom of will beyond the fear of death.
The third rule serves to direct one’s focus towards the natural world, rather than a solely
internal contemplation of oneself, despite the self being all that is within our control. It must be
remembered that while Descartes did pave the way for psychology and other arenas that focus on the
inner workings of the individual soul, he himself viewed the mind/body split as a purely anatomical
feature of being human, and to him it required very little subsequent study. The fourth principle takes a
moral stance similar to that of Plato and Aristotle, that the greater good of the community is the goal and
that one should comport oneself towards the study of knowledge as it benefits us all. The fifth rule serves
a second reminder of our own subsidiary nature to the greater good by assuring us that our passions, and
the desires that come thereof, are not nearly as crucial as they may appear. Again Descartes cautions us
against trusting appearances.
38

39

Descartes does make a second, rather nostalgic mention of poetry in Discourse on Method. He
describes the breadth of his course of study at College Royal Henry-Le-Grand in La Fleche: “But I never
lost my respect for the curriculum of the college. I knew that the languages learned there are necessary if
one wants to grasp the works of the ancients;… poetry has quite ravishing delicacy and sweetness; …”
(Descartes, Discourse 3).
40
The means by which one gathers observations, develops hypotheses and theories, codifies
knowledge, teaches knowledge, and establishes truth.
41
Butler lays out gender as a concept upheld by a kind of improvised performance based on or
running against societal norms and socio-psychological structures.
42
For more on this topic see Markie.
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Most influential is Hegel’s phenomenological conception of consciousness (knowing) that
rejects knowledge as universally modeled, but knowledge “in the case of” or “such as the case of.” For
more a summary of Hegel’s influence on current epistemology reference Solomon.
44
Schopenhauer’s influence on modern epistemology is largely based on his concept of sufficient
reason and logical necessity. He believed that if something were to be judged true, it must have sufficient
logical grounds. For his full epistemological paradigm reference On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of
Sufficient Reason, translated by Payne.
43

45

Late 15th century (in an earlier sense). From Anglo-Norman mathesis, Middle French mathesie
and their etymon post-classical Latin mathesis astrology, the liberal arts, the quadrivium, the science of
numbers, science, learning from ancient Greek μάθησις the action of learning from the stem of μανθάνειν
to learn (“Mathesis”).
46
See Corazon.
47
I am referencing the basic tenets for overcoming Cartesian doubt by Kemerling.
48
Briefly, scholasticism is a medieval school of philosophy (or, perhaps more accurately, a
method of learning) taught by the academics of medieval universities and cathedrals in the period from
the 12th to 16th Century. It combined logic, metaphysics and semantics into one discipline, and is
generally recognized to have developed our understanding of logic significantly.
49
See On the Order of Things by Foucault.
50
Frege worked in finitistic and externalist means. As he worked primarily as a mathematician,
his work largely handled the world in mathematical terms. He believed that objects and concepts are finite
and self-contained (in line with Descartes), that the world around us has bearing on our mentation
(opposed to Descartes mind/body dualism), and that logic moved beyond Aristotelian syllogism and Stoic
propositions. His own system of logic is termed axiomatic predicate logic and depends upon a nonpsychologistic viewpoint of logic and cognition. “Before Frege the laws of logic had been regarded as the
laws of thought. That is to say it was considered something to do with human mental processes. Frege
determined that this couldn’t be so—that the validity of a proof couldn’t depend on our psychology”
(Ayers, Section 1). Frege sought to reconcile the mathematical, which until after the inception of his work
appeared to be objective and eidetic in nature, and the logical without recourse to psychology or Idealism.
His conception of number theory is most helpful in illuminating this accomplishment. I draw this brief
explanation from Graham Priest’s lecture on Frege:
“A number is a set.
A set is the extension of a condition. Any condition defines a set. (Ex: The condition “is red”
defines the set of all red things)
A number is a set. (Ex: the condition “is three” is the set of all things that are three).
Instead of a number being defines by an essence or eidos of that number (this is to say by the
archetype of an ideal version of that number or by some divine/otherworldly presence of that number) the
number is defined by its external existence as a common thread of finite things that are external to human
perception. He then used this conception of numbers and logic could be made universally practical by the
design of an engine of inference that could be applied to all conditions, not only syllogisms or
propositions. He in essence deployed the mechanisms of Algebra and Geometry (variables and
representational proofs) to logic. This required a new system of expression and higher specificity of
definitions of “sets” than had previously existed. His work can be seen as a critical continuation of the
work of Descartes (who united Algebra and Geometry into a singular approach to mathematics, but failed
to do so with any means beyond the numerical) and Leibniz (who generated a system of universal
calculus, but failed to create a system that could be used beyond combinatorial circumstance)” (Priest).
51
“Stress has been laid upon this descent because it affords a good example of the
unaccountability of artistic talent. What a eugenist would have said about breeding a painter from such
stock? But once it was decreed that Joseph should paint, what more could Fate do to ensure that he should
paint in Derby? … There was room for a painter in Derby, and that being so, who should be better fitted
to fill that room that the son and grandson of respected citizen of Derby?” A fascinating remark from
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Kaines-Smith and Bemrose denoting the dubious value placed upon the profession of artist, even in the
eighteenth century (3).
52
Also the teacher of his professional rival Joshua Reynolds (1723-1792).
53
“The sole reason that we can discover for the comparatively obscure position in public
estimation to which Joseph Wright has been relegated is that his work is not known” (Kaines-Smith and
Bemrose, 32).
54
The stance is that his moderate nature was not detrimental per se, but that it largely contributed
to his lack of professional recognition. I argue that is moderation was not between extremes of skill, nor
that his upper-provincial caste impaired him in anyway. Moderation can often indicate a balanced
position between polar extremes. The beauty of his nature was that it was between the growing divide in
the philosophic discourse that was gradually pushing the arts into modes that either fervently favored
romantic expression, or that conversely favored universality of form. Recalling that Wright was painting
just prior to Kant’s publication of the Critiques and that the historical beginnings of formalism had not yet
occurred, Wright’s work offers an emphasis on universality (a theme that dominates his Science
Paintings) that affords a more Cartesian conversation, rather than Kantian.
55
H. Cheney Bemrose and Barker both reference this same portion of this letter.
56
For a more in-depth description of this concept, see Janiak.
57
Many of Descartes physical theories are disputed in Book two, such as Descartes theory of
vortices in which the rotation of planets is due to a spinning liquid inside the planetary core. In terms of
methodology however, the two philosophers differ only in the practical reaches of their natural
philosophies. Both insist upon reproducible means, reason/hypothesis standards, and verifiable
mathematics to secure axiomatic laws.
58
Recall from Chapter 1 that Descartes insists that one qualitatively proceed from that which is
clear and distinct.
59
Kant will famously criticize Burke in the First Critique for the psychologically driven nature of
his taxonomy, "To make psychological observations, as Burke did in his treatise on the beautiful and the
sublime, thus to assemble material for the systematic connection of empirical rules in the future without
aiming to understand them, is probably the sole true duty of empirical psychology, which can hardly even
aspire to rank as a philosophical science” (First Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason). Kant has
declared here that Burke has extended a kind of undue pragmatism towards the beautiful and the sublime,
as there is no attempt to understand the mechanism of these psychological reactions. Simply put, Kant
takes issue with Burke’s rationally unqualified schema of aesthetics, as it does not universally apply and
relies solely on perceived experience. Psychological responses to any aesthetic experience are not firmly
fixed from person to person and therefore cannot be depended upon to issue reliable truths. The irony of
Kant’s own pursuit of these topics towards the end of his life is palpable, however there Kant does
concede the sensus communus indeed provides the kinds of truths when considering judgements of taste.
These truths are far removed from rational scientific knowledge and are largely concerned with morality.
60
The hierarchies in painting are those formalized by the European academies in the late 17th
century, in particular the French Académie de peinture et de sculpture, which held a central role in
Academic art. The fully developed hierarchy from utmost to lowest is as follows: Allegorical, religious,
or historical painting; Portrait painting; Genre painting; Landscapes; Animal paintings; and finally, Still
life. The hierarchy was based on a distinction between art that made an intellectual effort to "render
visible the universal essence of things" (imitare in Italian) and that which merely consisted of
"mechanical copying of particular appearances. For more on this topic see Belton.
61
Full title: An essay on prints: containing remarks upon the principles of picturesque beauty; the
different kinds of prints; and the characters of the most noted masters.
62
A force that eventually begat such trekking clubs as the Sierra Club and photojournalistic
traditions such as that found in National Geographic Magazine.
63
See Egerton.
64
Egerton states that the piece was exhibited at the Society of Artists (London and Liverpool) in
1769, and was offered, but never purchased by, several years later to the Empress of Russia.
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65

Egerton indicates that the scallop shells pinned to the hats of the boys indicates a pilgrimage:
“The scallop shells in their hats indicate that they are pilgrims, come to see a ‘holy one’” (92).
66
This claim is based on portraiture of these figures by Wright and other artists.
67
This is not to say that Descartes disapproved of women participating in natural philosophy. He
himself held a professional epistolary relationship with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia, discussing
mathematics and physics. But women participating in scientific or philosophical discourse was certainly
not the norm of his time, and thus would not have figured into his paradigm of the proper setting for
science.
68
There is an in-depth description of the cost of Ferguson’s (and others’) lectures as well as notes
on the make-up of their attendees (Elliot 43-45).
69
The absolutism of reality is Blumenberg’s conception of the terror of existence. Nichol’s
crystallizes this concept: “The ‘absolutism of reality’ is described by Blumenberg as a “limit concept”
(Grenzbegriff) that is based upon the “common core of all currently respected theories on the subject of
anthropogenesis.” This notion of a “limit concept,” or Grenzbegriff, seems to have been derived from
Blumenberg’s earlier description of the life-world as a Grenzvorstellung or “limit representation” that is
bound up with the revised phenomenological reduction of Husserl’s Krisis-Schrift. Husserl, according to
Blumenberg, saw the life-world as not an object of science but as a “limit representation,” as the
“construction of an ahistorical beginning of history, of an atheoretical prehistory.” The philosopher, in
exposing the life-world to conscious analysis, is always already outside of the life-world. The life-world
is thus posited as a “limit representation” that embodies what is irretrievable to thought precisely because,
in being self-evident, it is also by and large unconscious. Against this background, the “limit-concept” of
the “absolutism of reality” can be seen to function in a similar way, to the extent that it might emerge not
from the phenomenological, but rather from what might be dubbed the anthropological reduction
(Nichol’s coinage, not Blumenberg’s) (109-110).
70
Concepts such as Genesis and the Fall indicate clear moments of beginning with transparent
causes.
71
Recall that Descartes understood the passions to be caused by the physical movement of
“animal spirits” (small particles) as they stimulate the Pineal gland.
72
“If a man is offered a fact which goes against his instincts, he will scrutinize it closely, and
unless the evidence is overwhelming, he will refuse to believe it. If, on the other hand, he is offered
something which affords a reason for acting in accordance to his instincts, he will accept it even on the
slightest evidence. The origin of myths is explained in this way” (Russell, 97).
73
For more on this theory see Doucet, A., & Mauthner.
74
Plato’s dialogues all reflect the general stance of positivism.
75
For more information on Comte’s positivism, reference Bourdeau.
76
For a more in depth discussion of these five criticisms, see Young.
77
Hein and Kosmeyer define feminine perspective as: "Feminine" is a descriptive identification
that points to the presence of a woman's perspective or of attributes stereotypically ascribed to women”
(5).
78
A recent series of works comparing the philosophical work of Descartes to that Therese of
Avila might provide more food for thought on this matter. See Goldhill.
79
For a more in depth analysis of Foucault’s discussion of Las Meninas see Gugleta.
80
Cervantes chose mental illness/a philosophic education as his hero’s pitfall, de Tormes chose
an impoverished existence and systemic oppression for his.
81
For an introduction into the many means by which science fiction engages with philosophy,
reference Johnson’s lectures.
82
For more on this type of philosophical speculation reference: Borgmann.
83
Most neuroscientists agree the organ’s morphology is unisex, however the neural patterning
and activity is argued by some to be gendered. For a brief introduction see Price.
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